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Chapter One  
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the research topic 
The population of South Africa is approximately 56,52 million people and presently, over 51% 
(28, 9 million) of the population are women.1 Currently, South Africa experiences one of the 
largest Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(HIV/AIDS) epidemics2 in the world. The overall HIV prevalence is estimated at a rate of 
12.6% within the population of South Africa.3 According to a South African statistical release, 
in 2017, the total number of people living with HIV increased to 7,06 million compared to 4,94 
million in 2002.4 Previous surveys on national HIV prevalence in South Africa have shown 
that the HIV epidemic is inordinately dispersed by age, sex, race, area, class and province.5  
HIV affects all race groups but HIV prevalence is highest among black Africans as compared 
to other race groups.6  
Furthermore, substantial differences in HIV prevalence exist between people who are living in 
urban and rural areas.7 People residing in the informal urban areas have a considerably higher 
HIV prevalence rate of 19.9%, compared to the rate of 13.4% in the informal rural areas in 
2012.8 Disparities in HIV prevalence are also evident by province, with KwaZulu-Natal 
continuing to lead South Africa in HIV prevalence with a rate of 20.5% in 2005,9 which 
dramatically increased to 30.1% in 2012.10 The Western Cape has the lowest HIV prevalence 
                                                          
1 Statistics South Africa ‘Statistical release: Mid-year population 2017’, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za 
/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2017. 
2 J Harries et al ‘Policy maker and health care provider perspectives on reproductive decision-making amongst 
HIV-infected individuals in South Africa’ (2007) 7 BMC Public Health 282. 
3 Statistics South Africa ‘Statistical release: Mid-year population 2017’, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/ 
publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2017. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
6 O Shisana et al ‘South African National HIV Prevalence, Incidence and Behaviour Survey 2012’ (2014) 2 
available at http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/ 4565/ SABSSM%20IV%20LEO%20final.pdf accessed 
on 28 March 2016.  
7 Ibid. 
8 So far, this is most important study that has been done on HIV prevalence and it is for this reason that that 
the year 2012 is referred to. Shisana et al ibid.  
9 Ibid. This study looked at the prevalence for a seven-year period between 2005 and 2012, which is why 2005 
is referred to. 
10 South African National AIDS Council ‘HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-2011’, (n.d.) 45, 
available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/ExternalDocument/2007/ 20070604_sa_nsp_final_en.pdf, accessed on 
28 March 2016. 
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at 5.0%.11 A combination of factors characterises the constant growth of the epidemic namely, 
risky sexual behaviours, sexual inequalities, population demographics, social deficiencies, 
migration, high population density, unemployment and unbalanced communities.12  
Globally, over three million women are HIV positive.13 In Sub-Saharan Africa, in 2013, women 
constituted almost 60% of people living with HIV.14 In the year 2011, in this region, about 92% 
of pregnant women were HIV positive.15 In South Africa, in 2017, at least 17% of women in 
their reproductive age, that is, 15-49 years, are living with HIV.16 
1.2 The impact of HIV on women 
Women belong to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups in our society, and during their 
adolescence stage, are deprived of many of the privileges that young men have; namely, 
mobility and autonomy in the sexual reproductive realm.17 Moreover, women of reproductive 
age in South Africa are at great jeopardy of being infected with HIV.18 This is resultant from 
gender-based violence, which makes it difficult for these women to protect themselves against 
sexual abuse and being infected with HIV.19 In addition to the gender-based violence that 
women face, women living with HIV experience particular challenges aligned with their HIV 
status.20 Worldwide, the occurrence of higher HIV infections among women is due to socio-
economic, cultural and physiological reasons.21 Poverty, underdevelopment and the low status 
                                                          
11 Shisana et al ‘South African National HIV Prevalence, Incidence and Behaviour Survey 2012’ (2014) available 
at http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/ 4565/ SABSSM%20IV%20LEO%20final.pdf accessed on 28 
March 2016.  
12 South African National Aids Council ‘South Africa’s National Strategic Plan (NSP) for HIV, TB and STIs: 2017 – 
2022’, (n.d.), available at http://sanac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/NSP_FullDocument_FINAL.pdf, 
accessed on 28 December 2017. 
13 J Martin ’10 things everyone should know about adolescent girls and HIV on World AIDS Day’ Coalition for 
Adolescent Girls available at https://coalitionforadolescentgirls.org/world-aids-day/ accessed on 29 April 2016. 
14 RC Dellar, S Dlamini and Q Abdool Karim (2015) ‘Adolescent girls and young women: populations for HIV 
epidemic control’ (2015) 18(1) Journal of the International AIDS Society 65.  
15 G Ramjee and B Daniels ‘Women and HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2013) 10(30) AIDS Research and Therapy 1. 
16 Statistics South Africa ‘Statistical release: Mid-year population 2017’, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2017. 
17 A Harrison ‘Young people and HIV/AIDS in South Africa: prevalence of infection, risk factors and social 
context’ in S S Abdool Karim and Q Abdool Karim (eds) HIV/AIDS in South Africa 2nd ed (2010) 308. 
18 AS Muula ‘HIV Infection and AIDS among young women in South Africa’ (2008) 49(3) Croat Medical Journal 
423; Harrison ibid; See also D Cooper ‘In pursuit of social development goals and HIV-infected women’s 
reproductive rights – South Africa as a case study’ (2008) 22(75) Agenda 6-7.  
19 Martin ‘10 things everyone should know about adolescent girls and HIV on World AIDS Day’ Coalition for 
Adolescent Girls available at https://coalitionforadolescentgirls.org/world-aids-day/ accessed on 29 April 2016.  
20 Southern Africa Litigation Centre ‘Dismantling the Gender Gap: Litigating Cases Involving Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights’ (2013) available at https://southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Dismantling-the-Gender-Gap_FINAL.pdf accessed on 15 March 2016. 
21 A Ramkissoon et al ‘Options for HIV-positive women’ (2006) 1 South African Health Review 316. 
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of women in our society are also core features of the epidemic in South Africa.22 A lack of 
knowledge of how to protect oneself from infection is one of the contributing factors to the 
high rate of HIV prevalence among these women in developing countries.23 The Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has found that in the sub-Saharan region, only 
26% of adolescent girls have any actual knowledge about HIV transmission.24 Harrison 
contends that in South Africa, gender roles and customary practices are also causes of the 
prominent gap between HIV awareness and social practices that influence young women’s 
incongruent risk of HIV.25  
According to Essack and Strode,26 the high HIV prevalence rates among women of 
reproductive age have implications for the public healthcare system.27 Most women only come 
to know of their positive HIV status when they visit clinics or hospitals for antenatal check-
ups.28 In terms of the existing studies conducted, most women living with HIV continue to 
have a desire to bear children, despite the knowledge of their HIV positive status.29 HIV can 
be vertically transmitted from mother to child and it may adversely affect the fertility of HIV 
positive women.30  
Globally, since the late 1990s, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of 
HIV has been an imperative.31 PMTCT, also known as the vertical transmission of HIV, refers 
to the transmission of the virus from the infected mother to a child during pregnancy, labour 
                                                          
22 ‘South Africa’s National Strategic Plan (NSP) for HIV, TB and STIs: 2017 – 2022’ (n.d.), available at 
http://sanac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/NSP_FullDocument_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 28 March 2016, 
20. 
23 Ramkissoon et al ‘Options for HIV-positive women’ (2006) 1 South African Health Review 316. 
24 Martin ‘10 things everyone should know about adolescent girls and HIV on World AIDS Day’ Coalition for 
Adolescent Girls available at https://coalitionforadolescentgirls.org/world-aids-day/ accessed on 29 April 2016. 
25 Harrison ‘Young People and HIV/AIDS in South Africa: prevalence of infection, risk factors and social context’ 
in S S Abdool Karim and Q Abdool Karim (eds) HIV/AIDS in South Africa 2nd ed (2010) 308. 
26 Z Essack and A Strode ‘“I feel like half a woman all the time”: The impacts of coerced and forced 
sterilisations of HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26(2) Agenda 24. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Harries et al ‘Policy maker and health care provider perspectives on reproductive decision-making amongst 
HIV-infected individuals in South Africa’ (2007) 7 BMC Public Health 2. 
30 Essack and Strode ‘“I feel like half a woman all the time”: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations of 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26(2) Agenda 25. 
31 S Crede et al ‘Factors impacting knowledge and use of long acting and permanent contraceptive methods by 
postpartum HIV positive and negative women in Cape Town, South Africa: a cross-sectional study’ (2012) 12 
(197) BMC Public Health 198.  
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and delivery or breastfeeding. Approximately 600 000 children are infected with HIV each 
year.32  
HIV positive women have to find the best ways in which to have children and reduce the 
transmission of the virus to their unborn babies during pregnancy.33 Through PMTCT and 
antiretroviral therapy programmes, the chance of HIV positive women transmitting the virus is 
negligible, and women living with HIV can live long productive lives.34 The PMTCT was 
presented as a solution to limit mother to child transmission and is still implemented in many 
countries in Africa. However, these countries still face difficulties in making the programme 
more accessible.35  
1.3 Description of the problem 
Over the years, the HIV epidemic has continued to be both a health catastrophe and a source 
of human rights violations in South Africa and around the world.36 People living with HIV 
(PLWHIV) experience various multifaceted challenges associated with stigma and 
discrimination.37 These include discrimination in the employment sector38 and the life 
insurance industry.39 More recently, another form of discrimination whereby women living 
with HIV are being sterilised either forcibly or coercively, has made its presence felt.40 
Healthcare personnel have been defending this practice, claiming it to be necessary for the sake 
of public health.41 Public health interests must conform with human rights, so that fewer people 
will be infected with HIV, and those already infected, and their families, will be better able to 
                                                          
32 FAU Mamad Forced Sterilisation of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Mauritius, 2009) 5. 
33 Southern Africa Litigation Centre Dismantling the Gender Gap: Litigating Cases Involving Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights (2013) available at http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Dismantling-the-Gender-Gap_FINAL.pdf accessed on 15 March 2016. 
34 Essack and Strode ‘“I feel like half a woman all the time”: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations of 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26(2) Agenda 26.  
35 Mamad Forced Sterilisation of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Mauritius, 2009) 6. 
36 BG Maughan-Brown ‘Attitudes towards people with HIV/AIDS: Stigma and its determinants amongst young 
adults in Cape Town, South Africa’ (2006) 37(2) South African Review of Sociology 166. 
37 N Ntlama ‘The challenge for democracy: Doing justice for persons living with HIV/AIDS’ (2004) 76, available 
at http://english.aifo.it/learning_materials/african_dreams_2004_essays.pdf, accessed on 10 January 2018. 
38 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC). 
39 Ntlama ‘The challenge for democracy: Doing justice for persons living with HIV/AIDS’ (2004) 76 available at 
http://english.aifo.it/learning_materials/african_dreams_2004_essays.pdf, accessed on 10 January 2018. 
40 P Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 2. 
41 Ibid. 
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cope with HIV/AIDS when human rights are realised and protected, rather than when 
violated.42 
With the help of various organisations, women who have been victims of forced and coerced 
sterilisation have taken the litigation route for the courts to pronounce on the violation of their 
human rights though such sterilisation.43 This has taken place in countries such as Slovakia,44 
Hungary,45 Peru,46 Chile,47 Kenya,48 South Africa49 and Namibia.50 Some of the cases are still 
underway in the courts,51 some have been finalised,52 and infringements of women’s rights 
have been found by the courts in two jurisdictions.53 However, the courts have failed to find 
that forced and coerced sterilisation practices violate the women’s equality right and the right 
to be free from discrimination.54 
The decision of LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia,55 is the landmark 
case that deals with the forced sterilisation of women living with HIV in the sub-Saharan 
region. In this case, three Namibian women who were subjected to bilateral tubal ligation 
(BTL) without their informed consent in two public hospitals during the period of 2005 and 
2007, claimed damages based on the alleged unlawful conduct.56 The women also claimed that 
the sterilisations performed, formed part of an unlawful discriminatory practice against them 
on the basis of their HIV status and was in violation of their human rights as enshrined in the 
                                                          
42 UNAIDS HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guideline: Third International Consultation on HIV/AIDS 
and Human Rights (2003) available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub02/jc905-guideline6_en.pdf, 
accessed on 10 January 2018.  
43  Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 2. 
44 VC v Slovakia (application no. 18968/07) 8 November 2011; NB v Slovakia (Application no. 29518/10) 12 
June 2012 and IG and Others v Slovakia (Application no. 15966/04) 13 November 2012. 
45 AS v Hungary Communication No. 4/2004. 
46 See Chavez v Peru Report No. 66/00. 
47 FS v Chile Report No. 52/14. 
48 SWK and Others v Médecins Sans Frontières and Others Petition 605 of 2014 (High Court of Kenya, Nairobi) 
and LAW and Others v Marura Maternity Nursing Home and Others Petition 606 of 2014 (High Court of Kenya, 
Nairobi). 
49 Isaac v Pandie 2004 (4) SA 31 (T) and Sithole v MEC for Health and Social Development and Others 
(unreported case no. 1944/2012 Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg). 
50 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012). 
51 SWK and Others v Médecins Sans Frontières and Others Petition 605 of 2014 (High Court of Kenya, Nairobi) 
and LAW and Others v Marura Maternity Nursing Home and Others Petition 606 of 2014 (High Court of Kenya, 
Nairobi). 
52 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012). 
53 Slovakia (European Court of Human Rights) and Namibia (Supreme Court of Appeal). 
54 Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 2. 
55 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012). 
56 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) para 1. 
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Republic of Namibia Constitution57 and in terms of common law.58 The High Court found that 
the burden was on the State to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the plaintiffs gave 
informed consent for the sterilisations, which the State failed to do, and therefore, the claim 
succeeded.59   
 
In respect to the claim of discrimination, the court found that the plaintiffs had an onus to prove 
on a balance of probabilities that they were unlawfully discriminated against, based on their 
HIV positive status.60 The court further found that the plaintiffs failed to produce credible 
evidence to convince the court that the sterilisation procedures had been done on them merely 
because they were living with HIV and, therefore, the claim was dismissed.61 No further 
reasons were given for the dismissal of this claim.62 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Namibia 
upheld the High Court decision and referred the case to the court a quo to determine the 
quantum of damages.63  
 
It is as a result of the above decision that this dissertation seeks to question the evidentiary 
requirements that HIV positive women who have been sterilised either forcibly or coercively 
must prove, in order for the courts to be satisfied, that this practice is a form of discrimination 
against them based on their HIV positive status. The argument is that it is crucial that the courts 
recognise and find that forced and coerced sterilisation of the said group is discrimination. This 
is so because HIV positive women belong to a disadvantaged group and they need their human 
rights to be protected, and redress on the issue. Moreover, finding in their favour will bring 
transformation in our society and change the perceptions of people involved in discriminatory 
behaviours across a broader spectrum.64 This will also help other people as well to realise that 
this is a serious violation of women’s rights that must be addressed and investigated further in 
                                                          
57 Articles 6, 7, 8 and 14 of the Namibian Constitution. 
58 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012) para 6. 
59 Ibid para 71. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid paras 82-83. 
62 C J Badul and A Strode ‘LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan case 
dealing with coerced sterilisations of HIV-positive women-Quo vadis’ 2013 African Human Rights Law Journal 
222. 
63 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) para 112.  
64 Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 8. 
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order to curb the problem. Generally, protecting human rights is vital in order to sustain the 
human dignity of PLWHIV and to keep operative, rights-based responses to HIV/AIDS.65  
 
Even though the majority of the court in the case of VC v Slovakia66 dismissed the claim of the 
violation of article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms regarding discrimination, Judge Mijovic held to the contrary. In doing so, she 
observed that: 
While I have no difficulty in sharing the majority’s view that there have been violations of 
both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, to my regret, my opinion on the Article 14 complaint 
differs significantly from the conclusion reached by the majority. The Chamber decided that 
no separate examination of the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention was called for. 
To me, that complaint was the very essence of this case and should have been dealt with on 
its merits, with a finding of a violation of Article 14…I am compelled to disagree totally 
with the Chamber’s finding and regret that the discrimination to which the applicant was 
clearly subjected is given scant attention in the judgment. Furthermore, ECRI expressed 
particular concern about reports indicating that Roma women had been, on an ongoing basis, 
subjected to sterilisation in some hospitals without their full and informed consent. To my 
mind, the applicant was “marked out” and observed as a patient who had to be sterilised just 
because of her origin, since it was obvious that there were no medically relevant reasons for 
sterilizing her. In my view, that represents the strongest form of discrimination and should 
have led to a finding of a violation of Article 14 in connection with the violations found of 
Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.67  
 
1.3.1 An Overview of the allegations of forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive 
women 
There have been allegations of forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women globally 
and in South Africa.68  The sub-Saharan Africa region is one of the most profoundly affected 
                                                          
65 UNAIDS HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines: Third International Consultation on HIV/AIDS 
and Human Rights (2003) available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub02/jc905-guideline6_en.pdf, 
accessed on 10 January 2018. 
66 VC v Slovakia (application no. 18968/07) 8 November 2011. 
67 Ibid 44-47. 
68 LC McLaughin ‘The price of failure of informed consent law: Coercive sterilisations of HIV-positive women in 
South Africa’ (2014) 32 Law & Inequality 69. 
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regions in the world.69 Studies have been conducted in countries such as South Africa,70 
Namibia,71 Uganda,72 Kenya73 as well as other countries like Chile,74 on the nature of this 
practice. Forced sterilisation is a procedure whereby a person is sterilised without her 
knowledge or informed consent.75 Coerced sterilisation takes place when misinformation, 
intimidation strategies, financial enticements or access to health services or employment are 
used to induce individuals into accepting the procedure.76  
The studies indicate that healthcare workers in healthcare facilities are the perpetrators of this 
HIV-related stigma and discrimination, thus violating the rights of the infected individuals.77 
For example, one HIV positive woman from Uganda who was sterilised in 2007 after becoming 
pregnant, recalls that when she went for a medical check-up: 
“the doctor asked me why I was pregnant. I told him I want to have a third child. The doctor 
said: ‘you people living with HIV at times annoy us because you understand your situations 
but you come to disturb us.’ Then, I said to the doctor I am very sorry, I have a problem and 
cannot go anywhere else. The doctor said that they would begin to decide on our behalf.”78    
                                                          
69 Badul and Strode ‘LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan case 
dealing with coerced sterilisations of HIV-positive women-Quo vadis’ 2013 African Human Rights Law Journal 
223. 
70 A Strode, S Mthembu & Z Essack ‘“She made up a choice for me”22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of 
involuntary sterilisation in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20(39) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 and 
Essack and Strode ‘“I feel like half a woman all the time”: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations of 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26(2) Agenda 24-34.  
71 International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS ‘The forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women in Namibia’ (2009) available at http://www.icw.org/files/ 
The%20forced%20and%20coerced%20sterilisation%20of%20HIV%20positive%20women%20in%20Namibia%2
009.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
72 International Community of Women Living with HIV ‘Eastern Africa, violation of sexual and reproductive 
health rights of women living with HIV in clinical and community settings in Uganda’ (2015) available at 
http://www.icwea.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2015/11/ICWEA-Sexual-Reproductive-Health-Rights-
Report-Uganda.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
73 F Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) available at http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Report-on-Robbed-Of-Choice-Forced-
and-Coerced-Sterilisation-Experiences-of-Women-Living-with-HIV-in-Kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
74 Center for Reproductive Rights ‘Dignity denied: Violations of the rights of HIV-positive women in Chilean 
health facilities’ (2010) available at: https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/ 
files/documents/chilereport_FINAL_singlepages.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
75 T Kendall and C Albert ‘Experiences of coercion to sterilize and forced sterilisation among women living with 
HIV in Latin America’ (2015) 18 Journal of the International AIDS Society 1. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 2. 
78 International Community of Women Living with HIV ‘Eastern Africa, violation of sexual and reproductive 
health rights of women living with HIV in clinical and community settings in Uganda’ (2015) 36, available at 
http://www.icwea.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2015/11/ICWEA-Sexual-Reproductive-Health-Rights-
Report-Uganda.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
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In one of the Kenyan healthcare facilities, an HIV positive woman was sterilised as the hospital 
claimed that they had permission from her husband to sterilise her and she recalls the doctor 
telling her that: 
“You people with the virus just disturb people. You will give birth to children and the way 
you have the virus, where will you take your children?”79 
 It is contended that forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women is gender related 
and a form of discrimination because of their HIV status.80  The mere fact that there are only 
reports of coerced and/or forced sterilisation of HIV positive women (as opposed to men) 
suggests that these women face stigma and discrimination relating to their sex and gender, as 
no man living with HIV has been reported to have been sterilised.81 Studies have shown that 
there is a presence of negative attitudes by healthcare workers, and discriminatory remarks 
discourage women from accessing healthcare facilities.82   Some women felt as if the doctors 
were doing them a favour, and agreed to sterilisation out of fear and did not want to disappoint 
the doctor:83 
“the doctor was willing to help me, but he can only help me if I sign to sterilisation because 
he didn’t wish to see me in the hospital a year later with another request for abortion. I was 
sort of desperate, and I signed…to some degree I also felt that if I don’t sign I’d be 
disappointing this doctor, who has agreed to help me because others have refused” 
(Participant 15).84 
The forms of stigma and discrimination towards PLWHIV are generally seen as obstacles in 
the delivery of adequate healthcare, insufficient psychological and social support, and lack of 
proper medical treatment in South Africa.85  The study findings of the Stigma Index reveal that 
21% of the participants have experienced discrimination, 21% have been gossiped about, 15% 
                                                          
79 Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) 10, available at https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/kihara/files/report-on-robbed-of-choice-forced-and-coerced-
sterilisation-experiences-of-women-living-with-hiv-in-kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
80 Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 7. 
81 Ibid. 
82 S Gruskin, L Ferguson & J O’Malley ‘Ensuring sexual and reproductive health for people living with HIV: An 
overview of key human rights, policy and health systems issues’ (2007) 15(29) Reproductive Health Matters 6. 
83 Strode, Mthembu & Essack. ‘“She made up a choice for me”22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of 
involuntary sterilisation in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20(39) Reproductive Health Matters 65. 
84 Ibid. 
85 South Africa National AIDS Council ‘The people living with HIV Stigma Index: South Africa 2014 summary 
report’ (2015) available at  http://www.stigmaindex.org/sites/default/files/reports/Summary-Booklet-on-
Stigma-Index-Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf, accessed on 24 February 2016.   
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verbally insulted and harassed, 10% excluded from social gatherings, 9% excluded from family 
activities and 8% have been physically harassed and/or threatened.86 When the participants 
were asked to state the reasons for the overall HIV-related stigma and/or discrimination in the 
past year, 26% pointed out that it was their belief that people had no understanding of HIV 
transmission and were scared, while 18% specified that people were afraid of being infected 
with the virus.87 
In the studies that were conducted in South Africa,88 Kenya89 and Namibia,90 participants 
reported that medical personnel sterilised them because of their HIV status and they were told 
that infected women must not have children. The following are examples from studies of the 
women’s experiences: 
“They just said a person with this disease is not allowed to have more children” (Participant 
1).91 
“They only told me that they will sterilize me because I was HIV-positive and I was never 
supposed to get another child” (Participant 19).92 
“The nurse came and picked my card and said ‘I can see in your file that you are HIV 
positive. You must have tubal ligation since HIV positive women are not supposed to give 
birth’” (Maureen).93  
“He (the doctor) said there was no need for me to continue having children since I was HIV 
positive” (Rebecca).94 
                                                          
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Strode, Mthembu & Essack. ‘“She made up a choice for me”22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of 
involuntary sterilisation in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20(39) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
89 Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) available at https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/kihara/files/report-on-robbed-of-choice-forced-and-coerced-
sterilisation-experiences-of-women-living-with-hiv-in-kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016 
90 International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS ‘The forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women in Namibia’ (2009) available at http://www.icw.org/files/ 
The%20forced%20and%20coerced%20sterilisation%20of%20HIV%20positive%20women%20in%20Namibia%2
009.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
91 Strode, Mthembu & Essack ‘“She made up a choice for me”22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of 
involuntary sterilisation in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20(39) Reproductive Health Matters 3. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) 6, available at https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/kihara/files/report-on-robbed-of-choice-forced-and-coerced-
sterilisation-experiences-of-women-living-with-hiv-in-kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
94 Ibid 16. 
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“I asked the nurse why they were discriminating against me because of my HIV status, and 
she said ‘it is illegal for HIV positive women to have children” (Nekesa).95 
“When I was groaning in pain, the doctor looked at my file and said to me, ‘woman you are 
still giving birth and you are HIV positive’?.”96 
“The hospital staff said to us you are not supposed to have more kids because there is no-
one supporting you. You cannot support yourself or your kids so it is best if you are 
sterilised” (Namibian woman living with HIV, 2008).97 
Some women reported that the healthcare workers presented the sterilisation procedure as an 
implied or expressed condition for obtaining medical assistance and benefits, including 
receiving milk for the prevention of vertical HIV transmission, caesarean section delivery and 
abortion.98 The following are narratives by the women: 
“I decided to consent for tubal ligation so that I could receive help for medicine and milk” 
(Aida)99 
“The nurse was very clear and told me that if sterilisation is not done then the baby would 
not get milk from the clinic. No tubal ligation, no milk.” (Nelly)100 
“I was admitted for a pregnancy and the doctor came to tell me I am HIV positive and I was 
confused and I took the poison (overdose. They say when we do this abortion we will also 
do BTL (bilateral tubal ligation). I say no I don’t want. If you don’t want it we cannot do 
abortion, I am stuck. Later, I agree to sign the form for operation – not my will.” (Namibian 
woman living with HIV, 2008).101   
                                                          
95 Ibid 25. 
96 Ibid 2. 
97 International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS ‘The forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women in Namibia’ (2009), available at http://www.icw.org/files/ 
The%20forced%20and%20coerced%20sterilisation%20of%20HIV%20positive%20women%20in%20Namibia%2
009.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
98 Kendall and Albert ‘Experiences of coercion to sterilize and forced sterilisation among women living with HIV 
in Latin America’ (2015) 18 Journal of the International AIDS Society 4. 
99 Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) 22, available at https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/kihara/files/report-on-robbed-of-choice-forced-and-coerced-
sterilisation-experiences-of-women-living-with-hiv-in-kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
100 Ibid 28. 
101 International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS ‘The forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women in Namibia’ (2009), available at http://www.icw.org/files/ 
The%20forced%20and%20coerced%20sterilisation%20of%20HIV%20positive%20women%20in%20Namibia%2
009.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
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Another woman from Kenya said the doctor made her sign the consent form while in labour 
and recalled that: 
“when they insisted on tubal ligation, I signed the documents so that they could attend to me 
and relieve me of the pain I was going through. I was not able to reach my husband as he 
had no phone”.102   
1.3.2 LM and Others v The Government of Namibia103  
i)  Facts 
The three plaintiffs instituted actions against the Namibian Government for damages 
alleging unlawful sterilisation performed on them by medical personnel without their 
informed consent.104 The plaintiffs were all HIV positive women, and it was their 
allegation that coerced sterilisation was performed on them because of their HIV positive 
status.105 The first plaintiff was LM, who was 26 years old when sterilisation was 
performed on her.106  On 13 June 2005, LM delivered her third child by way of an 
emergency caesarean section at the Oshakati State Hospital.107  She testified that prior to 
the operation, she was told by the nurse that she would be sterilised as all HIV positive 
women undergo the same procedure. While on a stretcher to the theatre, LM was given 
forms by the nurse, which she signed giving consent to the procedures.108  She signed 
one document for the procedures, caesarean section and bilateral tubal ligation but she 
had no idea what these procedures meant.109 LM was in labour and in severe pain when 
she signed for the operation. She did not ask any questions about the procedures as she 
felt compelled to go through with them. Neither did the medical personnel explain to her 
nor did the medical records show the type of information that was given to her before her 
consent was taken.110   
                                                          
102 Kasiva ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilisation experiences of women living with HIV in Kenya’ 
(2012) 2, available at https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/kihara/files/report-on-robbed-of-choice-forced-and-coerced-
sterilisation-experiences-of-women-living-with-hiv-in-kenya.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
103 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012). 
104 Ibid para 1. 
105 Ibid para 2. 
106 Ibid para 33. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. 
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The second plaintiff was MI, who gave birth on 9 December 2007 by caesarean section 
at Katutura State Hospital, Windhoek and was sterilised at the same time.111 MI was 
advised by the doctor that because of her HIV status and having given birth to her second 
child through caesarean section, she will be giving birth by operation.112 She was also 
informed that she will be unable to give birth in future and was sterilised without 
counselling; she was also not given information about her being sterilised.113 Further, MI 
was told that if she did not agree to the sterilisation she would not be assisted with the 
birth of her child.114 She was then given documents to sign, both for the caesarean and 
sterilisation, and she testified that she did not understand what BTL in the second form 
meant and the nurse did not explain it to her.115 MI attested that she was made to believe 
that there was a rule in place, which said that HIV positive women must be sterilised.116  
NH was the third plaintiff. She was unmarried, 46 years old and had seven children.117  
On 13 October 2005, she assented to a caesarean section together with a bilateral tubal 
ligation.118 She signed a standard consent form to a caesarean procedure and a separate 
consent form assenting to the sterilisation.119  NH signed both consent forms while in 
prolonged labour and on a stretcher awaiting to go into theatre.120  NH’s hospital records 
indicated that she was booked for an elective caesarean because of her advanced age, her 
HIV status, the number of preceding deliveries and her long labour.121  The consent form 
comprised of a signed pro forma statement from the surgeon, which confirmed that he 
had clarified the process and its associated repercussions to NH.122 
(ii)  Issues before the court 
Both the High Court and Appeal Court had to determine first, whether the medical 
practitioners in the Government hospitals sterilised the plaintiffs without their informed 
                                                          
111 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia para 40. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid.  
117 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia para 47. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid para 48. 
121 Ibid para 51. 
122 Ibid para 53. 
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consent. Second, whether the plaintiffs’ sterilisations constituted a form of unlawful 
discriminatory practice against the plaintiffs because of their HIV positive status.123 
(iii) The High Court judgment  
The first decision on the matter was made by the Namibian High Court.  The court first 
dealt with the issue of informed consent. In determining whether informed consent was 
obtained from the plaintiffs before the procedures were performed, the court held that 
before assessing that, it had to establish whether adequate information was provided to 
the plaintiffs to enable them to make an informed decision.124  In reaching its decision, 
the court examined the experts’ evidence and the plaintiffs’ testimonies. Then, the court 
held that the Government had failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on them to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that informed consent was given by the plaintiffs.125 
Therefore, the court found in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the first claim. 
In regards to the second claim that the sterilisations of the plaintiffs were as a result of 
unlawful discrimination against them because they were HIV positive, the court found 
that the onus was on the plaintiffs to prove such discrimination on a balance of 
probabilities.126 Accordingly, the claim was dismissed on the grounds that there was ‘no 
credible and substantial evidence’ that sterilisations were performed on the plaintiffs 
simply because they were HIV positive.127  The court did not provide further reasons as 
to the dismissal of the claim. 
(iv) The Supreme Court judgment  
Before examining the evidence led by the parties in the High Court proceedings, the 
Supreme Court recognised the relationship between informed consent and other rights 
enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, including the rights to dignity,128 to physical 
integrity,129 and to found a family.130 The Court then held that, for women, deciding 
                                                          
123 Badul and Strode ‘LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan African 
case dealing with coerced sterilisations of HIV-positive women – Quo vadis’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 220. 
124 LM and others v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (30 July 2012) para 16.   
125 Ibid paras 69, 71 and 77. 
126 Ibid para 82. 
127 Ibid para 83. 
128 Article 8(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
129 Article 8(2)(b) of the Namibian Constitution. 
130 Article 14(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
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whether to get sterilised or not is more of a personal decision than a mere written consent, 
and must be made freely and voluntarily.131 
In relation to the first claim, the Court came to the same conclusion as the High Court 
that the appellants had failed to show on a balance of probabilities that the respondents 
had given informed consent for sterilisations.132  In reaching its decision, the Court relied 
on the absence of the hospital records indicating that medical practitioners had explained 
the nature and risks of the medical procedures before they were performed on the 
respondents. Therefore, no informed consent was obtained and the appeal was 
dismissed.133 
In relation to the claim of discrimination, the Supreme Court concurred with the 
observation made by the court a quo that found that there was no credible evidence 
presented by the women in support of that claim.134  The Court utterly rejected the 
submission made by the respondents that an organised policy was put in place, to sterilise 
women living with HIV who were of childbearing age.135   
1.4 International legal framework 
Generally, at a global level, human rights rules are set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). Most importantly, the UDHR advocates for fundamental principles 
such as non-discriminatory equality136 and access to justice.137 These human rights norms have 
been adopted in international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR);138 the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW);139 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
                                                          
131 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and others [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) para 2. 
132 Ibid para 107. 
133 Ibid para 108. 
134 Ibid para 2. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Articles 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the UDHR. 
137 Article 8 of the UDHR. 
138 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession on 16 December 1966 and came into operation in 23 March 1976. South Africa signed the 
Covenant on 3 October 1994, and ratified on 10 December 1998 and came into force on 10 March 1999. 
139 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women was adopted on 18 December 1979, 
came into operation on 3 September 1981, South Africa signed the Convention on 29 January 1993 and ratified 
it on 15 December 1995. 
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Treatment or Punishment (CAT);140 the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)141 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).142  Like most states in Southern Africa that have dualist 
legal systems, South Africa has ratified the international treaties listed above. These are 
fundamental sources of international law and become binding on the State upon ratification.143  
The South African Constitution, under section 39(1), provides that the courts must take into 
account international law and may take into consideration foreign law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights (BoRs).144 Internationally, women’s reproductive rights and equality rights are 
protected and provided for in terms of CEDAW and ICCPR.145 An active response entails the 
implementation of all human rights, civil and political, economic, social and cultural, and 
fundamental freedoms of every person, consistent with current international human rights 
values.146 
The UN Human Rights Committee which ensures compliance with the ICCPR, has indicated 
that a basic principle relating to the protection of human rights is formed by equality, non-
discriminatory practices and protection of these rights by the law.147 The Committee has stated 
that sterilising women without their consent is a violation of the right to be free from torture 
and other inhumane and degrading treatment.148 In addition, Article 3 of the ICCPR provides 
for state parties to the Covenant to make sure that men and women have equal rights and equal 
                                                          
140 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was 
adopted on 10 December 1984 and came into effect on 26 June 1987; South Africa signed the Convention on 
29 January 1993 and ratified it on 10 December 1998. 
141 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted and 
opened for signature on 21 December 1965 and came into force on 4 January 1969, South Africa signed the 
Convention on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 10 December 1998. 
142 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was adopted on 16 December 1966 
and came into effect on 3 January 1976; South Africa signed the Covenant on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 
12 January 2015. 
143 Southern Africa Litigation Centre Dismantling the gender Gap: Litigating Cases Involving Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights (2013), available at http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/ wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Dismantling-the-Gender-Gap_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 15 March 2016. 
144 Section 39(b) and (c) of the South African Constitution, 1996. 
145 Southern Africa Litigation Centre Dismantling the Gender Gap: Litigating Cases Involving Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights (2013) available at http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-
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enjoyment of all political and civil rights as set out in the Covenant.149 Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR guarantees freedom from discrimination in respect of the listed prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.150 
The Committee on ESCR has found that the right to health comprises of the provision of 
healthcare services to everyone in a non-discriminatory way.151 The International Community 
of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (ICW) has recognised forced and coerced sterilisation of 
women living with HIV as a serious infringement of the fundamental human rights to bodily 
integrity, equality and informed consent.152 This is also a persistent practice of violence against 
women and a measure of a systemic technique of violation of sexual and reproductive rights of 
women living with HIV around the world.153 Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR must be read 
together with Articles 2(1) and 3 of the ICCPR.154 
CEDAW sets out relevant law for the protection of women’s rights and guaranteeing their right 
to equality and non-discrimination.155 A fundamental principle of non-discrimination is found 
in Article 2 of CEDAW.156 Furthermore, Article 12(1) of CEDAW solemnly requested States 
to put mechanisms in place in order to eliminate discrimination against women relating to 
accessing healthcare services, in order to ensure equality between men and women, including 
family planning services.157 Article 16 of CEDAW provides for non-discriminatory healthcare 
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services, reproductive rights, and a right to be educated on such rights.158 In AS v Hungary,159 
the CEDAW filed a complaint in regards to a Roma woman who was sterilised without her 
consent.160  In this case, the Committee found that the Hungarian government had failed to 
protect AS’s reproductive rights and, therefore, they were in violation of CEDAW.161  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has pointed out that 
‘some customs of racial discrimination may be directed towards women precisely because of 
their gender, namely the coerced sterilisation of native women’.162 HIV positive women face 
persistent stigma and discrimination163 that even further restrict their full and equal 
participation in society.164 In the Czech Republic, in 2004, 10 Roma women lodged a complaint 
with the Czech Ombudsman, alleging that they had been involuntarily sterilised.165 Since then, 
the Czech courts have heard of violations of reproductive rights in other similar cases.166 FS v 
Chile167 is a good example of the systemic problem of forced sterilisation of women in Chilean 
healthcare facilities.168 FS was HIV positive and only 20 years old when she was coercively 
sterilised when she went for a caesarean section.169 The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) in this case, found that failure by the State to examine the allegations of FS’s 
sterilisation without her knowledge and consent and hold accountable those who were liable 
for this action, was a lack of urgent attention to real issues that affected its citizens.170 The 
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Commission also recognised that this might constitute a form of discrimination in a broader 
context.171 
There has been some litigation on the issue of coerced sterilisation is some other countries 
based on ethnicity and race. In Chavez v Peru,172 the IACHR established that coerced 
sterilisation of women is an infringement of the right not to be treated in an inhumane way.173 
In IG and Others v Slovakia,174 the court held that sterilisation of women without their 
knowledge or consent is a violation of their right to respect and dignity and constitutes  
treatment in a degrading manner.175 In VC v Slovakia,176 the court had to determine whether 
VC gave her consent to the sterilisation procedure and it found that VC did not give her consent 
voluntarily.177 In NB v Slovakia,178 the IACHR found that forcing the applicant into agreeing 
to sterilisation while in labour was an infringement of her right to physical integrity and 
ingenuous disrespect of her right to dignity.179  
 
1.5 Regional legal framework 
Parties involved in human rights litigation in Africa, in particular relating to sexual 
reproductive rights, can use a number of regional treaties to advance their claims. These treaties 
include the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR or the African Charter), 
which operates as an international human rights tool aimed at protecting and promoting human 
rights and basic freedoms throughout the African continent.180 The African Charter makes 
provision for the establishment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR).181 The African Commission aims to protect and promote human rights and monitors 
member states’ compliance with the African Charter and the Protocol to the African Charter 
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on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol or Protocol 
on Women).182 South Africa is a member state of the African Charter, and ratified it on 9 July 
1996. 
The principle of non-discrimination is fundamental to the provisions in the African Charter. In 
terms of Article 2 of the African Charter, every person shall be eligible to: 
to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter 
without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status”. 
Nonetheless, this article has not specifically provided for protection against discrimination 
based on HIV status.183 
The African Commission has not expressly pronounced whether discrimination based on HIV 
status is included under Article 2 of the African Charter.184 In 2001, the African Commission 
in its Resolution on the HIV/AIDS pandemic, called upon states to give protection to the rights 
of PLWHIV.185 Thereafter, the Commission established a committee to deal with the rights of 
PLWHIV and those affected by it.186 Often, Article 2 is closely interpreted in relation to Article 
3 of the African Charter, which protects the right to equality, and equal treatment of everyone 
in terms of the law.187  
The African Commission, in its 54th Ordinary Session in 2013, in Banjul, the Gambia, raised 
its concern about the number of allegations of forced and coerced sterilisations of women living 
with HIV, in particular in the State Parties to the African Charter.188 It further declared that all 
practices of involuntary sterilisation were in violation of the equality right and right to non-
discrimination and other rights protected by the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol and 
                                                          
182 Southern Africa Litigation Centre Dismantling the Gender Gap: Litigating Cases Involving Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights (2013), available at http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Dismantling-the-Gender-Gap_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 15 March 2016. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women General Comment No. 2 on Article 
14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/general-
comment-two-rights-women/, accessed on 11 January 2018. 
186 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on the HIV/AIDS Pandemic – Threat against 
human rights and humanity’ (2001), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/ 29th/ resolutions/53/, 
accessed on 11 January 2018. 
187 Article 3 of the ACHPR.  
188 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘260: Resolution on Involuntary Sterilisation and the 
Protection of Human Rights in Access to HIV Services’ (2013) 1, available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/ 
54th/resolutions/260/, accessed on 05 May 2016. 
21 
 
other regional and international human rights instruments.189 The ACHPR called upon State 
Parties to introduce instruments to ensure that healthcare workers or medical institutions do not 
subject HIV positive women to pressure, or unjustified inducement or coercion to consent to 
sterilisation or other medical methods.190 Furthermore, the ACHPR urged the State Parties to 
prepare resources and structures, legal assistance, and restitution for HIV positive women, the 
victims of such inhumane practices.191 
Article 14 of the Protocol on Women requires the states to ‘ensure that the right to health of 
women, including sexual and reproductive health of women, is being respected and 
promoted’.192 In terms of this Article, the Protocol on Women has become the only 
international treaty on human rights to provide specific protection for women in relation to 
their HIV/AIDS status.193 Women also have a right to fertility control, deciding on the number 
and spacing of their children, and deciding on a contraceptive method.194 The ICW contends 
that if healthcare workers do not make sure that infected women make their own informed 
decisions, safely, comfortably and in a confidential manner, they are violating these women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights.195 Article 18(3) provides that countries: 
shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the 
protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions.196  
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1.6 South African legal framework 
1.6.1 The final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
In terms of the Constitution,197 the Sterilisation Act,198 the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Act199 and common law,200 a patient must provide informed consent for a medical procedure 
to be performed on her, including sterilisation.201 Forced and coerced sterilisation of women 
living with HIV is a violation of a number of human rights that are enshrined in the Republic 
of South Africa’s Constitution.202 The Constitution is the supreme law of the land203 and many 
people rely on it when they litigate on matters relating to the violation of their human rights.  
The BoRs significantly provides constitutional protections for every person.204 It protects even 
persons with HIV/AIDS.205 These rights include the right to equality,206 human dignity,207 and 
freedom of security.208 Section 12(2)(b) gives every human being a right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, including the right to take decisions relating to their reproductive 
activities and security of and control of their bodies.209 Further, section 9 of the Constitution 
concerns itself with the right to equality and non-discrimination of everyone in the country 
based on the prohibited grounds under this provision.210 Since the adoption of the Constitution, 
the courts have adjudicated matters brought in terms of section 9.211 In doing so, the courts 
have interpreted and applied the equality clause, taking into consideration circumstances of 
each case. In addition, when interpreting this provision, the courts have laid down factors to 
take into account when one is faced with a case where unfair discrimination based on prohibited 
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or analogous grounds is alleged.212 Further discussion on section 9 of the Constitution is in 
Chapter two of this dissertation.  
1.6.2 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
(PEPUDA) 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) provides 
protection to people living with HIV/AIDS.213 The Act’s main objection is to prevent unfair 
discrimination by private individuals or government institutions. Unfair discrimination on any 
one of a list of specific grounds is prohibited in terms of the Act.214 In Hoffmann v South African 
Airways,215 the Court included HIV status as a prohibited ground of discrimination (analogous) 
under s 9(3) of the South African Constitution, notwithstanding it not being specifically 
provided for in the section. PEPUDA also makes provision for the Equality Courts and the 
procedure and remedies that this court may order in the event where a complaint is brought 
before it.216 Chapter three of this dissertation discusses this section in more detail.   
1.6.3 Sterilisation Act, 44 of 1998 
In terms of section 4 of the Sterilisation Act,217 consent must be provided freely and voluntarily 
and may only be given in instances when the person giving the consent has: 
 (a) been given a clear explanation and adequate description of the proposed plan of the 
 procedure; and consequences, risks and the reversible or irreversible nature of the sterilisation 
 procedure;  
 (b) been given advice that the consent may be withdrawn any time before the treatment; and (c) 
 signed the prescribed consent form.218 
1.6.4 The National Health Act 61 of 2003 
According to section 27(2) of the Constitution, the State is required to take reasonable statutory 
and other measures within its available resources in order to achieve the progressive realisation 
of the right of the people of South Africa to have access to healthcare services, including 
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reproductive healthcare,219 thus, the National Health Act (NHA). The NHA also provides for 
and recognises the protection of human rights and promotion of equality in South Africa.220 
The preamble of the Act recognises: 
the socio-economic injustices, imbalances and inequities of health services of the past; the 
need to heal the divisions of the past and to establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights and the need to improve the quality of life of all 
citizens and to free the potential of each person.221  
Further, the Act aims to respect, promote and fulfil the rights of women in South Africa to the 
progressive realisation of their constitutional right of access to healthcare services, including 
reproductive healthcare.222 Furthermore, according to section 7 of the Act, unless a patient or 
authorised person has given informed consent, a healthcare worker may not provide services 
to the patient.223 Subsequently, a person providing healthcare services must take all reasonable 
steps to obtain the patient’s informed consent.224 Moreover, any person aggrieved by the 
manner in which he or she was treated at a health institution may lay a complaint in terms of 
the procedure established by the relevant Minister and have the complaint investigated.225  
1.6.5 Policies on HIV/AIDS 
1.6.5.1 South African National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (NSP) 
The NSP provides for the advocacy of zero discrimination associated with HIV.226 One of its 
objectives is to ensure and enable access to a legal framework that protects and promotes 
human rights in order to support the implementation of this policy. The NSP has identified the 
need to continuously assess obstacles to the access of services; experiences of stigma and 
discrimination and provide the framework for addressing such issues by aiming to reduce self-
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reported stigma related to HIV and TB by at least 50%.227 According to Grant and Strode, there 
are laws in place which prohibit unfair discrimination, but these are limited.228 
1.6.5.2 The National Contraception and Fertility Planning Policy and Service Delivery 
Guidelines (NCFPP) 
The NCFPP guidelines have adopted the view that particularly during this HIV era, fertility 
and planning guidelines must be amended to enable the counselling of women of a reproductive 
age on their fertility intentions.229 Everyone should have access to accurate, unbiased 
information about all the available methods in order to make an informed choice.230 Clients 
should be provided with the contraceptive method/s that they request, subject to meeting 
relevant medical eligibility criteria and availability, combined with an assessment of their 
circumstances.231  
With South Africa facing the problem of growing rates of unintended pregnancies by girls of a 
reproductive age and women with HIV, long-acting reversible contraception amongst other 
effective contraceptive methods, which have the intended effect of reducing unwanted 
pregnancies, have been introduced.232 A sterilisation procedure carried out without informed 
consent is unlawful in South Africa and counselling must be provided before and after the 
procedure is performed.233  
1.7 Access to justice in terms of South African law by means of a class action or public 
interest action 
The concept of access to justice has become central in our constitutional dispensation.234 This 
is provided for under section 34 of the Constitution.235 It is trite law that before a person 
approaches the court about a particular matter, he/she must have legal standing to bring such a 
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matter to court. Before the adoption of the Constitution, litigants were required to show 
sufficient interest in the case brought to court.236 This restricted litigants from bringing cases 
in a representative capacity.237 However, with the enactment of the Constitution, the rules of 
standing changed. Before moving on to what the Constitution says about the rules of standing, 
it is imperative to mention that the rules of the High Court allow for joinder, where more than 
one litigant is a party or has interest in the matter.238 According to Rule 10(1) of the Uniform 
High Court Rules: 
any number of persons, each of whom has a claim, whether jointly, jointly and severally, 
separately or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same defendant 
or defendants against whom any one or more of such persons proposing to join as plaintiffs 
would, if he brought a separate action, be entitled to bring such action, provided that the right 
to relief of the persons proposing to join as plaintiffs depends upon the determination of 
substantially the same question of law or fact which, if separate actions were instituted, would 
arise on each action, and provided that there may be a joinder conditionally upon the claim 
of any other plaintiff failing.239 
 According to Rule 10(3), several defendants may be sued in one action, where the issue 
between the applicants and the defendant is dependent on the determination of the same 
question of fact or law.240 
Section 38 of the Constitution provides for the enforcement of the rights clause.241 The 
Constitution expressly provides for class action litigation under section 38(c). There has been 
litigation around this provision where the litigants were seeking suitable relief as a class.242 In 
these cases, the courts have set out the guidelines that can be followed when dealing with class 
actions. The leading case in this regard is Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another.243 
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The case of Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods,244 focused on the requirement 
of the certification of a class action. Although there has not been much literature on class 
actions brought based on HIV status discrimination, the case of N and Others v Government of 
Republic of South Africa and Others (NO 1)245 hinges on this matter. In this case, the applicants 
were fifteen HIV/AIDS positive prisoners (and the Treatment Action Campaign) incarcerated 
at the Westville Correctional Centre who needed antiretroviral (ARV) treatment.246 
They instituted proceedings on their behalf and in the name of other HIV positive prisoners 
who needed ARV treatment as a class action.247 The respondents contested the locus standi of 
the applicants to seek relief on behalf of all prisoners living with HIV at Westville Correctional 
Centre.248 The Court found that the respondents' implementation of the laws and policies 
relating to the provision of adequate medical treatment to HIV/AIDS infected prisoners at 
Westville Correctional Centre was unreasonable in that: 
(a) it was inflexible; 
(b) it was characterised by unjustified and unexplained delays; and  
(c) some of the steps taken by the respondents after the institution of the present proceedings 
were irrational.249   
Section 38(d) of the Constitution permits any person and members of civil society to bring 
matters to court in the public interest.250 For many years, organisations such as Lawyers for 
Human Rights,251 Black Sash,252 Section 27,253 Treatment Action Campaign,254 the Atlantic 
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Philanthropies,255 and University law clinics256 have participated in bringing about social 
change by helping various groups in accessing the courts where their rights have been violated, 
e.g. children, women and PLWHIV.257 For these organisations, when engaging themselves 
with this kind of litigation, it is very important that they design an appropriate strategy in order 
to achieve social change.258 Various strategies are used by these organisations in tackling 
human rights matters, providing access to justice to those who cannot afford litigation on their 
own, and bringing awareness and advocacy. In exploring these strategies, Chapter four of this 
thesis establishes whether these strategies may be useful and applicable when dealing with 
cases of coerced and forced sterilisation of HIV positive women in South African, either 
brought as a class action and/or a public interest action. 
There is an abundance of literature on class actions and public interest litigation. However, 
little if any deal with bringing matters of the sexual reproductive rights of HIV positive women. 
This is what this thesis seeks to achieve. 
1.8 Main questions of the study  
The study aims to address the following questions: 
1.8.1 Is forced and/or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women a form of unfair 
discrimination in terms of both international and South African law? 
1.8.2 What are the evidential requirements for proving unfair discrimination through forced 
and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women by means of a class action and public interest 
litigation in the South African Equality Court? 
1.8.3 What are the lessons that can be learnt from the LM case, international jurisprudence and 
South African judgments on equality matters? 
 
                                                          
255 S Budlender, SCM Gilbert and N Ferreira ‘Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: 
Strategies, tactics and lessons’ (2017), available at https://southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Atlantic-Philanthriopies_Public-interest-litigation-SA-exec-summ.pdf, accessed on 
26 February 2016.   
256 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and 
Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others 2016 (6) SA 
596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 1535 (CC). 
257 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC); [2000] 12 BLLR 1365 (CC). 
258 YS Badwaza Public Interest Litigation as  Practiced by  South  African  Human Rights NGOs: Any Lessons for 
Ethiopia? (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Western Cape, 2005) 19. 
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1.9 Research design and methodology 
The research method adopted in this thesis is desk-top study which provides the analysis and 
development of the literature on the topic that is already in existence. No empirical data is 
required for this research. The data is collected from existing published primary and secondary 
sources in order to provide information on the current law so that the research provides an 
informed analysis and recommendations to fill in the gaps in the current law. The sources that 
primarily constitute this thesis include case law, journal articles, books, internet sources, and 
existing legislation on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, forced and coerced 
sterilisation, HIV/AIDS and international and regional treaties on this topic. These sources are 
easily accessible from the internet and the University Library and databases. 
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Chapter Two 
The right to equality and non-discrimination 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to 1994 and the first democratic election in South Africa, all our constitutional 
dispensations1 were based on inequality and discrimination.2 In 1909, the first Constitution of 
the Union of South Africa was enacted.3 In terms of the South Africa Act, the Union of South 
Africa was made up of the British colonies of Transvaal, Natal, Cape of Good Hope and the 
Orange River Colony.4  The South Africa Act gave all power to whites and effectively 
disenfranchised the non-white majority.5  
The South Africa Act also established parliamentary supremacy, which granted all political 
and economic powers to the white minority and ignored political aspirations of the black 
majority who were subjected to autocratic laws.6 Although it is outside the scope of this chapter 
to discuss all the discriminatory laws that were enacted against non-white people, it is worth 
mentioning a few of the Acts that were the mechanisms to oppress non-white people in South 
                                                          
1 K Govender ‘Equality and social justice: First draft discussion document, Equality- The South African 
perspective’ (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/Library/Guides/Equality/Gov-art4.html accessed on 26 
March 2016.  
2 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 211. 
3 Govender ‘Equality and social justice: First draft discussion document, Equality- The South African 
perspective’ (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/Library/Guides/Equality/Gov-art4.html accessed on 26 
March 2016.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica ‘South Africa Act: South Africa 1909’ Britannica.com, available at 
https://www.britannica.com/event/South-Africa-Act accessed on 28 March 2016. 
6 P De Vos and W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 10. 
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Africa.7 In 1958, the South Africa Amendment Act8 was adopted by Parliament.9 In terms of 
this Act, the judiciary had no powers to pronounce on any Act made by Parliament as invalid, 
unless it was concerning the two official languages at the time (English and Afrikaans).10 
 In 1961, South Africa became a Republic and a new Constitution was passed which recognised 
the system of parliamentary supremacy.11 Thus, this new Constitution was no better than the 
others in that it disregarded the human rights of the affected majority in the Republic.12 In 1983, 
the Republic of South Africa’s Constitution13 came into effect extending the franchise to 
Indians and Coloureds.14 This Constitution provided for a Tricameral Parliament constituting 
of the House of Assembly that represented whites with 178 seats, the House of Delegates, 
which represented Indians with 85 seats, and the House of Representatives that represented 
                                                          
7 The Native Land Act 27 of 1913 (allowed territorial segregation and land dispossession of Africans who could 
only own 7% of the land and the rest was allocated to Europeans, see Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council 1920 AD 530; The Railways and Habours Regulations, Control and Management Act 22 of 
1916, (prevented non-whites from sitting in compartments regarded as first class in a train which were 
reserved for whites only, see Rex v Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 (A) and R v Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484 (A));  the 
Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923 (granted power to local urban authorities to govern and control the 
movement of blacks into the cities and to issue licenses to Africans who wanted to move to an urban area, and 
blacks were restricted from owning freehold properties in these areas, see In re Dube 1979 (3) 820 N 821 (F) 
and Rikhoto v East Rand Administration Board and Another 1983 (4) SA 278 (W)); The Black Administration Act 
38 of 1927 (created separate  administration laws and proclamations which governed black areas, see Western 
Cape Provincial Government and Others In Re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Limited v North West Provincial 
Government and Another 2000 (4) BCLR 347; 2001 (1) SA 500 and Moseneke and Others v Master of the High 
Court 2001 (2) BCLR 103; 2001 (2) SA 18 (6 December 2000)); the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 (it 
was passed to further limit the black franchise. In terms of this Act, Africans who lived in the Cape Province 
were put on the separate electoral roll, which gave them the right to elect three people to represent them in 
the Union House of Assembly and only two representatives in the Cape Provincial Council. They were removed 
from the normal electoral roll); the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 (it removed Coloureds 
from the ordinary voters’ roll and introduced separate representation in Parliament and in the provinces  in 
the Cape and Natal between the whites and non-white population, see Harris and Others v Minister of the 
Interior and Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) and Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 (1) SA 552 (A)); the 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953 (created separate social environments for whites and blacks, 
allocation of services and infrastructure, education, jobs etc); the Bantu Education Act 1953 (further restricted 
the blacks’ educational system and educational facilities were separated and provided for in terms of race); 
the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 (created residential segregation, promoted white privilege and prevented 
interracial contact and blacks could not transact on immovable property).   
8 South Africa Amendment Act 1 of 1958. 
9 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 11. 
10 Ibid 12. 
11 Section 59 of the 1961 Constitution provided that Parliament was supreme and it held sovereign legislative 
authority all over the Republic and Parliament had all the power to pass laws of peace, order and good 
government of the Republic. 
12 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 12. 
13 Republic of South Africa’s Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
14  Govender ‘Equality and social justice: First draft discussion document, Equality- The South African 
perspective’ (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/Library/Guides/Equality/Gov-art4.html accessed on 26 
March 2016. See also, De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 14.  
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Coloureds with 45 seats.15  The black majority was not accommodated and totally excluded 
according to this dispensation, and they had their political aspirations catered for in terms of 
the homelands system which left them struggling for freedom.16 
2.2 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
In November 1993, about twenty-six political formations convened at Kempton Park, near 
Johannesburg after the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations; they 
were tasked with the drafting of the interim Constitution.17 The interim Constitution was 
adopted to bring down the apartheid regime, pending the drafting of the final Constitution by 
the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly.18 The interim Constitution came into 
operation on 2 April 1994 to govern the first democratic elections and created a coalition of 
two major political parties19 to share interim governmental power for a five-year period.20 The 
interim Constitution also contained a Bill of Rights that protected the rights guaranteed by 
international human rights conventions and covenants.21 For the first time in South African 
history, there was some recognition of equality between the racial groups. The preamble of the 
1993 Constitution stated that:  
…there is a need to create a new order in which South Africans will be entitled to a 
common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in 
which there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens 
shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms…in order to 
secure this goal, elected representatives of all the people of South Africa should be 
mandated to adopt a new Constitution in accordance with solemn pact recorded as 
Constitutional Principles.22  
                                                          
15 Govender ibid. See also, De Vos and Freedman ibid. 14-15. 
16 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 15. 
17 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
18 J Dugard ‘International law and the South African Constitution’ (1997) 1 European Journal of International 
Law 78. See also, De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 19-20.  
19 African National Congress and the National Party. 
20 Govender ‘Equality and social justice: First draft discussion document, equality- The South African 
perspective’ (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/Library/Guides/Equality/Gov-art4.html accessed on 26 
March 2016. See also, De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 20. 
21 Dugard ‘International law and the South African Constitution’ (1997) 1 European Journal of International Law 
79. 
22 The preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
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The Constitutional Court has clarified that at the heart of the interim Constitution lay 
commitment to equality.23 Section 8 of the interim Constitution guaranteed the right to equality 
for every person in the Republic of South Africa.24 In Brink v Kitshoff, the first case to deal 
with the equality clause, O’Regan J observed: 
…section 8 is the product of our own particular history…Our history is of particular 
relevance to the concept of equality. The policy of apartheid, in law and in fact, 
systematically discriminated against black people in all aspects of social life. Black 
people were prevented from becoming owners of property or even residing in areas 
classified as 'white', who constituted nearly 90% of the landmass of South Africa; senior 
jobs and access to established schools and universities were denied to them; civic 
amenities, including transport systems, public parks, libraries and many shops were also 
closed to black people. Instead, separate and inferior facilities were provided. The deep 
scars of this appalling programme are still visible in our society. It is in the light of that 
history and the enduring legacy that it bequeathed that the equality clause needs to be 
interpreted. Although our history is one in which the most visible and most vicious pattern 
of discrimination has been racial, other systematic motifs of discrimination were and are 
inscribed on our social fabric. In drafting section 8, the drafters recognised that systematic 
patterns of discrimination on grounds other than race have caused, and may continue to 
cause, considerable harm. Section 8 was adopted then in the recognition that 
discrimination against people who are members of disfavoured groups can lead to 
patterns of group disadvantage and harm.25  
 
 
                                                          
23 Most of the Constitutional Court’s equality cases dealt with section 8 of the interim Constitution: Brink v 
Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC), para 33; Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC), (1997) 
2 BCLR 153 (CC), para 20 and President of Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 708 
(CC), para 74. 
24 Section 8(1) every person shall have a right to equality before the law and to equal protection of law. 
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating 
from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, 
gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture or language. 
(3) (a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and 
advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in 
order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
    (b) ... 
4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be 
presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the 
contrary is established. 
25 Brink v Kitshoff NO (1996) 4 SA 197 (CC) para 40. 
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2.3 The Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The year 1996 saw the completion of South Africa’s constitutional revolution.26 A 
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly (Parliament) adopted the final South African 
Constitution,27 which created a sovereign and democratic country based on certain values such 
as human dignity, equality, non-racialism and non-sexism and constitutional supremacy and 
the rule of law.28 In terms of section 2 of the Constitution, the Constitution is said to be the 
supreme law of the land.29 The Constitution is said to be transformative in nature.30 In addition 
to this, the Constitution was adopted to redress the inequalities in our society created by the ills 
of the past.31 In doing so, the Constitution introduced a Bill of Rights that sets out the range of 
human rights protected under the Constitution to facilitate social and economic transformation, 
while at the same time protecting the human dignity of all persons.32  Furthermore, the 
Constitution kept its commitment to the advancement of equality and equality for everyone, 
hence, the first substantive right in the Constitution, is the equality clause (section 9).33   
 
The focus of this chapter is the right to equality and non-discrimination. It will discuss equality 
in terms of international, regional and national law. It will also look at the interpretation of the 
equality clause in terms of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. In summary, it will 
comment on the extent to which the right to equality can assist PLWHIV, specifically women 
who have been discriminated against based on their HIV status, which led to their forced and 
coerced sterilisation.  
 
2.4 Defining the right to equality 
In the South African legal system, equality is a central and comprehensive concept, both as a 
constitutional value and as a fundamental human right.34 The concept of equality being a 
constitutional value realises the purpose and focus of the Constitution of a democratic and a 
                                                          
26 Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 6. 
27 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
28 See section 1 of the Republic of South African Constitution, 1996. 
29 Section 2 of the Republic of South African Constitution, 1996. 
30 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 36. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 319. 
33 This is what the chapter will focus on. 
34 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 249. See, S Jagwanth ‘Expanding equality’ 2005 Acta 
Juridica 131. 
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transformative country.35 The concept of equality being regarded as a fundamental human right 
is considered as a tool for the achievement of substantive equality, which equality as a 
foundational value in the Constitution seeks to achieve for every person in South Africa.36 The 
purpose of the equality right is to remedy the political and legal disadvantages created by the 
previous tyrannical and undemocratic government in our society.37 Equality has been proven 
to be one of the most evasive and controversial concepts in the legal arena.38  Over centuries, 
lawyers, philosophers and other writers have debated extensively with the aim of providing a 
proper definition of equality and what it ought to entail.39 To date, no consensus has been 
reached on the clear and precise meaning of equality.40 The notion of equality can be traced 
back to the times of Aristotle.41 Aristotle’s philosophy was simply that ‘likes must be treated 
alike and unlikes should be treated differently in proportion to their inequality.’42 For the 
purposes of this thesis, the focus is on two kinds of equality, namely, formal and substantive 
equality. 
 
2.4.1 Formal equality 
Generally, a difference is drawn between formal and substantive equality.43 Formal equality is 
sameness of treatment.44 Formal equality requires equal treatment despite differing positions 
and status of people.45 This means that everyone must be treated in a similar manner before the 
law.46 In other words, people must not be treated differently for arbitrary reasons, for example, 
                                                          
35 Albertyn and Goldblatt ibid.  
36 Albertyn and Goldblatt ibid. See, The President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), 
para 74.  
37 Albertyn and Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality (1998) 14 SAJHR 253. See, Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia 
[1989] 1 S.C.R 143 at 30 and National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC), paras 60-61. 
38 T Loenen ‘The equality clause in the South African Constitution: Some remarks from a comparative 
perspective’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 402. 
39 LWH Ackermann ‘Equality and non-discrimination: Some analytical thoughts’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 600-1. A Smith 
‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 611. 
40 Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 611. 
Adoption of the UDHR shows some form of consensus between the debaters on the core elements of equality. 
41 Ackermann ‘Equality and non-discrimination: Some analytical thoughts’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 600. This seemingly 
simple formulation of equality encompasses the modern notions of both formal and substantive equality.  
42 Ackermann ibid. 
43 J de Waal ‘Equality and the Constitutional Court’ (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 141. 
44  Ibid. 
45 C Albertyn and & B Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2nd ed (2008) 35-5. 
46 I Currie and J de Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) 347. 
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gender, religion or race.47 According to Devenish, formal equality is based on an acceptance 
that although all factors of inequality are divergent, the only relief is to treat all people the 
same.48 Put differently, formal equality is inexpedient as it could in reality worsen the real 
inequalities that exist as a result of South Africa’s apartheid era, including the injustices and 
constitutional discrimination.49 Currie and de Waal contend that the problem with formal 
equality is that it does not take into consideration the economic and social differences between 
persons and groups.50 It also does not require an assessment of the circumstances of a person 
or group, or the potential biased impact of the law on them.51 It simply requires that the law be 
applied equally without a consideration of context.52  
In the case of HIV positive women, application of formal equality will not make their lives 
easier as it fails to recognise their social or economic status and personal beliefs. Women face 
stigma, discriminatory social norms and stereotypes, particularly in a patriarchal society. As a 
result, formal equality fails to redress gender equality where women’s rights are guaranteed 
and protected. The criticism of this approach is that in this way, formal equality does not 
address the structural inequality in our country.53 In terms of the CEDAW, formal equality 
proclaims that women and men are equal and must be treated the same.54 However, CEDAW 
has moved away from this narrow formal equality approach and elucidated that there is a need 
to address the primary underlying causes of discrimination and inequality against women in 
order to ensure they achieve their equal position in our society.55   
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 611. 
In the landmark case of Brown v Board of Education, the US Supreme Court racial segregation of public schools 
and it found that the separation of educational facilities was inherently unequal and “segregation of white and 
coloured children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the coloured children”. 
48 GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 49.  
49 Ibid. 
50 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 213. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 612. 
53 Ibid. 
54 S Cusack and L Pusey ‘CEDAW and the rights to non-discrimination and equality’ (2013) 14 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 10. 
55 Ibid. 
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2.4.2 Substantive equality 
On the other hand, substantive equality is the current preferred concept of equality.56  In 
Minister of Finance and Others v Van Heerden, the Constitutional Court adopted the notion of 
substantive equality and held that: 
This substantive notion of equality recognizes that besides uneven race, class and gender 
attributes of our society, there are other levels and forms of social differentiation and 
systematic under-privilege, which persist. The Constitution enjoins us to dismantle them 
and to prevent the creation of new patterns of disadvantage. It is, therefore, incumbent on 
courts to scrutinize in each equality claim the situation of the complainants in society; 
their history and vulnerability, the history, nature and purpose of the discriminatory 
practice and whether it ameliorates or adds to group disadvantage in real life context, in 
order to determine its fairness or otherwise in the light of the values of our Constitution. 
In the assessment of fairness otherwise a flexible but ‘situation-sensitive’ approach is 
indispensable because of shifting patterns of hurtful discrimination and stereotypical 
response in our evolving democratic society. The unfair discrimination enquiry requires 
several stages.57     
In determining whether constitutional guarantees of the right to equality are achieved, 
substantive equality takes into consideration the social and economic circumstances of the 
persons or groups.58 As Aristotle stated, it requires those who are unalike to be treated 
according to their unlikeness.59 Substantive equality seeks to uphold the spirit of human dignity 
and avoid capricious treatment of individuals or particular groups.60 In achieving this goal, 
substantive equality accepts and recognises the inequalities created by past discrimination.61 
The important decision of Griggs v Duke Power62 is the landmark US case on addressing the 
limitations of solitary dependence on the principle of equal treatment of all persons.63 In this 
case, the employer had applied a uniform aptitude test to both white and African-American job 
                                                          
56 Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 612. 
57 Minister of Finance and Others v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC); [2004] 12 
BLLR 1181 (CC), para 27. 
58 Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 212. 
59 Ackermann ‘Equality and non-discrimination: Some analytical thoughts’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 600. 
60 Currie and de Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) 349. 
61 Smith (2014) and T Deane believe that this is manifested through legal measures such as affirmative action, 
also known as positive discrimination. T Deane The Constitutional Dimensions of Affirmative Action in SA 
(2012) available at: http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2012/ 
10chapter9.pdf;jsessionid=4EC3A564077EEF81198DD37C46D14568?sequence=8 accessed on 22 June 2016.   
62 Griggs v Duke Power Co. 401 US 424, 91 S Ct 849 (1971) (US Supreme Court). 
63 Ibid. 
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candidates.64 However, since the African-American candidates had received substandard 
education in their segregated schools, the test in place potentially disqualified such candidates 
at a significantly higher rate compared to white candidates.65 The court found that unless the 
requirement was made specifically for the execution of the particular job, equal treatment is 
discriminatory if fewer African-Americans could qualify.66 
According to Freedman, substantive equality has specific objectives that must be met.67 These 
are: 
(i) substantive equality must aim to break the sequence of disadvantage related with out-
groups;68  
(ii) it must seek to promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all persons, thus 
redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of membership of an 
out-group;69 
(iii) it must involve positive affirmation and celebration of identity within our society; and 
(iv) it should enable full participation in society.70  
An explicit commitment to redressing disadvantage, preventing social exclusion and 
facilitating positive participation for all require positive provision.71 Thus, substantive equality 
includes a positive duty on the part of the state.72 Furthermore, CEDAW embraces the concept 
of substantive equality and it requires that Member States take steps to guarantee the full 
advancement and development of women’s rights and ensuring that those women’s rights are 
fully realised.73 It is submitted that application of substantive equality in our of HIV positive 
women will assist in accessibility of justice, better opportunities and treatment of women. This 
is because substantive equality takes into consideration the circumstances, structural 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 S Fredman ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005) 21 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 167: “First, substantive equality should aim to break the cycle of disadvantage 
associated with out groups. Second, it should promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all, thereby 
redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of membership of an out-group. Third, it 
should entail positive affirmation and celebration of identity within community, and, finally, it should facilitate 
full participation in society. An explicit commitment to redressing disadvantage, combating social exclusion 
and facilitating positive participation all require positive provision. Thus substantive equality, however its aims 
are specified, entails a positive duty on the part of the state.” 
68 Fredman ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 167. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid 168. 
73 Article 3 and 24 of CEDAW. 
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constraints, and power inequality that these women find themselves in. Substantive equality 
also strengthens women’s voices and participation in decision making, including sexual 
reproductive related issues. In that way, we will be moving away from historical health 
inequalities and towards radical transformation in recognition of women’s autonomy when it 
comes to sexual reproductive rights.   
 
2.5 Distinction between equality and human dignity principles 
The right to equality is protected both in our Constitution74 and in international conventions 
and covenants. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has been accepted 
globally75 and its principles have become part of states’ national laws.76 Although the UDHR 
does not define the human rights that it refers to, it has become a cornerstone interpretation of 
these rights.77 In terms of the UDHR, all persons are “born free and equal in rights and dignity 
by virtue of being human beings”.78 In this classical formulation in article 1, the UDHR 
provides a model of the value of human dignity in people’s daily lives and a significant 
connection between equality and dignity.79 Furthermore, this bold assertion in the UDHR has 
put equality as a priority concept that has been incorporated into a range of constitutional and 
international instruments.80  
 The recognition of human dignity, equality and freedom in the UDHR is a remedial response 
to the atrocities and crises that were faced by nations during World War II.81 According to 
Freedman and De Vos, the value of dignity is the cornerstone of the Constitution, including the 
                                                          
74 Section 9 of the South African Constitution, 1996. 
75 L Weiwei ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination under International Human Rights Law’ (unpublished research 
notes, Norwegian Center for Human Rights, 2004) 19.   
76 JP Humphrey ‘The implementation of international human rights law’ (1978) 24 New York Law Review 32. 
77 Ibid 33. 
78 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More details on the Declaration will be provided and 
discussed later on in the chapter. 
79 The International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights ‘Non-discrimination in international law: A 
handbook for practitioners’ (2011) 221.  
80 E Grant ‘Dignity and equality’ (2007) 7(2) Human Rights Law Review 300.  
81 LWH Ackermann ‘Equality and the South African Constitution: The role of dignity’ Bram Fischer Memorial 
Lecture, held at Rhodes House, Oxford, 26 May 2000, 539. 
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rights enshrined in it.82 In terms of the Constitution, equality, dignity and freedom are 
concomitantly joined to each other and are a foundation of our new democratic society.83  
 
 
2.6 Discrimination based on HIV status 
From the time of the outbreak of the HIV epidemic during the 1980’s, PLWHIV have been 
subjected to discrimination and stigma in most aspects of their lives.84 As a result, the 
discrimination and stigma they face adversely affects PLWHIV,85 thereby increasing their 
vulnerability.86 The claim that HIV/AIDS falls under one of the most stigmatised diseases of 
all times is no exaggeration.87 Acts of discrimination and stigma are not new to public health 
especially in the South African context,88 however, they have now become a social justice 
issue.89 In 1987, under the apartheid government, the regulations relating to Communicable 
Diseases and the Notification of Notifiable Medical Conditions were passed in terms of the 
Health Act 63 of 1977.90  These regulations imposed hostile measures for people infected with 
HIV/AIDS.91 Annexure 1 of the Regulations mentioned AIDS as a communicable disease but 
                                                          
82 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 418. Section 1(a) of the 
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not HIV.92 Furthermore, in the same year, regulations were enacted in terms of the Admission 
of Persons to the Republic Regulation93 Act 59 of 1972, rendering PLWHIV and AIDS 
‘prohibited persons’.94  
 
South Africa as an underdeveloped country has not enacted specific HIV/AIDS laws.95  
Nonetheless, South Africa has addressed the HIV epidemic issue through other current 
legislation dealing with several forms of discrimination and government policies.96 For 
instance, the Employment Equity Act97 expressly outlaws unfair discrimination based on the 
ground of ‘HIV status’ in the employment sector.98  The Constitutional Court, in the case of 
Hoffmann v South African Airways,99 found that the conduct of the South African Airways 
(SAA) in refusing to employ Hoffmann as a cabin attendant, because of his HIV positive status, 
was an infringement of his right to equality and freedom from discrimination as protected under 
section 9 of the Constitution.100 In arriving to this decision, the court observed as follows:  
The appellant is living with HIV. People who are living with HIV constitute a minority. 
Society has responded to their plight with intense prejudice. They have been subjected to 
systemic disadvantage and discrimination. They have been stigmatised and marginalised. 
As the present case demonstrates, they have been denied employment because of their 
HIV positive status without regard to their ability to perform the duties of the position 
from which they have been excluded. Society’s response to them has forced many of 
them not to reveal their HIV status for fear of prejudice. This in turn has deprived them 
of the help they would otherwise have received. People who are living with HIV/AIDS 
are one of the most vulnerable groups in our society.101 
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2.7 The international legal framework on equality 
The values of equality and non-discrimination have been recognised in Africa and abroad in 
the form of international instruments focusing on human rights.102  The concept of equality is 
the foundation for the enjoyment, realisation, advancement and protection of human rights and 
has its origins in international human rights law.103 The UDHR is referred to as a ‘common 
standard of achievement by all nations’ with one goal of equality and non-discrimination 
principles and enforcement of human rights.104 In the preamble, the UDHR goes further, 
elucidates the value of equality, and reaffirms that all men and women have equal rights.105 
Thus, this has become the standard framework for equality in the sense that all persons must 
be treated equally, regardless of their gender, occupation and position they hold in the 
society.106 
The UDHR states that every human being is entitled to all the rights and freedoms within the 
Declaration ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.107 Article 2 
promotes human rights for every person free of discrimination.108 There has been universal 
agreement that Article 2 is the cornerstone of the Declaration as it prohibits discrimination.109 
The UDHR refers to women’s rights.110 Even so, this universal recognition of non-
discrimination does not explicitly mention HIV/AIDS status, only the term “other status” in 
the article, but as a human rights standard, the clause’s interpretation should include HIV/AIDS 
status.111   
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Article 7 of the Declaration further provides that ‘everyone is equal before the law and entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection under the law: ‘all are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration’.112 This provision protects 
an autonomous, freestanding right to equality with two distinct elements to its content: 
‘equality before the law and equal protection of the law’.113 The enshrinement of an 
autonomous right to equality has a significant value.114 For instance, in some jurisdictions, a 
separate and a distinct non-discrimination right that is not dependent on, and subsidiary to, 
other rights can be relied upon to reinforce equality in socio-economic spheres of life in respect 
of which the state does not recognise relevant rights.115 In this respect, it is permissible to say 
that the UDHR recognises both formal and substantive equality in a sense that while it 
mandates that everyone must be treated the same, it also proclaims the right to equality as a 
value in itself and as an indispensable aspect in achieving a fair and just ideal society.116   
After the UDHR was adopted, two other human right treaties were drafted by the Commission 
on Human Rights (HRC), namely (ICCPR) and (ICESCR).117 These Covenants, together with 
the UDHR, form the International Bill of Human Rights.118 The ICCPR provides that all 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to the equal 
protection of the law.119 This is the primary provision in the Covenant dealing with non-
discrimination.120 Subsequent case law has interpreted the meaning of Article 26.121 In Broeks 
v The Netherlands,122 the HRC took the view that the mere fact that Article 26 of the ICCPR 
requires legislation to be enacted prohibiting discrimination does not mean that it provides for 
an obligation regarding the matter, which may be provided for in the legislation.123  However, 
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the HRC further held that in the event where such legislation is put into place, it must be 
compliant with Article 26.124  
Accordingly, Article 2 of the ICCPR requires each member to respect and make sure that all 
persons within its territory and material to its jurisdiction enjoy the rights realised in the 
Covenant ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.125 These 
grounds of discrimination are the same as the grounds mentioned in the UDHR. The use of 
‘other status’ in Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR presuppose that grounds of discrimination also 
cover additional grounds. In Gueye v France,126 the HRC found that nationality was not 
expressly mentioned in the ICCPR, the ‘or other status’ words prohibited discrimination based 
on the grounds of nationality. 
In terms of Article 3 of the ICCPR, every Member State is obligated to ensure that men and 
women have equal enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Covenant.127 Subsequently, in the 
Mauritius Women case,128 a group of 19 women lodged a complaint with the Human Rights 
Committee, relying on the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.129 In their complaint, they alleged 
that the Mauritius immigration laws (which limited the immunity from deportation to the wives 
of Mauritius citizens only) discriminated against them based on their gender.130 The Committee 
found that the differential treatment was a form of discrimination and was in violation of 
Articles 2(1), 3 and 26 read together with Articles 17(1) and 23(1) of the Covenant.131 When 
looking at the articles from the Covenant, the obvious inference that one can draw is that the 
ICCPR refers to emphasise formal equality.132  
In the ICESCR, there are particular provisions in the Covenant that directly deal with equality 
issues.133 Article 2(2) is regarded as the Covenant’s principal provision that deals with non-
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discrimination and has been construed to be a ‘dependent’ guarantee of non-discrimination in 
respect of the ‘rights enunciated in the present Covenant’.134 The Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) affirms and clarifies that Article 2(2) prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination and requires the State Party to make sure that formal and substantive 
equality is achieved and enjoyed by disadvantaged and marginalised groups.135 
 In terms of the Covenant, the State Party undertakes to guarantee that the rights set out in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.136 The language used in this Article is the same as that used in Articles 2 and 26 of the 
UDHR and ICCPR respectively.137  
Article 12 of the ICESCR declares that everyone has a right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, and this is also linked to the principle of non-
discrimination and equality.138 The case of Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney-General,)139 
demonstrates the importance of substantive equality for disadvantaged groups in accessing 
healthcare services. In this case, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to pronounce on 
sections 3, 5 and 9 of the Hospitals Insurance Act and its Regulations.140 Furthermore, the 
Court found that there was an infringement of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
as the hospitals failed to give medical interpreter services to the deaf.141 It was held that this 
failure was an infringement of the Canadian Charter and the deaf were adversely affected by 
this failure.142  
In 2000, the CESCR issued a General Comment no.14 relating to the right to health.143 This 
innovative document offers respect, protection and fulfilment of the right to health by member 
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states.144 In terms of this comment, accessibility of the health facilities must be a priority and 
be accessible without discrimination to every person, including to those living with HIV/AIDS 
as one of the marginalised and vulnerable groups.145  
The CEDAW guarantees the right to equality and non-discrimination.146 Promotion of equality 
and prevention of discrimination in terms of CEDAW is focused mainly on women.147  These 
rights are the backbone of the Convention.148 According to article 1 of CEDAW, the term 
"discrimination" is the implication of ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 
with an impact of invalidating or impairing the appreciation, enjoyment or exercise by every 
person, equal rights and freedoms’.149 
The Convention goes further than other conventions, covenants and national legislation dealing 
with the concept of discrimination.150 The Convention covers both direct and indirect 
discrimination against women and emphasises the suffering that women went through in the 
past and which they continue to face today.151 Articles 1 to 5 and 24 of the Convention are 
regarded as substantive articles that show the States’ commitment to values of equality and 
non-discrimination.152 
In the international arena, no legally binding document has been enacted to specifically govern 
human rights violations based on HIV/AIDS.153 However, HIV-specific regulation is provided 
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for in the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights.154 The emphasis of the 
Guidelines is that states should put in place laws governing or strengthening discrimination 
free laws, providing for the protection of the marginalised groups such as PLWHIV and 
disabled people.155 The Guidelines also provide for the implementation of speedy and effective 
remedies in the administrative and civil forums catering for discrimination.156 
2.8 The regional legal framework on equality 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)157 promotes and protects human 
rights and freedoms on the African continent.158  The African Charter also protects people 
against unfair discrimination and provides for equality before the law.159 As a result, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights are empowered to deal with the implementation of the provisions set forth in 
the Charter.160 Article 2 of the Charter states that ‘every individual shall be entitled to the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without 
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status’.161 Some of these 
grounds of discrimination are similar to those mentioned in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR. 
In the case of Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania,162 the African 
Commission held that addressing discrimination was very important: 
Article 2 of the Charter lays down a principle that is essential to the spirit of this 
Convention, one of whose goals is the elimination of all forms of discrimination and to 
ensure equality among all human beings. The same objective underpins the Declaration 
of the Rights of People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities 
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adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolutions 47/135 of 18 
December 1992… From the foregoing, it is apparent that international human rights law 
and the community of States accord a certain importance to the eradication of 
discrimination in all its guises.163 
In addition, Article 3 of the Charter states that ‘every person shall be equal before the law and 
shall have equal protection of the law’.164 In terms of Article 18, the State shall guarantee the 
eradication of every form of discrimination against women and ensure the protection of the 
rights of women and children as postulated in international declarations and conventions. 
Article 19 also provides that all persons shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and 
shall have the same rights.165  
The African Commission adopted a resolution on forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
women.166 The resolution condemned all forms of stigma and discrimination in terms of access 
to, and provision of, health services in the context of HIV.167 It also made it clear that all forms 
and practices of involuntary sterilisation violated women’s rights to equality and non-
discrimination, dignity, liberty and security of the person, and freedom from torture, cruel, 
inhumane and degrading treatment, as well as the right to the highest attainable physical and 
mental health as enshrined in terms of regional and international human rights legal 
frameworks.168  
Moreover, the ACHPR has called upon Member States of the African Charter to make sure that 
the existing international medical and ethical principles of free and informed consent regarding 
all medical procedures, including sterilisation, are reflected in national laws and are enforced 
in the provision of healthcare services to HIV positive women.169 Furthermore, the ACHPR 
called upon State Parties to put in place mechanisms to ensure that healthcare providers and/or 
                                                          
163 Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania, Communication no. 210/98. 
164 See also section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
165 Article 19 of the CEDAW. 
166 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on Involuntary Sterilisation and 
Protection of Human Rights in Access to HIV Services’ (2013), adopted at its 54th Ordinary Session held from 
22 October to 5 November 2013, in Banjul, The Gambia. 
167 R Lee ‘African Commission condemns coerced sterilisation of HIV+ women’ OSISA 06 November 2013, 
available at http://www.osisa.org/hiv-and-aids/regional/african-commission-condemns-coerced-sterilisation-
hiv-women, accessed on 15 December 2016.  
168 Ibid.  
169 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on Involuntary Sterilisation and 
Protection of Human Rights in Access to HIV Services’ (2013), adopted at its 54th Ordinary Session held from 
22 October to 5 November 2013, in Banjul, The Gambia. 
49 
 
institutions do not subject HIV positive women to coercion, compression or unjustified 
inducement in order to secure consent for sterilisation or other medical procedures.170  
State Parties must ensure that HIV positive women are provided with all information on 
available HIV and reproductive health services in a language that they understand; ensure 
regular training of medical personnel on the protection of human rights in the perspective of 
healthcare, including the doctrines of informed consent and non-discrimination.171 It has been 
found that healthcare workers’ attitude towards HIV positive women is one of the causes of 
the problem and they are the perpetrators of this HIV-related stigma and discrimination172. 
More importantly, the States must investigate allegations of involuntary sterilisation conducted 
on women living with HIV and practices involving health practitioners, institutions and all 
persons involved in cases of involuntary sterilisations of HIV positive women.173 
In 2008, a group of human rights and equality experts around the world adopted and signed 
The Declaration of Principles on Equality.174 There was consensus on the 27 principles on 
Equality175 after several debates and conferences held in attempts to reaffirm and develop the 
right to equality.176 This was done in order to assist the legislators and judiciary of different 
jurisdictions around the globe in their implementations and interpretations of the promotion of 
equality and prevention of discrimination.177 This Declaration is held to be a proclamation of 
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the universal right to equality.178 These Principles on Equality have been adopted from the UN 
Charter, UDHR and other international and regional covenants and Conventions.179 
2.9 The South African legal framework 
Prior to 1994, no legislation protected the notion of equality in South African law. This has had 
a significant impact which is still felt today. Many argue that in South Africa, current inequality 
and poverty result from colonialism and the apartheid era.180 The apartheid regime promoted 
the socio-economic development of white people at the expense of other races, especially black 
people, as they were almost entirely excluded from the formal economy and discriminated 
against in all aspects of communal life.181 The country’s racial past has played a huge role in 
making certain groups more vulnerable than others.182 This historical context has clearly 
shaped our jurisprudence with the courts holding that these factors must be considered when 
assessing the effect of discrimination on complainants.183 With the new era of democracy and 
constitutional dispensation, the right to equality is now protected in our Constitution.184 
2.9.1 The equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 
The preamble of the Constitution provides that: 
the people of South Africa adopt the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so 
as to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a democratic and 
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bequeathed that the equality clause needs to be interpreted” para 40.  
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open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is 
equally protected by law.185  
Since its earliest judgments, the Constitutional Court has recognised the importance of the 
aspirational equality principles described in the preamble.   
The interim Constitution rejected racial policies, segregation, apartheid and colonialism,186 and 
the final Constitution has gone further by stipulating a provision for enacting legislation and 
policy to address the inequalities created by the apartheid regime.187 It has been argued that our 
Constitution is a transformative Constitution and the value of equality is significant in 
achieving the objective of an equal society.188 The right to equality is specifically catered for 
in section 9 of the Constitution, which consists of five subsections. The first provides for the 
classic formulation of equality, which gives a guarantee of every person being equal before the 
law and having the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.189 The second provision 
includes mechanisms such as legislation and affirmative action to be put in place in order to 
promote equality and redress the inequalities of the past.190  
The third proscribes direct and indirect unfair discrimination by the state based on listed and 
analogous grounds.191 The fourth provides for the extended prohibition of unfair discrimination 
by private persons and calls for an enactment of the national statute to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.192 The last subsection provides for a presumption that discrimination by the 
state or private persons based on listed grounds is unfair unless proven otherwise.193 These 
provisions show the State’s commitment to transforming our country.194  However, unequal 
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treatment may be expected and accepted in the course of the transformation process.195  An 
infringement of the constitutional right to equality is assessed in a three-tier inquiry.   
2.9.2   The stages of inquiry 
In Harksen v Lane NO,196 the Constitutional Court developed a three-stage inquiry for equality. 
This is one of the first cases to deal with the value of equality and the Court articulated the 
instances where treating a person differently could amount to unfair discrimination. As per 
Goldstone J, the test was set out as follows: 
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does 
the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it 
does not, then there is a violation of section 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational 
connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage 
analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”? If it is on a specified 
ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, 
then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the 
ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably serious manner. 
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to “discrimination”, does it amount to “unfair 
discrimination”? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness 
will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by 
                                                          
195 Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC), para 74, “But 
transformation is a process. There are profound difficulties that will be confronted in giving effect to the 
constitutional commitment of achieving equality. We must not underestimate them.  The measures that bring 
about transformation will inevitably affect some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming 
from the previously advantaged communities. It may well be that other considerations may have to yield in 
favour of achieving the goal we fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution.  What is required, though, is that 
the process of transformation must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution.   
196 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). In this case, Jeanette Harksen was married out of community of property and her 
husband’s estate was sequestrated. She challenged the attachment of her property as being part of her 
husband’s estate on the following grounds: firstly, constitutionality of 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
(which she argued that it discriminated against her on the basis of marital status, thereby infringing her right 
to equality); secondly that the attachment also violated her right not to have her property expropriated 
without compensation which provided for in terms section 28(3) of the Constitution. According to the majority 
judgment, section 21 was discriminatory but not unfair.  
53 
 
the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the 
discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then 
there will be no violation of section 8(2). 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made 
as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause (section 33 of the 
interim Constitution).197  
The first stage of the inquiry provides that no question of the infringement of the right to 
equality can be raised if no differentiation has been made.198  Of importance is the 
establishment of whether differentiation of an individual or a group of persons amounts to 
discrimination.199 If the answer is in the affirmative, the next step is to ascertain whether the 
discrimination is based on a prohibited ground or not.200 In terms of section 9(1), identical 
treatment is not a requirement.201 This provision does not distinguish between mere 
differentiation and differentiation, which amounts to unfair discrimination but deals with 
rational differentiation.202 This means that in a democratic state, in regulating the people’s 
interests to some extent, different treatment is inevitable.203 In other words, the state must not 
govern in an arbitrary manner because that would be inconsistent per the rule of law and 
constitutional expectations of a democratic country.204 However, the different treatment must 
not be unfair, must not affect adversely on the people, and should be justified under the 
limitation clause.205 
 At this stage, it is imperative that one draws a distinction between a differentiation that is 
permissible on one hand and a differentiation that is prohibited by the Constitution.206 The 
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former is the one that does not amount to unfair discrimination. Therefore, differentiations are 
permissible if they do not aggregate to unfair discrimination.207 This means that differentiations 
which do not result in unfair discrimination based on listed and/or analogous grounds will not 
be in violation of s9(1) of the Constitution.208 The Constitutional Court referred to this as ‘mere 
differentiation’. In the Prinsloo case, the Court explained: 
It is convenient, for descriptive purposes, to refer to the differentiation presently under 
discussion as “mere differentiation”. In regards to mere differentiation, the constitutional 
state is expected to act in a rational manner. It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner 
or manifest “naked preferences” that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that 
would be inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental premises of the 
constitutional state. The purpose of this aspect of equality is, therefore, to ensure that the 
state is bound to function in a rational manner. This has been said to promote the need for 
governmental action to relate to a defensible vision of the public good, as well as to enhance 
the coherence and integrity of legislation.209  
In essence, in order to constitute a mere differentiation, differentiation must have a rational 
connection to the legitimate governmental objective and if that is not the case, the provision in 
question will be unconstitutional.210 The reason for the differentiation must be provided and 
therefore, a causal nexus between the differentiation and the purpose pursued by the authority 
is required, otherwise, the differentiation will be in violation of 9(1).211 The standard in this 
regard is that of rationality.212 In terms of the ‘rational connection’ test, the court will assess 
the reason that the government provides for any law which differentiates between individuals 
or groups in order to determine whether it has a legitimate purpose.213  
S v Ntuli214 is an example in our law where the court found that there was no rational connection 
to the differentiation and the governmental purpose. In this matter, section 305 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act,215 read in conjunction with section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act,216 
prohibited prisoners without legal representation from making appeals against their sentence 
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or conviction by a magistrate’s court, without a judge first certifying that there were sensible 
grounds for the appeal. The court found that this requirement was an infringement of the right 
to be treated equally before the law. These provisions differentiated between prisoners who 
have legal representation and those who do not. The Court could not find any rational link 
between the differentiations of represented and unrepresented prisoners and the legitimate 
purpose of avoiding hopeless appeals in our courts.  
According to Krüger, in the case where the complainant alleges that he/she has been 
discriminated against, the court needs to identify unfair discrimination without considering the 
rationality test as a threshold inquiry.217 
 In the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,218 Ackermann J 
observed as follows:   
This does not mean, however, that in all cases the rational connection inquiry of stage (a) 
must inevitably precede stage (b). The stage (a) rational connection inquiry would be 
clearly unnecessary in a case in which a court holds that the discrimination is unfair and 
unjustifiable.219 
The second leg of the test requires that the differentiation be based on the listed or unlisted 
grounds of discrimination. The Bill of Rights, in section 9(3) provides the grounds of 
discrimination.220 In terms of this provision, any differentiation founded on one of the grounds 
listed in the section is presumably unfair discrimination.221 This kind of differentiation will 
impose a burden on people who were disadvantaged during apartheid and will impact on their 
human dignity.222 In Harksen v Lane NO,223 Goldstone J explained the basis for having listed 
grounds of discrimination in as follows: 
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What the specified grounds have in common is that they have been used (or misused) in the past 
(both in South Africa and elsewhere) to categorize, marginalize and often oppress persons who 
have had, or who have been associated with, these attributes or characteristics. These grounds have 
the potential, when manipulated, to demean persons in their inherent humanity and dignity. There 
is often a complex relationship between these grounds. In some cases, they relate to immutable 
biological attributes or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans, in some to the 
intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a combination 
of one or more of these features. The temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories 
should be resisted. Section 8(2) seeks to prevent the unequal treatment of people based on such 
criteria which may, amongst other things, result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage 
such as has occurred only too visibly in our history.224 
However, it must be clear that the grounds are not a closed list.225 The other grounds that are 
not specifically stated in the Constitution and the Equality Act are referred to as analogous. 
These include grounds such as citizenship226 and HIV-status,227 and they are also protected in 
terms of section 9 of the Constitution.228  
Section 9(3) must be read in conjunction with section 9(5), which provides for the presumption 
that discrimination on any of the stated grounds will be unfair, unless the contrary is proven.229 
A distinction must be drawn between cases in which differentiation on any of the listed grounds 
is contended, and those in which discrimination on analogous grounds is purported.230 In the 
former, unfairness will be presumed unless the defendant is able to prove fairness.  
It is accepted in South African law that not every differentiation constitutes discrimination and, 
therefore, must be prohibited.231 At this stage, it is of great importance that the author looks at 
what the Court has interpreted discrimination to mean and the link between discrimination and 
the value of equality in our law. The Constitution prohibits direct or indirect discrimination on 
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a horizontal level and mandates for the creation of legislation to combat unfair discrimination 
under section 9(4).232 In the case of Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another,233 the Court 
expressed the view that “‘discrimination’ has incorporated a specific pejorative meaning 
concerning the unequal treatment of persons based on attributes and characteristics ascribing 
to them”.234   
From the description of ‘discrimination’, it is established that it can be direct or indirect.235 
Indirect discrimination will be present when some rule or provision is in place and ex facie 
seems neutral, but when applied it impacts adversely on particular individuals or a group of 
individuals.236 Direct discrimination occurs when one is treated differently or unfavourably 
based on the grounds prohibited by the Constitution.237  
Moreover, the equality clause also differentiates between unfair and fair discrimination. In the 
Harksen case, the court held that primarily, unfair discrimination can be defined as a 
differential treatment of people in a manner that impairs their ultimate dignity as human 
beings.238 Discrimination will be deemed to be fair if it is well founded relating to the purposes 
latent to the value of equality.239 The judgment in the Hugo case is a good example of what 
will constitute fair discrimination.240 In order for discrimination to be unfair, it must be 
ascertained whether the affected person belongs to a group that was disadvantaged in the 
past.241 The court found that fathers who were imprisoned at that time had not been previously 
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disadvantaged. In addition, the question must be asked whether the measure adopted is 
established to achieve a valiant and significant societal goal.242 
 In South African law, the complainant does not have to prove that law or conduct with a 
discriminatory effect was intended to discriminate.243 In other words, intention is not a 
requirement, as it would be in delictual or in criminal matters.244 In Pretoria City Council v 
Walker,245 it was found that the intention requirement would place a burden of proof on the 
complainant, particularly in cases of indirect discrimination.246 The onus of proving that there 
has been an act of unfair discrimination rests with the person alleging the discrimination.247 To 
put it differently, the complainant must prove that prima facie the law or conduct on analogous 
grounds is founded on attributes or characteristics which have the effect of impairing, or the  
prospective to impair, the ultimate dignity of persons as human beings, or they will be adversely 
affected in a relatively solemn manner.248  
However, if the alleged discrimination is founded on a listed ground, the respondent shall prove 
that the discrimination was fair.249 In determining whether the discriminatory conduct has 
impacted unfairly on the complainant, certain factors must be taken into account. These are as 
follows: 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past 
from patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the case under consideration is 
on a specified ground or not; 
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. If its 
purpose is manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the complainants in the 
manner indicated above, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal; and  
(c) the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants 
and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes 
an impairment of a comparably serious nature.250 
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In Harksen’s case, the Court found that it was only rational that the onus must be cast upon the 
solvent spouse.251 
The Constitutional Court has developed extensive jurisprudence on the right to equality whilst 
being assisted by the High Courts.252 In delivering these judgments, it is clear that the 
Constitutional Court has focused on substantive equality ‘incrementally and cautiously’.253 
This means that in each case, the Court must carefully and thoroughly understand the impact a 
discriminatory practice will have on the group of people affected so as to be able to decide 
whether the overall effect in that particular case will advance the objective and the principle of 
equality aimed to be achieved by the Constitution or not.254  
Furthermore, in developing the jurisprudence, the Court has dealt with the equality value as a 
tool in remedying inequalities and disadvantages of South Africa’s past.255 For instance, in 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,256 the Court referred to 
equality as remedial or restitutionary equality.257 In support of this approach, Justice 
Ackermann observed as follows: 
Section 9 of the 1996 Constitution, like its predecessor, clearly contemplates both 
substantive and remedial equality. Substantive equality is envisaged when section 9(2) 
unequivocally asserts that equality includes “the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms.” The State is further obliged “to promote the achievement of such equality” by 
“legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination,” which envisages remedial equality. This 
is not to suggest that principles underlying remedial equality do not operate elsewhere.258 
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2.10 The relationship between the equality clause and the limitation clause 
Section 36 of the BoRs sets out the criteria that need to be followed in justifying the 
differentiation in terms of the ground of discrimination or limitation of the rights enshrined in 
the Constitution. Subsequently, South African Courts apply a two-stage approach when 
adjudicating matters involving the limitation of human rights.259 The first stage is to determine 
whether the right in the BoRs has been violated.260 At this stage, the complainant must prove 
that he/she is protected under the ambit of the right in question.261 Once it has been established 
that the right has been violated, the second stage is invoked. The second stage is the justification 
analysis. This stage relies on the factors stated in section 36(1) to determine whether the 
violation of the right is justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. It has been argued that it is not easy to apply the two-stage analysis on 
the right to equality and limitation of this right upon violation.262 Despite the difficulties, the 
Constitutional Court also takes into account section 36 in cases where the right to equality has 
been violated.263  
2.11 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) 
The Equality Act264 was enacted as required by section 9(4) of the Constitution.265 This is the 
primary legislation which aims to and gives effect to the constitutional equality clause as a 
whole.266 As a very determined piece of legislation, the Equality Act preamble provides the 
aims to be achieved: 
the eradication of social and economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in 
nature, which were generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, and 
which brought pain and suffering to the great majority of our people.267 
This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.   
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2.12 Conclusion 
Universally, it has been accepted that the equality right is the fundamental human right that 
every human being enjoys. Not only it is a right that is extensively protected in terms of South 
African legislation, but, it is also a right that is protected and guarded nationally and 
internationally. Therefore, any violation of the right to equality without justifiable limitation is 
viewed in an extremely serious manner. Accordingly, any violation warrants a full examination 
into the circumstances and prejudices surrounding the violation of any person’s right to 
equality. Of great importance are the underlying reasons and in most cases, stereotypes and 
prejudices that exist in order to perpetuate discrimination against certain individuals and/ 
classes of persons. Furthermore, conducting awareness and educating people about these 
grievous actions will help in order to address the problem. Such incidents must also be 
thoroughly investigated to find any systemic causes for prejudices and reasons for the 
discrimination be provided. People also need to be educated on the legal remedies which exist 
in order for there to be some kind of relief. In addition to being aware, it is extremely important 
to investigate what relief is claimable by women who have been sterilised either coercively or 
forcibly.   
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Chapter Three 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described how the equality clause under section 9 of the Constitution is 
a comprehensive right that affords protection against unfair discrimination.268 It incorporates 
equality for all persons and equal protection under the law for everyone.269 It also prohibits 
unfair discrimination in more or less every sphere of society, as it applies both vertically and 
horizontally.270 The right to equality also embraces freedom for all and aims at trying to achieve 
a transformative and democratic society.271 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act272 (hereafter PEPUDA or Equality Act) was enacted to give effect 
to s 9(4) and item 23(1) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution.273  These sections place an obligation 
on the State to assure that equality legislation was promulgated to give effect to section 9 of 
the Constitution.274 
The Equality Act is one of a range of legislative endeavours to undo the effects of centuries of 
inequalities and injustices, race-based oppression and marginalisation created by social and 
legal segregation in South Africa.275 As a key legislative tool to the advancement of substantive 
equality, PEPUDA provides legal mechanisms to enforce the right to equality by prohibiting 
unfair discrimination and the removal of systemic barriers, which prevent progression towards 
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a more equal society.276 It also describes positive measures to promote equality.  In its preamble 
the Equality Act provides for:  
the eradication of social and economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in nature, 
which were generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, and which brought 
pain and suffering to the great majority of our people.277 
The apartheid regime in South Africa created deep social and economic disparities, which still 
exist today.278 The Equality Act seeks to prohibit unfair treatment of people in every aspect in 
our society.279  In instances where a person who alleges that he/she has been discriminated 
against, they must invoke the provisions of PEPUDA. Wherever there is a challenge regarding 
the constitutional validity of the Constitution, PEPUDA may not be used, the Constitutional 
Court may only be approached in these instances.280  PEPUDA provides a speedy way to 
resolve equality disputes.281 South Africa is also one of the most deeply patriarchal countries 
in which women have been considered an inferior group in society, and this has occurred across 
all races.282 The inequalities in terms of gender are also caused by the high levels of violence 
against women,283 which is a major challenge to the achievement of women's socio-economic 
equality in our society.284 
 Additionally, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is also a barrier that challenges women's socio-
economic equality, not only in South Africa but in other countries as well, both regionally and 
internationally.285  As one of the vulnerable groups in our society, women, especially HIV 
infected women, continue to experience injustices and various forms of oppression, 
stigmatisation and discrimination relating to their HIV status, both in the public and private 
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sectors.286 As discussed in the previous chapters, HIV positive South African women and other 
women from around the world, have been subjected to forced and/or coerced sterilisation in 
healthcare facilities which is a grave violation of their human rights.287 As a result of these 
human rights violations, HIV positive women need legal protection against the unfair 
discriminatory practices that they face. It is for this reason that this chapter aims to explore 
whether women living with HIV who allege that they have been coercively and/or forcibly 
sterilised can use the Equality Act as a means of claiming appropriate relief. In doing so, this 
chapter will also look at the procedure that the complainants need to follow in an Equality 
Court and the remedies that the courts can grant to the successful complainant.   
3.2 Objectives of the Equality Act 
The objectives of the Equality Act are aimed at transformation as it requires the State and others 
not only to end discriminatory practices but also to promote equality.288 It dictates that positive 
action be taken to eradicate unfair practices,289 and remedy past and present practices of 
subsidiary as well as institutionalised unfair discrimination and inequality in our society.290 In 
addition, PEPUDA aims to ensure that South Africa satisfies its international treaty obligations 
imposed by treaties such as CERD, ICCPR, ICSECR and CEDAW.291 Under these treaties, 
South Africa has agreed to certain obligations to determine, administer and apply at the national 
level, internationally accepted rights, freedoms and obligations and responsibilities held by 
these treaties.292 
3.3 Application of the Equality Act 
According to section 5 of the Equality Act, the Act binds the State and all persons.293 The Act 
calls on the State and all persons to actively participate in the promotion of substantive 
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equality.294 A 'person' in terms of the Equality Act encompasses a juristic person, non-juristic 
body, a group or category of persons'.295 According to Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer,296 the 
definition of ‘the State’297 is wider than the one in the Constitution. The definition in the 
Equality Act includes: 
 any department of State or administration in section 5(2) of the Equality Act provides that if 
 any conflict relating to a matter dealt with in the Equality Act arises between the Act and the 
 provisions of any other law, other than the Constitution or an Act of Parliament expressly 
 amending the Equality Act, the former should take precedent.’298  
This means that all disputes regarding unfair discrimination, except those that arise in the 
workplace, fall within the perimeters of PEPUDA.299 In the matters relating to discrimination 
in the workplace, the Employment Equity Act300 and Labour Relations Act301 will be 
applicable.302  Nevertheless, workers not covered by these two statutes in the employment 
sector are protected by the Equality Act.303  
3.4 The Prohibition on Unfair Discrimination in terms of the PEPUDA 
Section 6 of the Equality Act prohibits unfair discrimination by the state or private persons 
against individuals.304 This is a broad and very fundamental prohibition of unfair 
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discrimination.305 The horizontal application306 of section 6 means that unfair discrimination 
by private institutions or actors such as private hospitals is also prohibited.307 
In terms of section 1 of the Equality Act discrimination means: 
any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which directly or 
indirectly; imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or withholds benefits, opportunities 
or advantages from any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.308  
From this definition, three basic elements are clear, namely, (a) ‘an act or omission which may 
either be direct or indirect’; (b) ‘that causes harm by imposing a burden or withholding a 
benefit’; and (c) ‘on a prohibited ground’.309 A positive act means that certain measures are put 
into place in order to respond to the effects of past discrimination, for instance, affirmative 
action.310 An act of omission occurs when one fails to act where there is a duty on them which 
has legal consequences. For example, in the Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney-General)311 
case, it was held that the Medical Services Commission and hospitals failed to provide a sign 
language interpreter where it was necessary for effective communication between disabled 
patients and the healthcare personnel.312 This was found to be an absolute violation of the rights 
of the deaf patients enshrined in section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.313 The failure to provide an interpreter discriminated against them as compared to 
other hearing patients.314  
In the definition of discrimination in the Equality Act, there are different forms of 
discrimination.315 Firstly, there is direct discrimination which occurs when there is a direct 
connection between the prohibited ground and discrimination.316 The Hoffman317 case is a good 
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example of direct discrimination as in that matter, the SAA excluded all HIV positive job 
applicants in terms of its internal recruitment policy.318 The other form of discrimination is 
indirect discrimination which occurs when a seemingly innocent or neutral act or prerequisite 
has a harmful or prejudicial effect on a person or group recognised under the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination section.319 Of importance in this instance, is the impact that the treatment has 
on that person or group. 320 This was evident in the judgement of the MEC for Education: 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay.321 In this matter, a seemingly neutral school policy 
regarding the wearing of jewellery was found to have a disparate impact on Hindu girls who 
have a cultural practice of wearing a nose stud once they reach the age at which culturally they 
are regarded as women.322  
For there to be discrimination, a person must have suffered some form of harm or prejudice.323 
Discrimination in section 1 of PEPUDA is broadly defined and it echoes the definition set out 
by the Constitutional Court in the decision of Harksen.324 Discrimination in terms of this 
section must be disparaging in nature.325 Therefore, differential treatment alone does not 
necessarily amount to discrimination.326 Differential treatment will constitute discrimination 
only when it results in harm or prejudice and is, therefore, unjustifiable.327 The concepts of 
‘discrimination’ and ‘unfair discrimination’ in the Constitution and PEPUDA, in the matters 
relating to constitutional and human rights in South Africa, are problematic.328 
‘Discrimination’ is used in most jurisdictions and then they rely on the courts to interpret and 
                                                          
318 Ibid. 
319 Albertyn, Goldblatt & Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (2001) 34. Liebenberg and O’ Sullivan ‘South Africa’s new equality legislation, a tool for 
advancing women’s socio-economic equality?’  2001 Acta Juridica 90-1. 
320 Liebenberg and O’ Sullivan ibid 91. 
321  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 
2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (5 October 2007). 
322 Ibid paras 73-78. 
323 Albertyn, Goldblatt & Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (2001) 34. 
324 Harksen v Lane NO (1997) 11 BCLR 1489 (CC); Liebenberg and O’ Sullivan ‘South Africa’s new equality 
legislation, a tool for advancing women’s socio-economic equality?’  2001 Acta Juridica 90. 
325 C Cooper and R Lagrange ‘The application of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act and the Employment Equity Act’ (2001) 22 Industrial Law Journal 1536. 
326 Lølandsmo Equality rights and democratic transition study of cases in South Africa’s Equality Courts 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo, 2006) 11. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Gutto Equality and Non-Discrimination in South Africa: The Political Economy of Law and Law Making (2001) 
129. 
68 
 
determine whether the particular act can be dealt with by using the Constitution or the 
legislation.329  
The definition of discrimination must be read together with the definition of ‘prohibited 
ground’ in section 1 of the Equality Act. In this definition, a distinction is made between listed 
and unlisted grounds.330 PEPUDA also provides for the grounds of discrimination and it must 
be noted that it is not a closed list. Section 1(1)(xxiii) states that the ‘prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, include race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth, or any other ground.’331  In Harksen v Lane332, Goldstone J explained the basis for having 
listed grounds of discrimination: 
What the specified grounds have in common is that they have been used (or misused) in the past 
(both in South Africa and elsewhere) to categorize, marginalize and often oppress persons who 
have had, or who have been associated with, these attributes or characteristics. These grounds have 
the potential, when manipulated, to demean persons in their inherent humanity and dignity. There 
is often a complex relationship between these grounds. In some cases, they relate to immutable 
biological attributes or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans, in some to the 
intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a combination 
of one or more of these features. The temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories 
should be resisted. Section 8(2) seeks to prevent the unequal treatment of people based on such 
criteria which may, amongst other things, result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage 
such as has occurred only too visibly in our history.333  
It should be noted that in the Equality Act, HIV status334 together with other grounds such as 
nationality335 and socio-economic status, family status and family responsibility were not 
mentioned as prohibited grounds of discrimination, although initially they were included in the 
Bill.336 Subsequent to the public participation process, the legislature created room for the 
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consideration of inclusion of these grounds in the future.337 PEPUDA made provision for the 
institution of the Equality Review Committee (ERC) which had to investigate and make 
recommendations to the Minister regarding the inclusion of the excluded grounds within one 
year of the ERC coming into operation.338 Regardless of this provision, there were delays on 
the part of the ERC to finalise and submit recommendations made. Thereafter, authors and 
organisations such as the AIDS Law Project made suggestions on several documents,339 but all 
attempts seemed to be in vain. Seventeen years after the enactment of the Equality Act, an 
amendment to section 1 of PEPUDA has been made and HIV/AIDS status is now included in 
the definition of ‘prohibited grounds’.340  
Furthermore, the Equality Act provides for additional criteria that can be used to determine 
whether an unlisted ground is a prohibited ground in terms of section 1(1)(xxiii).341 It states 
that a prohibited ground may also include: 
(b) any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground: 
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a 
serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a listed ground.342 
The inclusion of a notion of systemic disadvantage is very important in order to address 
discrimination against women based on their socially and economically disadvantaged position 
in our society.343  
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3.5 Establishing whether the discrimination is unfair 
The Equality Act,344 in section 14 states that discrimination is only unlawful when it is regarded 
as ‘unfair’.345 Seemingly, there are two significant things to note when dealing with section 14. 
First, determining the effect that the denial of the discriminatory conduct by the respondent 
will have on the complainant.346 Second, whether such denial of discrimination is justified 
under the law.347 This section sets out a test which includes numerous factors that a court must 
take into account when determining whether the respondent has provided sufficient evidence 
to show that the discrimination is fair.348 Section 14(1) of the Equality Act is contextual in 
nature.349 It takes into consideration the history of the person complaining and the position they 
hold in society,350 and the need for measures to remedy and address the impacts of the past and 
systemic unfair discrimination and advancement of human dignity for every person.351 Section 
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14(2)-(3) of PEPUDA sets out the criteria for unfairness and the factors stated in these sections 
include elements that are taken into consideration in determining unfairness.352  
According to Albertyn, Goldblatt & C Roederer, section 14(2)(a) refers to a ‘method of 
adjudication’ in which the effect that the act of discrimination has on people’s lives is 
understood and taken into consideration and systemic discrimination is addressed and catered 
for.353 This takes into account the relevant socio-economic status of individuals and a group of 
persons concerned and the historical background of each case.354 Section 14(2)(b) serves as a 
direction to the court dealing with discrimination matters to look at the factors as set out in 
section 14(3) in determining unfairness.355 Section 14(2)(c) of the Equality Act mandates the 
court to determine ‘whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates 
between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity 
concerned’.356 This provision recognises that some activities my require persons to have 
inherent attributes or characteristics not shared by anyone. For instance, in Hugo’s case,357 the 
majority of the Constitutional Court judges endorsed the decision of the then President Mandela 
in pardoning all imprisoned mothers who had children under the age of 12 years.358 This act 
discriminated against fathers who were also incarcerated who had children of the same age.359 
This differentiation on the basis of gender was judged to be reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances.360 Likewise, the South African Law Reform Commission stated that being HIV 
negative would be an inherent job requirement of nurses required to be surrogate feeders to 
babies.361 
It should be noted that section 14(3)(a)-(c) of PEPUDA does not separate human dignity as a 
fundamental requirement as in the Constitutional Court jurisprudence.362 In deciding whether 
the discrimination is fair or not, the courts have the discretion to take into account all relevant 
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factors listed in section 14 of PEPUDA.363 Each case must be decided according to the 
individual facts and circumstances of that particular case. Section 14(3)(d)-(e) provides for the 
systemic kind of discrimination, whether it is direct or indirect and whether it has an impact 
only on the complainant or a group where the complainant belongs.364 Section 14(3)(f)-(i) of 
PEPUDA deals with the manner in which the court may weigh up the explanations and 
justifications provided by the respondent.365 In this instance, the court will look at the purpose 
of the discriminatory conduct and the connection between such an act or omission and the 
stated purpose of it.366 The court also takes into account the extent to which the respondent has 
sought to address the discrimination in question.367 If the court discovers that the respondent 
took reasonable steps to address discrimination, the court may order that he or she is not 
liable.368 In other words, the respondent is required to have taken positive steps to resolve the 
problem prior to the complaint being laid.369 
The enquiry also requires a determination of whether there is a legitimate purpose behind the 
discriminatory conduct.370 In Harksen’s case,371 the court observed as follows: 
If the discrimination is held to be unfair then the provision in question will be in violation of section 
8(2). One will then proceed upon the final leg of the enquiry as to whether the provision can be 
justified under section 33 of the interim Constitution, the limitations clause. This will involve a 
weighing of the purpose and effect of the provision in question and a determination as to the 
proportionality thereof in relation to the extent of its infringement of equality.372 
Currie and De Waal believe that the combination of these factors is sensible as it avoids gradual 
reasoning.373 They suggest that if the unfairness enquiry were to be separated from the 
limitation clause, it would result in non-systemic reasoning by the courts when applying the 
enquiry.374 Moreover, some of these factors relate closely to the enquiry raised in section 9(2) 
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of the Constitution.375 Although the Constitutional Court has not decided on this extensive 
interpretation, it is presumed that its analysis of cases dealing with sections 9(2)-9(3) and 
section 36 must be taken into consideration when dealing with section 14 of the Equality Act.376   
3.6 Burden of proof 
The term burden of proof, also referred to as onus of proof, can be defined as a duty to persuade 
the court that particular allegations are true upon conclusion of the trial.377 Generally, in civil 
matters, the applicable standard of proof is that cases must be proved on a balance of 
probabilities.378 This means that the party bearing the onus is required to convince the court 
that their case is more probable than that of the other party.379 At the beginning of the case, the 
burden of proof is determined and remains on the same party for the duration of the 
proceedings.380 Typically, in civil cases, the field of substantive law in which the concerned 
parties litigate, determines who bears the onus of proof and what requirements must be fulfilled 
in order to be successful.381 In the event this does not happen, the principle ‘he who alleges 
must prove’ will be applicable.382 According to Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, the burden 
of proof in a case will not automatically be borne by one party alone; however, all parties may 
bear the onus regarding different aspects of the matter.383   
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381 DT Zeffertt and AP Paizes The South Africa Law of Evidence 2nd ed (2009) 45-6. See also Bellengere … et al 
The Law of Evidence in South Africa: Basic Principles (2013) 35-6. 
382 Bellengere … et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa: Basic Principles (2013) 34. See also Pillay v Krishna 
and Another 1946 AD 946 at 952, where Davis AJA observed: “If one person claims something from another in 
a Court of law, then he has to satisfy the Court that he is entitled to it. But there is a second principle which 
must always be read with it: where the person against whom the claim is made is not content with a mere 
denial of that claim, but set up a special defence, then he is regarded quod that defence, as being the claimant: 
for his defence to be upheld he must satisfy the Court that he is entitled to succeed on it … But there is a third 
rule, which Voet states…as follows: ‘He who asserts, proves and not he who denies, since a denial of a fact 
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383 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed (2015) 618. 
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3.7 Evidentiary burden  
It is, therefore, important at this stage to note that a distinction must be drawn between the 
burden of proof and evidentiary burden.384 Evidentiary burden is defined as the duty on one 
party to give enough evidence for the presiding officer to call on the other party to answer.385 
In South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd,386 Corbett 
JA held that an evidentiary burden is a ‘duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence in order to 
combat a prima facie case made by his opponent’.387  
From this definition, four things are clear: first, evidentiary burden is based on substantive law; 
its main objective is to govern the manner in which evidence must be adduced during trials.388 
Second is that the evidentiary burden can rest on either party during the trial.389 Third is that 
the meaning of the term ‘prima facie’ must be borne in mind when dealing with evidentiary 
burden as in most instances, the latter is referred to in the context of the former.390 Lastly, it 
asks the question of who bears the evidentiary burden and when does it shift from one party to 
the other.391 Evidentiary burden moves between the parties subject to the circumstances of each 
case.392 In the event where the plaintiff has given sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie 
case, then the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant and if he/she does nothing at this stage 
to rebut the plaintiff’s version, he/she runs the risk of losing the case.393 
The burden of proof referred to under the Equality Act is different from the one used in disputes 
dealing with section 9 of the Constitution.394  The only instance in which PEPUDA refers to 
the burden of proof is with regard to allegations of unfair discrimination.395 This is set out in 
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section 13 of the Equality Act 396 which states that if the complainant makes a mere prima facie 
case if he/she is ensuing the complaint on the basis of the discrimination on a prohibited 
ground,397 then no further proof of discrimination is required.398 In other words, there is a 
presumption of unfair discrimination that the respondent must rebut;399 the complainant is not 
required to prove a case of discrimination per se.400 This is to say, that the onus of proof then 
shifts to the respondent to show that the discrimination did not occur as per the complainants 
allegations; or the respondent’s conduct is not based one or more of the prohibited grounds.401 
In the case of Thembani v Swanepoel,402 Brooks J agreed with the decision taken in the court a 
quo and found that the shift of the evidential burden to the respondent to disprove evidence by 
the complainant is not offensive to the principles of fairness, equality rights and interests of 
justice in our law.403 
Once discrimination has been proven, the burden is on the respondent to show that it is fair. 
The decision in Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others404 is 
an illustration of this. In this case, a highly qualified white magistrate with 19 years’ experience, 
applied for two advertised positions as a regional court magistrate and was unsuccessful.405 
The complainant alleged that he was unfairly discriminated against due to the selection criteria 
used by the commission which excluded him from being considered for appointment to the 
                                                          
396 (1) If the complainant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination- 
(a) the respondent must prove, on the facts before the court, that the discrimination did not take 
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404 Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others [2006] 8 BLLR 767 (SE). 
405 Ibid para 2. 
76 
 
Port Elizabeth Regional Court.406 This matter was decided according to the provisions of  
PEPUDA, since magistrates are not employees in terms of the Employment Equity Act.407 It 
was the respondent’s argument that the selection criteria was justified by its policy of 
affirmative action.408 The court held that: 
… although affirmative action measures do not necessarily disadvantage any other persons, 
inevitably, some measures will have an effect, such as when a person is preferred over another on 
the basis of race or gender in the appointment to a position for which both had applied. To escape 
constitutional invalidity, such measures must come within the protection afforded affirmative 
action by section 9(2) of the Constitution.409   
Moreover, the Court found that in terms of sections 13 and 1 of the Equality Act, once the 
complainant has proven a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of gender and race 
and the discrimination was deemed to be unfair, the respondent has the onus of proving 
otherwise in the circumstances.410  Furthermore, the court held that the shortlisting criteria 
clearly discriminated against the complainant grounded on race and gender and, therefore, the 
exclusion was irrational.411  The respondents failed to prove that the discrimination was fair 
and the court gave the order that the posts be re-advertised.412 
Complainants may rely on discrimination based on an unlisted ground.413 In such a case, 
discrimination is only unfair if one or more of the criteria set out in the definition of ‘prohibited 
grounds’ is satisfied as discussed in 3.4 above, unless the respondent proves otherwise.414 This 
means that the complainant must prove that the allegations are more likely to be true based on 
all the evidence presented.415 In both instances of discrimination, the Equality Act provides for 
the less strenuous burden of proof for the complainant.416 The mere fact that now the onus 
shifts to the respondent does not qualify the complainant from leading evidence in respect of 
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economic equality?’  2001 Acta Juridica 100. 
77 
 
the enquiry established in section 13 of PEPUDA.417 It is of vital importance that the 
complainant be given an opportunity to lead evidence rebutting evidence presented by the 
respondent. Furthermore, it is recognised that most of the time, important evidence will be held 
by the respondent; therefore, if the complainant were to prove from the outset a comprehensive 
case, this purpose will be defeated at all costs.418   
3.8 Lodging a complaint of discrimination with the Equality Court 
The Equality Act makes provision for and has established Equality Courts as the primary 
enforcement tool within the Act.419 In the case of Woodways CC v Vallie,420 Zondi J found 
that: 
It is clear to me that the Act creates an informal and inexpensive platform for the adjudication of 
unfair discrimination disputes. It marks a shift from the conventional way of litigation, which 
emphasises elegance in the formulation of the pleadings. It creates a space for the victims of unfair 
discrimination to tell their stories so that systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination, which, as 
the preamble states, remain deeply embedded in social structures, may be eradicated. The promise 
of equality and easy access to justice, which the Act seeks to fulfil, would never be realised if 
litigants in unfair discrimination cases were expected to be meticulous in the manner in which they 
plead their causes of action. 
These courts aim to maximise access to justice for people who have been victims of 
discrimination in South Africa.421 Across the country, Equality Courts have been in operation 
since 2003.422 The main purpose behind the introduction of the Equality Courts is to decide on 
matters which relate to violations of the right to equality, unfair discrimination and hate 
speech,423 with the idea of remedying the inequalities created by the apartheid era in our country 
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in terms of gender, race and socio-economic matters.424 The 2016-2017 annual report compiled 
by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, reveals that nationally there 
were 558 matters registered in the Equality Courts in the 2015-2016 reporting period, as 
compared to the 480 registered matters during the 2016-2017 reporting period.425 This means 
that there has been a 14% decrease of matters registered in the financial year 2016/2017.426 
Furthermore, the report shows that during the 2015-2016 period, 38% of unfair discrimination 
matters were reported, whereas 35% were reported in 2016-2017.427 This is followed by hate 
speech complaints at 21.9%, and harassment complaints being at 5%.428 The 38% were ‘not 
indicated’ matters.429 In terms of HIV/AIDS as the grounds of discrimination, the report shows 
an increase of 5.7% in matters reported in the 2016-2017 financial year, as compared to 2.5% 
in the 2015-2016 financial period.430 
By default, all High Courts are designated Equality Courts and are empowered to adjudicate 
on matters relating to equality and unfair discrimination.431  Furthermore, in terms of section 
16 and subject to section 31 of the Equality Act, Magistrates’ Courts will have an Equality 
Court once the Minister has designated such subsequent to consultations with the 
administrative region concerned.432 However, such jurisdiction can only be exercised once 
there is a presiding officer and clerks who have received training, have expertise and 
commitment to the values of equality and human rights433 regarding the operation of the courts 
of this nature.434 Generally, Equality Courts have jurisdiction to hear equality-related matters 
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and they follow the normal rules of jurisdiction435 proclaimed by the Magistrates’ Courts Act436 
and the Superior Courts Act437. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Equality Courts extends to 
complaints made against private and legal persons.438 So far, there are three hundred and eighty 
two (382) designated Equality Courts around South Africa.439  
In section 20, the Equality Act sets out the procedure which a person must follow when 
initiating a complaint in the Equality Court.440 Any person who wishes to initiate a complaint 
shall approach his/her nearest Magistrates’ or High Court sitting as an Equality Court, and ask 
for the Equality Court where he or she will find a clerk of the Equality Court and notify the 
latter of his/her intention to initiate a complaint.441 The clerk of the Equality Court is someone 
who has been appointed under section 17 of the Equality Act.442 The clerk will then give the 
complainant Form 2 (See Appendix A for a copy of this form) 443 to complete.444 Form 2 is 
used to commence any action in the Equality Court.445 When instituting the proceeding, the 
complainant does not bear costs446 and legal representation is not required in this proceeding.447 
If the complainant needs assistance, the clerk will help in completing the form or a complainant 
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may approach the advice offices run by an NGO or the provincial offices of the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) or the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE).448  
The complainant must provide his or her personal details, the relief or the remedy they are 
seeking, and they must state whether they have lodged the complaint with any other 
institution.449 Once the complainant has laid a complaint with the clerk, it is important that the 
respondent be notified of the complaint within seven (7) days.450 This is done by the clerk of 
the court who completes Form 3 for this purpose (See Appendix B for a copy of this form).451 
This is to give the respondent an opportunity to reply to the allegation made against him/her 
within ten (10) days after service.452  The services of court processes in the Equality Court are 
free and the complainant does not have to pay any costs.453 These costs are borne by the state, 
unless the complainant appoints a legal representative, then he/she will have to pay out of their 
own pocket.454  
Subsequently, the matter will be referred to a presiding officer within ten (10) days after a 
response is received from the respondent.455 Thereafter, the presiding officer has to make a 
decision as to whether the matter will be heard by the Equality Court or if it must be referred 
to a different and more appropriate forum.456 For instance, if the dispute involves 
discrimination in the place of employment and falls under the Employment Equity Act, it must 
be referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).457 
According to section 20(4), there are certain factors that the presiding officer must take into 
consideration when making a decision as to whether the matter must be heard by the Equality 
Court with all the relevant circumstances, including:   
(a) the personal circumstances of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
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(b) the physical accessibility of any contemplated alternative forum; 
(c)  the needs and wishes of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
(d) the nature of the intended proceedings and whether the outcome of the proceedings could 
facilitate the development of judicial precedent and jurisprudence in this area of the law; and  
(e) the views of the appropriate functionary at any contemplated alternative forum.458 
If the matter will be heard by the Equality Court, then the magistrate must set the matter down 
for a direction hearing.459 During the direction hearing, issues relating to the initiation of 
proceedings and other administrative and procedural matters are narrowed down and resolved 
and facts admitted by the parties are noted as such.460 According to section 4 of the Act read 
with regulation 10(1), the hearing should be informal and participatory.461 In George and 
Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,462 Erasmus J held that:  
An integral part of the Equality Act, then, is the focus on the creation of a user-friendly Court 
environment where proceedings are conducted along inquisitorial lines, with an emphasis on 
informality, participation and the speedy processing of matters. This objective itself goes to the 
essence of what equality is about because it emphasizes the need to make the judicial processes 
available to all, including the poor and oppressed who are usually the victims of unfair 
discrimination and inequality. The formal, adversarial, often expensive and potentially 
intimidating proceedings that prevail in an ordinary magistrate's court or High Court and which 
may act as a barrier to those seeking justice, have no place in an Equality Court.463 
Once the direction hearing is finalised, the clerk must, within three (3) days, set a date for the 
hearing on the merits and all the parties must be clear on when this will take place.464 Generally, 
the hearing on the merits will follow the procedure normally adhered to in all cases where a 
magistrate must decide on the facts presented by the parties.465 The South African legal system 
is an adversarial system in which the presiding officers play a ‘neutral umpire’ role and ensure 
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that the trial roles are adhered to, and makes a decision after listening to the evidence.466 In this 
regard, the presiding officer plays an active role and this assists in the accessibility of the 
Equality Court.467 This process takes no longer than thirty seven (37) days before the Directions 
hearing is held which is advantageous to the complainant who approaches the Equality Court 
in cases of discrimination.468 
 The diagram below outlines the process that must be followed when bringing a claim to the 
Equality Court: 
Complaint is brought within 3 
years of the sterilisation occurring 
  
    
     
 
                                
                                         Within 7 days 
                       
                                              
 
                                              Within 10 days 
                                                          
                                                   
  Within 3 days (of the 10 
day                                                                         
period   above expiring) 
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467 Hahn ‘Your Guide to the South African Courts: A step by step process to empower paralegals, community 
leaders and human rights educators’ (2015) 23. 
468 Diko ‘Seeking redress…The Equality Court and HIV-related discrimination’ 2012 ALQ 42. See the Figure A. 
STAGE 1: Complainant approaches 
the Equality Court with the complaint  
STAGE 2: Complainant completes Form 2 and 
submits it to the clerk of the Equality Court 
 
STAGE 3: Clerk notifies the  respondent  of the complaint by 
sending the respondent Form 3 for completion 
   
STAGE 4: The respondent submits the 
reply on Form 3 to the clerk of Court 
STAGE 5:  The clerk refers the complaint and the reply to 
the Presiding Officer 
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Figure A: Process in resolving a discrimination dispute using the Equality Court   
 
3.9 Remedies for unfair discrimination by the Equality Court 
Complainants who allege that their rights under the Equality Act have been violated, approach 
the Equality Court with the purpose of obtaining a particular relief from the court.469 Functions 
and powers of the Equality Court are set out in section 21 of the Equality Act. Section 21(1) 
gives power to the Equality Court to inquire into alleged discrimination, harassment or hate 
speech and make a determination whether such has occurred as per the complainant’s 
allegations.470 Subsequent to the enquiry, the Equality Court is empowered to make an 
appropriate order.471 An appropriate order in terms of the Equality Act includes a wide range 
of remedies which are set out with the purpose of addressing the restrictions that the judiciary 
comes across when making an appropriate order when dealing with discrimination cases.472 It 
is argued that the remedies provided in the Equality Act are a combination of civil473 and 
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Court must hear the matter 
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constitutional remedies.474 Whereas some of these remedies focus on the individual who 
brought the complaint,475 others are community-based remedies.476 Some of the remedies 
provided in section 21 are counteractive, deterrent477 and restorative in nature.478  
Systemic remedies have become part of our law in dealing with cases of discrimination.479 
Whilst some orders are forward-looking, focusing on regulating a respondent’s future 
behaviour,480 some are backward-looking remedies aimed at addressing discriminatory 
behaviours emanating from the past.481 These remedies, penalties and forms of punishment 
introduced by the Equality Act are not widely used in the legal system of South Africa.482 In 
other words, the aim of the remedies is that the court may play an active role in ensuring that 
appropriate measures are taken in order to eradicate discrimination, thus educating the 
respondent (the wrongdoer) instead of passing punitive sanctions.483 Punitive orders that are 
given by the courts are a clear indication that our judiciary is prepared to change societal 
structures of inequality.484 
The orders given by the Equality Court enjoy the same status as orders given in a civil action.485 
However, in terms of PEPUDA this becomes a case only where it is appropriate.486 Section 
21(4)(a) gives the court power to refer its apprehensions encountered during or after an inquiry, 
in any proceedings before it, to any constitutional institution for further investigation, mostly 
in the case of ‘insistent contravention or failure to comply with a provision of this Act or in the 
case of systemic unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment’.487 In addition, section 
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21(4)(b) provides that a court may refer any matter before it for mediation, conciliation or 
negotiation to any constitutional institution or appropriate body.488 For example, in the case of 
Umlazi T Section, the court ordered that the South African Police Services organise a 
community meeting within a month, requesting the Umlazi T section’s residents to report more 
violations relating to the ban on women wearing pants in this Section.489 
The presiding officers in the Equality Courts are required to deliver effective orders for the 
affected persons, which are appropriate and specific to a particular complaint.490 This must be 
done while taking into consideration the set of circumstances of each case.491 Albertyn 
proposes that the innovation of the remedies provided for in the Equality Act require that 
special skills and resources be provided to the presiding officers to necessitate their effective 
engagement when deciding matters of inequality and discriminatory practice.492 It is evident 
from the jurisprudence that to some extent our Equality Courts have effectively utilised these 
remedies. Although most of the cases that the courts have dealt with are hate speech matters, 
the orders given are relevant for the purposes of this chapter.  
The Equality Court provides for a number of civil law remedies including interim relief,493 
declaratory orders,494 and making a settlement agreement between the parties an order of the 
court.495 In Gerber v Dunmarsh Investment (Pty) Ltd and Another,496 the Durban Magistrate’s 
Court confirmed the settlement agreement between the parties as an order of the court in which 
the respondent accepted and acknowledged that their refusal to lease a flat to the complainant 
on the basis that the husband was an Indian was ‘unconstitutional and therefore unlawful’.497 
The respondent apologised unequivocally for their conduct and undertook to pay the 
                                                          
Moshidi J held as follows: ‘In the present case, this remedy brings to mind immediately the alleged conduct of 
the SAPS, as revealed by the evidence of POWA and MN, in failing to open cases by them and victims of the 
LGBTI community. For this reason, I deem it appropriate, if not obligatory, to refer these proceedings to the 
National Police Commissioner for further investigation and to report back to this Court.’ 
488 Section 21(4)(b) of PEPUDA. 
489 ‘Apology won by 'pants' woman’ IOL News, 10 April 2008, 1, available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/apology-won-by-pants-woman-396026, accessed on 22 December 2017. 
490 Albertyn, Goldblatt & Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (2001) 28. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Section 21(2)(a) of the Equality Act. 
494 Section 21(2)(b) of the Equality Act. 
495 Section 21(2)(c) of the Equality Act. 
496 Gerber v Dunmarsh Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another (69/2007) [2007] ZAEQC 5 (14 November 2007). See 
also, Kollapen v Du Preez (EC 001/03) [2005] ZAEQC 1 (29 March 2005) para 1. 
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complainant a sum of R10 000 in compensation.498 Interim relief is an order of the court, which 
reserves or reinstates the status quo pending the final determination of the rights of the parties 
in the matter.499 This does not comprise a final determination of the rights in question nor does 
it affect said final determination.500 A declaratory order can be granted when an interested party 
makes an application to court seeking a declaration of what the law is on the particular issue.501  
According to section 21(2)(d) of the Equality Act, the respondent can be ordered to pay 
damages as a form of reparative justice to the complainant for loss suffered as a result of the 
respondent’s conduct.502 In the matter of Donaldo v Haripersa,503 it was held that the 
respondent must pay the complainant damages amounting to R10 000 in ten instalments of R1 
000 each. Furthermore, in the case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente 
Moreleta Park,504 the court ordered the respondent to pay the complainant an amount of 
R75 000 for the impairment of his dignity and emotional and psychological suffering and R 11 
970 for loss of earnings.505  In Nomasomi Gloria Kente v Andre van Deventer,506 the court 
awarded the complainant damages of R50 000 after finding that she indeed experienced hate 
speech and harassment by her employer.507 On review, in Thembani v Swanepoel,508 the court 
confirmed the decision by the court a quo for an award of R100 000 as damages for having 
been called a ‘kaffir’.509  
Section 21(2)(e) provides for the compensation of damages as an award to a suitable 
organisation. In ANC v Sparrow,510 the court ordered the respondent to pay damages in the sum 
of R 150 000 within 60 days of the date of service or publication of the order to the Oliver and 
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499 D Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2003) A5.6. 
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Adelaide Tambo Foundation (AOTF).511 The OATF promotes non-racialism, tolerance, 
reconciliation and social economic upliftment in South Africa.512 Likewise, in the case of Sonke 
Gender Justice Network v Malema,513 the court ordered the respondent to pay to People 
Opposed to Women Abuse (POWA), an organisation that gives shelter to abused women, an 
amount of R50 000.514 This was also the case in the Kollapen v Du Preez matter where the 
complainant who is of Indian heritage, lodged a complaint with the Equality Court after he was 
refused a haircut at the barbershop on the basis that the respondent’s staff were inexperienced 
with Indian haircuts.515 The court ordered the payment of an amount of R10 000 in damages to 
the charity of the complainant’s choice, payable in instalments of R500 per month.516 
In terms of PEPUDA, the Equality Court is given wide ranging powers to inhibit the repetition 
of unfair discrimination patterns and practices.517 It is within the court’s powers to make orders 
restraining unfair discriminatory practices or directing that specific steps must be taken in order 
to halt discriminatory behaviours, harassment or hate speech.518 The case of Kollapen is an 
illustration of this point. In casu, the court ordered that in order for the respondent to cease a 
discriminatory practice he must pay R1000 per day for the training of his employees to cut hair 
for ethnic and indigenous groups.519 Furthermore, in Pillay and Another v Silver Club,520 a 
complaint of discrimination based on race was lodged by the SAHRC on behalf of a coloured 
male, Pillay, who was assaulted outside the night club when he and his white partner were 
refused entry into the bar.521 The matter was settled and the court confirmed the settlement 
holding that the respondent redraft the club’s policies.522 Payment of R10 000 in damages to 
the complainant and R3 000 to Siyazenzela, a non-profit organisation fighting prejudice and 
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discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered and inter-sexed communities 
nominated by Pillay, was ordered.523 
Section 21(2)(g) provides for an order to make available specific opportunities and privileges 
unfairly denied to the complainant.524 Moreover, section 21(2)(i) permits the court to grant an 
order directing the respondent to take steps to reasonably accommodate a group or class of 
persons.525 These broad remedies were one the aspects that were considered by the 
Constitutional Court in a significant and first appealed decision from the Equality Court.526 In 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay,527 the Court found that the school 
unfairly discriminated against the complainant and ordered it to amend its dress code in order 
to reasonably accommodate the learner’s cultural practices.528  
Further remedies that the Equality Court is empowered to order include ‘audits, special 
measures as well as reports to the court or another institution as to the progress made in 
implementing the remedies in order to address unfair discrimination’.529  In Mkhize v 
Edgemead High School,530 the court dealt with the matter of racial harassment against a black 
learner who was insulted by a white learner and her mother at the school premises. The court 
ordered that the respondent attend a diversity-training programme, the SAHRC was to audit 
the school’s policies and monitor the implementation of the order.531  
As indicated above, one of the mandates of the Equality Courts is to promote equality in both 
private and public spheres in society. In most of the judgments given by the court, an order for 
an unconditional apology seems to be central. Granting of this remedy by the court, as provided 
for in section 21(2)(j) of the Equality Act, shows the court’s commitment to promoting equality 
in South Africa, thereby restoring human dignity to those affected by acts of discrimination.  
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By looking at the jurisprudence of the Equality Court regarding an unconditional apology, one 
can conclude on the seriousness of restorative justice in our courtrooms. In a recent judgment 
of the Psychological Society of South Africa v Qwelane and Others,532 the court ordered that 
Qwelane render a written unconditional apology to the LGBTI community within thirty days 
of the court, or within such time, the parties may agree on, pursuant to concession and reach a 
settlement agreement regarding the contents of such apology.533 Moreover, the court ordered 
that the apology be published in one edition of a national Sunday newspaper or the equivalent 
circulation for publicity that the offensive comments had received leading to the complaint.534 
Proof of the written apology was to be furnished to the court with immediate effect.535  
According to section 21(2)(o), the court may order payment of the costs of the proceedings by 
the losing party and a compliance order with any provision in the Equality Act.536 In addition, 
the court is to award a deterrent of an appropriate ‘nature, including the recommendation to the 
appropriate authority, to suspend the licence of a person’.537 Further, the court may in terms of 
section 21(2)(l) ‘make an order directing the Clerk of the Equality Court to submit the matter 
to the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the possible institution of criminal 
proceedings in terms of the common law or relevant legislation’.538 For instance, in 
Sparrow’s539 case, the court directed the clerk of the Equality Court to submit the entire matter 
to the Director of Public Prosecutions KwaZulu-Natal to consider the possible institution of 
criminal proceedings referring to common law or relevant statute.540  
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3.10 Appeals and reviews  
Section 23 of the Equality Act deals with appeals and reviews of the decisions made by the 
Equality Courts.541 In terms of this section, an order made by an Equality Court can either be 
appealed or reviewed by a High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal having jurisdiction by an 
aggrieved party.542 An aggrieved party may also appeal directly to the Constitutional Court, 
provided that the rules of the Constitutional Court have been complied with.543 Section 23(5)(a) 
makes provision for reviews to the High Court subject to a determination by the Magistrate 
concerning a ground of discrimination.544  
3.11 Conclusion 
PEPUDA is an important piece of legislation that has attempted to ensure that discrimination 
disputes can be resolved speedily at a local level. The Equality Act has created a unique 
procedure which enables complainants to approach the Equality Court without the assistance 
of a lawyer. PEPUDA is also premised on the principles of restorative and preventive justice. 
This enables the court to try and address the underlying issues that may have fuelled the 
discriminatory conduct. In this way, the legislation aims at trying to meet its transformative 
objectives which are described in the preamble.  
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Chapter Four 
Public Interest Litigation and Class Actions 
4.1 Introduction 
The inception of our constitutional dispensation in South Africa made it possible for different 
mechanisms to be used in civil proceedings in order to address inequalities created by the past.1 
Historically, the attainment of access to justice to which most South Africans, especially the 
poorest were previously denied,2 remained an elusive concept.3 Litigation as a strategy in the 
enforcement of human rights is now ensured.4 However, constraints such as legal standing 
(hereinafter referred to as standing or locus standi) in certain circumstances have the effect of 
barring potential litigants from accessing the courts.5 The Bill of Rights provides for a wider 
approach than one in terms of common law to legal standing in cases where fundamental human 
rights are violated or threatened.6 Standing determines whether a litigant is allowed to seek 
relief before a court of law or a particular tribunal7 in respect of a particular issue.8   
The concept of standing and the right of access to justice are largely interrelated.9 Access to 
justice is significant for the realisation of human rights.10 In the case of Chief Lesapo v North 
West Agricultural Bank and Another,11 Mokgoro J emphasised this and held that: 
The right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensures 
the peaceful, regulated and institutionalized mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to 
                                                          
1 CF Swanepoel ‘The public-interest action in South Africa: The transformative injunction of the South African 
Constitution’ (2006) 41(2) Journal for Judicial Science 29. 
2 T Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social 
justice’ (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590. 
3 Permanent Secretary Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another v Ngxuza and 
Others 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) para 6.   
4 AK Abebe ‘Towards more liberal standing rules to enforce constitutional rights in Ethiopia’ (2010) 10 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 408. 
55 EA Taiwo ‘Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A 
need for a more liberal provision’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 548. 
6 Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.. 
7 Abebe ‘Towards more liberal standing rules to enforce constitutional rights in Ethiopia’ (2010) 10 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 408. 
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(12) BCLR 1420 (16 November 1999). 
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self-help. The right of access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy 
which it causes. Construed in this context of the rule of law and the principle against self-help in 
particular, access to court is indeed of cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful 
considerations would be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable.12 
Therefore, if judicial bodies apply laws regarding standing strictly, it is an inevitable truth that 
potential litigants will be denied access to justice.13  
In most cases, marginalised groups in South Africa face difficulty in approaching the courts 
and accessing legal relief.14 Various barriers that preclude potential litigants from accessing 
justice in South Africa are poverty, race, gender, disability, geographical location of the courts, 
high costs of litigation, technicalities associated with court procedures, language barriers and 
illiteracy.15 With the introduction of the Constitution in South Africa, categories of persons 
who can approach the courts have been expanded. As a result, even the most impoverished 
groups can easily access justice when their rights have been violated or threatened.16 Through 
section 38 of the Constitution, legal action can be instituted on behalf of a class or group or in 
the public interest.17  
This chapter aims to establish whether HIV positive women who have been sterilised either 
coercively or forcibly can litigate using class action proceedings or by utilising the public 
interest litigation (PIL) route. The first part of this chapter will look at the South African legal 
framework and cases that have come before our courts by means of a class action and PIL. 
Conversely, before embarking on the discussion of the legal framework regarding public 
                                                          
12 Chief Lesapo supra para 22. In the case of Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 131/12) 
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Zimbabwe: An analysis of the provisions in the new Zimbabwean Constitution’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 4. 
14 SB Gericke ‘Can a class action be instituted for breach of contract’ (2009) 72 Journal of Contemporary Roman  
Dutch Law 305. 
15 M Nyenti ‘Access to justice in the South African social security system: Towards a conceptual approach’ 
(2013) 46(4) De Jure 905; S Liebenberg ‘From the crucible of the Eastern Cape: New legal tools for the poor’ 
Public Lecture delivered on 28 July 2014, Rhodes University Law Faculty.   
16 Liebenberg ibid.    
17 See section 38(c) and (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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interest actions and class action, it is very important to look at legal standing and how it has 
been interpreted by the South African courts over the years.  
The South African Constitution makes provision for any person, including members of civil 
society such as human rights NGO’s, to litigate on public interest matters.18 The second part of 
this chapter will examine the role played by several organisations that have been and are still 
involved in PIL and class action matters and are helping in the realisation of human rights for 
vulnerable and marginalised persons. Lastly, this chapter will look at the strategies that these 
organisations have used to achieve and sustain public interest and the interest of the members 
of the class and the challenges that have been faced therein.  
4.2 Locus standi 
The concept of locus standi or legal standing is difficult to define.19 This is because standing 
has been used to refer to different aspects which impact on the rights of a person who 
approaches a court for particular relief.20 First, the doctrine of standing refers to the capacity 
of persons to litigate in a court of law.21 For example, minors and mentally challenged people 
lack capacity to approach the courts without assistance from parents, guardians or curators 
bonis.22 Second, locus standi refers to a person’s right to present the matter to court for 
adjudication.23 This means that the litigant’s claim must be based on a right enforceable by 
him/her in terms of the law.  Our focus will be on the second aspect of legal standing. Standing 
is regarded as a primary issue and is frequently dealt with before the merits of each case.24 In 
Wilson v Zondi, Henning J held that:  
A party who initiates legal proceedings, whether by petition, application or summons, must 
indicate in the commencing papers that he has locus standi to bring such proceedings. It would not 
                                                          
18 Abebe ‘Towards more liberal standing rules to enforce constitutional rights in Ethiopia’ (2010) 10 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 413-414. 
19 TR Ramagoma Locus Standi in Environmental Litigation: A South African Perspective (unpublished LLM 
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be sufficient for the litigant merely to assert that he is legally entitled to institute the proceedings. 
Thus it is necessary for a guardian of a minor who sues in that capacity to allege the relationship. 
It is usually apparent from allegations contained in the initiating process that a party has locus 
standi. Once locus standi has been sufficiently averred, it may, of course, be put in issue for 
adjudication by the court. The court, after hearing the matter in dispute, will then decide whether 
the party who has brought the proceedings was entitled to do so at all.25 
The doctrine of locus standi is an integral part of our legal process and has been associated 
with a few challenges for both litigants and the judiciary around the world.26 In terms of our 
common law, a litigant is required to show that he/she has a ‘direct and substantial interest’ in 
the matter.27 In addition, the right in question must entitle him/her to approach and the outcome 
of the case must have a personal effect on him/her.28 This has been said to be a restrictive 
approach as it is prevents matters from being brought in the public interest.29  India’s 
Constitution is well known for its liberal and innovative approach to legal standing.30 In 1982, 
in the case of SP Gupta v Union of India,31 Bhagwati CJ found that it was about time that a 
new approach was adopted when it comes to standing. In casu, the court held that:  
 Even in our own country we have recognised this departure from the strict rule of locus standi 
 in cases where there has been a violation of the constitutional or legal rights of persons who by 
 reason of their socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the 
 Court for judicial redress… It may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal 
 wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of 
 violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any 
 constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal 
 injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by 
 reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, 
 unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application 
 for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of 
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 breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court 
 under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or 
 determinate class of persons.32 
The common law position that most jurisdictions, especially in Africa, have adopted, originated 
from English law.33 As a result of colonialism, a plaintiff must have a special sufficient interest 
in the subject for him/her to challenge such action in court.34 In 1977, England adopted new 
rules of standing which introduced a judicial review procedure against public bodies.35 When 
applying for judicial review, a person had to seek leave for a judicial review application.36 
Subsequent to leave being granted, the court must be satisfied that the applicant has legal 
standing if it finds that the applicant has a ‘sufficient interest’37 to bring the case in the name 
of the public.38 In terms of Canadian law, the plaintiff had to show he/she was ‘exceptionally 
prejudiced’ by the legislation challenged as compared to any other person in the community.39 
Over time, the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence developed this rule holding that the 
court must use it when deciding standing matters taking into account the relevant circumstances 
of each matter.40  Thus, in the Canadian courts the plaintiff will be said to have locus standi if 
three requirements are met, ‘(i) that the action brought raises a legal issue serious in nature; (ii) 
the plaintiff has a genuine interest in the matter in question; and (iii) there is no other effective 
way in which the plaintiff can seek the relief in court’.41 
 
                                                          
32 SP Gupta v Union of India (1982) 2 SCR 365 at para 16-17. 
33 TI Ogowewo ‘The problem with standing to sue in Nigeria’ (1995) 39(1) Journal of African Law 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Taiwo ‘Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need 
for a more liberal provision’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 566. 
37 Inland Revenue Comrs v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 100.   
38 See Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 1 All ER 696 at 702-711; Taiwo ‘Enforcement of 
fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need for a more liberal provision’ 
(2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 566. 
39 Taiwo ‘Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need 
for a more liberal provision’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 566. 
40 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 595; see Thorson v  Attorney General of Canada [1975] 1 
S.C.R. 138 at 145 (The plaintiff must prove that their action raises a serious legal matter which is justiciable in 
terms of the law); Nova Scotia Board of Censors v McNeil [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662 (The Plaintiff must have no other 
practical way to resolve the matter except by seeking that particular remedy in a court of law); and Minister of 
Justice v Borowski [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 at 575-576 (A person bringing an application must prove that he/she has 
a genuine interest in the matter). See also, Finlay v Minister of Finance of Canada (1989) 146 DLR (3d) 704. 
41 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 595-6. 
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4.3 Locus Standi in terms of South African Law 
4.3.1 Standing in terms of the traditional approach in South Africa 
Preceding the enactment of the Interim Constitution in 1993, the common law governed legal 
standing in South African courts.42 According to the traditional approach, the South African 
courts adopted a restrictive viewpoint when dealing with standing matters.43 This approach 
required a person initiating the matter in court to have a personal interest in which he/she was 
adversely affected.44 This meant that the common law rule on standing catered only for 
adjudication between private parties whose personal interest was adversely affected by alleged 
violations.45 In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and 
Others, O’Regan J observed that:  
Existing common law rules of standing have often developed in the context of private litigation. 
As a general rule, private litigation is concerned with the determination of a dispute between two 
individuals, in which relief will be specific and, often, retrospective, in that it applies to a set of 
past events. Such litigation will generally not directly affect people who are not parties to the 
litigation. In such cases, the plaintiff is both the victim of the harm and the beneficiary of the 
relief.46 
It can deduced that if a person approaching the courts fails to show that he/she has a sufficient 
interest or is personally and adversely affected by the violation in question, the court will refuse 
standing.47 In the case of Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council,48 Stratford JA found that ‘in 
cases where reading of the legislation in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances; make 
it clear that the prohibition of an act in question is in the interest of any person or a group of 
persons; the court can grant the relief for enforcement a public right.’49 The Judge further held 
                                                          
42 G Jephson ‘Standing, class actions and the right of access to justice’ (2014), available at 
http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Jephson.pdf, accessed on 20 October 
2017. 
43 Loots ‘Standing to enforce fundamental rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 49. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Jephson ‘Standing, class actions and the right of access to justice’ (2014), available at 
http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Jephson.pdf, accessed on 20 October 
2017. 
46 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (CCT5/95) [1995] ZACC 13; 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (6 December 1995) para 229. 
47 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 591. 
48 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87. 
49 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council supra at 96; followed the principle adopted in the case of Patz v 
Greene & CO 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
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that it was mandatory for the applicant to allege and prove that he has suffered personal harm 
or special damages because of the prohibited act in question.50  
In addition, the decision of Wood and Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority and Another51 took 
an exception to the application of the traditional approach. In casu, the Appellate Division as 
it was then known, permitted a group of leaders who sought an interdict on behalf of a group 
of individuals who were illegally arrested, tried before a court of law and had their lives 
endangered because of their political associations.52 In granting locus standi, the Court held as 
follows: 
Although the position is that in Roman-Dutch law no private person can proceed by a popular 
action as such, it is clear that the interdict de libero homine exhibendo is part of our law, and it 
only remains to be considered at whose request a Court will issue the interdict. The cause of action 
is sui generis because not only was the right to freedom protected by it but also "it is set in motion 
as a matter of duty".  Nevertheless, actiones populares should be widely construed because illegal 
deprivation of liberty is a threat to the very foundation of a society based on law and order. This 
approach is based on sound reason and is in accordance with our law. In such a case, the applicant 
would not purport to act "on behalf of the public" and would not; therefore institute what in Roman 
law was an actio popularis. He would be allowed to act on behalf of a detained person because he 
would satisfy the Court that the detained person could not make the application himself. This 
procedure would preserve what in Roman law was already considered of the highest value and no 
less regarded in Roman-Dutch law. The Court would, of course, require to be satisfied that the 
applicant had good reason for making the application and that the detained person would have 
made the application himself if it had been in his power to do so.53  
The significance of this decision is that the Appellate Division was willing to adopt a liberal 
attitude towards the rules of standing in order to enable it to get to grips with the subject matter 
that had to be determined.54 
4.3.2 Locus Standi under the Constitution  
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, when granting legal standing, South African courts 
took an individualised approach.55 The enactment of the interim and final Constitutions 
                                                          
50 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council supra at 95. 
51 Wood and Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority and Another 1975 (2) SA 294 (A). 
52 Ibid. 
53 ibid 310-313. 
54 C Loots ‘Keeping locus standi in chains’ (1987) 3 South African Journal on Human Rights 69.  
55 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 602. 
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introduced radical changes to the common law rules governing standing in South Africa.56 This 
bold reform in our law was made in terms of section 7(4) of the interim Constitution57 and 
section 38 of the final Constitution,58 respectively.59 With these clauses coming into effect , 
any person or organisation may approach the court for the enforcement of the rights enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights, regardless of the fact that the alleged violation of rights adversely and 
personally affected them.60  
4.3.2.1 A broad approach on standing under the Constitution 
The courts have adopted a broad approach when interpreting the enforcement of a rights 
clause.61 The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence shows a clear stance of a liberal and broad 
approach when it comes to standing in order to uphold the effective enforcement of human 
rights. In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others,62 
the Constitutional Court showed the importance of it developing the common law and adopting 
                                                          
56 Taiwo ‘Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need 
for a more liberal provision’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 566; Jephson ‘Standing, class actions 
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57 This sub-section provided as follows:- 
‘(a) When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in this Chapter is alleged, any person referred 
to in paragraph (b) shall be entitled to apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may 
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(d) Anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) An association action in the interest of its members. 
59 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 602. 
60 Loots ‘Standing to enforce fundamental rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 49. 
61 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 603. 
62 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (CCT5/95) [1995] ZACC 13; 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (6 December 1995). 
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a generous approach in order to fulfil its constitutional mandate of protecting human rights as 
provided for in the Constitution.63 In casu, Chaskalson P for the majority observed as follows: 
Whilst it is important that this Court should not be required to deal with abstract or hypothetical 
issues, and should devote its scarce resources to issues that are properly before it, I can see no good 
reason for adopting a narrow approach to the issue of standing in constitutional cases. On the 
contrary, it is my view that we should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be 
consistent with the mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to 
ensure that constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of the protection to which they are entitled.8 
Such an approach would also be consistent in my view with the provisions of section 7(4) of the 
Constitution on which counsel for the Respondents based his argument. I will deal later with the 
terms of this section and the purpose that it serves.64 
Nevertheless, this far-reaching approach also has its own limitation on litigants as it only 
applies in matters where the violation alleged is the infringement of the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights.65 However, in the judgment of Wildlife Society v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs,66 the Court noted that ‘even in instances where standing cannot be given to the 
applicants under section 7(4) of the Interim Constitution, and the legislation has imposed an 
obligation on a public body to take particular steps to protect the environment in the public 
interest, the applicant must be given standing in terms of common law to compel such public 
body to fulfil that obligation.’67 There are two requirements that an applicant must meet when 
they wish to rely on section 38 of the Constitution, namely, a fundamental right must have been 
violated and the applicant must fall under one of the categories mentioned under this 
provision.68 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2016) 73.  
64 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (CCT5/95) [1995] ZACC 13; 
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318 (E). 
66 Wildlife Society v Minister of Home Affairs (1996) (3) SA 1095 (TkS).  
67 Wildlife Society v Minister of Home Affairs supra at 1105. 
68 Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ 
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4.4 Class Actions 
4.4.1 Background and definition of class actions in South Africa 
Historically, access to South African courts had been restricted in terms of the principle of 
locus standi or standing.69 Before our courts could grant standing to the person litigating, the 
latter had to show a ‘personal, sufficient, and direct interest’ in the matter.70  This was 
problematic as amongst others, representative organisations were denied the chance to litigate, 
as they could not prove legal standing because of their lack of a ‘direct interest’.71 This 
customary model of civil litigation was a clear limitation to social change as plaintiffs were not 
given an opportunity to seek legal redress for protection of their human rights through class 
actions.72  
Prior to the demise of apartheid in 1994,73 class actions were relatively foreign under South 
African law.74 The introduction of both the interim and final Constitutions provided 
acknowledgement and recognition to class actions in South Africa.75 Nonetheless, the 
developments in this field of law in South Africa continue to be in an embryonic stage.76 In 
1998, the South African Law Reform Commission issued a report discussing class action and 
public interest actions procedures and made recommendations on the nature of these actions 
and further proposed a Draft Bill on the enforcement for such action in our law.77 Despite the 
SALRC’s propositions, academic voices and the recommendations from a judicial commission 
of inquiry,78 Parliament has not enacted legislation setting out the procedures to be followed 
                                                          
69 South African Law Reform Commission Report on the Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions 
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70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 KM Robertson An Analysis of the Class Action in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria) 
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(29 November 2012) para 14. 
101 
 
when using class action and public interest actions and to give effect to section 38 of the 
Constitution.79 
Over the years, class actions have been part of, and used in other jurisdictions around the world, 
namely, in the United States of America,80 England,81 Australia,82 Russia,83 Canada,84 Brazil,85 
and Zimbabwe.86 Insofar as class actions are concerned, no statutory definition of it exists in 
South Africa.87 However, there have been attempts to define class actions. In terms of the report 
by the SALRC, class action can be defined as:  
an action instituted by a representative on behalf of class of persons in respect of whom the relief 
claimed and the issues involved are substantially similar in respect of all the members of the class, 
and which action is certified as a class action in terms of the proposed Act.88 It is a device by which, 
a single plaintiff can pursue an action on behalf of all persons with a common interest in the subject 
matter of the action, and with the ruling of the court being binding upon all class members.89  
 As defined by Professor Mulheron, the concept of class action means- 
a legal procedure which enables the claims (or parts of the claims) of a number of persons against 
the same defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class action, one or more persons 
(“representative plaintiff”) may sue on his or her  own behalf and on behalf of a number of other 
persons (“the class”) who have a claim to a remedy  for the same or a similar  alleged wrong to 
that alleged  by the representative  plaintiff, and who  have  claims  that share  questions of law or 
fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff (“common  issues”). Only the 
representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class members are not usually identified as 
individual parties but are merely described. The class members are bound by the outcome of the 
                                                          
79 Robertson An Analysis of the Class Action in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria) 
(2015) 7.  
80 The American federal class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 
1966 and class actions adjudicated at state courts are governed by Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 
81 In England class actions are regulated by the Civil Procedure Rules of 1998. 
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87 P Conradie and A Hofmeyr ‘South Africa’ in Global Legal Group et al. The International Comparative Legal 
Guide to: Class & Group Actions (2017) 122. 
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litigation on the common issues, whether favourable or adverse to the class, although they do not,  
for  the  most  part, take any active part in that litigation.90 
Moreover, Professor Silver asserts that a class action must not be mistakenly referred to as a 
joinder device but it is a representational device.91 In doing so, he pointed out that: 
The class action is a procedural device that expands a court’s jurisdiction, empowering it to enter 
a judgment that is binding upon everyone with covered claims. This includes claimants who, not 
being named as parties, would not ordinarily be bound. A class-wide judgment extinguishes them 
claims of all persons meeting the class definition rather than just those of named parties and persons 
in privity with them, as normally is the case. Judges and scholars sometimes treat the class action 
as a procedure for joining absent claimants to a lawsuit rather than as one that permits a court to 
treat a named party as standing in judgment on behalf of them. This is a mistake ... Class members 
neither start out as parties nor become parties when a class is certified.92 
 Even though the South African procedural system is derived from English law, class action 
rules have their roots in an American model.93 According to this model, ’a class action 
is a procedural tool, which empowers a large classification of persons to litigate collectively 
against the wrongdoer in the event their rights have been violated in a similar manner by the 
defendant.’94  
In America, before amendments class actions were governed by Federal Rule 23 of 1938 (now 
called Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).95 The rules set out the procedure that must be 
followed when bringing a class action to court.  
Previously, class actions were not recognised under common law in South Africa.96 
Subsequently, the need for class actions arose as society changed with the new law in place in 
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(2015) 7. 
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order to protect and promote human rights and redress the injustice of the apartheid regime.97 
Class actions in America also used civil rights, anti-trust and securities law infringements and 
played an effective enforcement role in those matters.98 According to Weston, class actions 
empower representatives to seek redress for wide-reaching issues in society and to advance 
consent or organisation from other members of the class is not considered essential.99 In this 
way, class action allows for aggregation of claims.100 
In terms of South African jurisprudence, there has been no clear definition of a class action. 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the above definitions provided by Mulheron and 
Silver will be accepted as it was endorsed in the judgment of Trustees for the time being of 
Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others.101 
At this point, it is imperative to note that the PIL is different from class action.  In the 1950s, 
PIL appeared as an instrument to challenge the social injustices experienced by the 
underprivileged and needy in our society.102 Until the late 1990s, class actions were 
unprecedented in South Africa.103 In so far as the two actions overlap, there is a distinction 
between PIL and class actions and this must be sustained with the two procedures being treated 
separately.104 The most crucial distinction between PIL and class action is that the decision by 
made the court in a class action binds all members of the class and hence, the principle of res 
judicata is applicable to the members belonging to that class.105 In PIL, the principle of res 
judicata is not applicable and the affected persons in whose name or interest the action is 
brought are not bound by the judgment that the court makes.106         
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4.4.2 Class actions under the constitutional dispensation  
South African law relating to the concept of class actions has developed in tandem with our 
constitutional supremacy regime coming into effect.107 This innovative shift from the common 
law position was introduced by the interim Constitution and the final Constitution under section 
7(4)(b)(iv) and 38(c), respectively.108 These provisions entitle any person acting as a member 
of or on behalf of the class or group of persons, to approach the court alleging infringement of 
a right entrenched in the BoRs.109  In Permanent Secretary Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government and Another,110 the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the 
constitutional prerogative that litigants may use a class action to enforce rights enshrined in the 
Constitution.111 However, in 2013, the same court acknowledged the usefulness of a class 
action in non-constitutional matters. In the decision of Children's Resource Centre Trust and 
Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others,112 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that: 
 it would be irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a constitutional 
 right is invoked but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances, merely because of the 
 claimants’ inability to point to the infringement of a right protected under the Bill of Rights. 
 The procedural requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type of case can 
 equally  easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a particularly appropriate way in which 
 to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but they are equally useful in the context of 
 mass  personal injury cases or consumer litigation.113 
This decision was endorsed in the cases of Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others114 
and Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Others.115 
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In the decision of Ngxuza, the Supreme Court of Appeal provided leeway for litigants who 
desired instituting class actions in South African courts.116 The Court also laid down the 
essential requisites of a class action. These include:  
 (i) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable; 
 (ii) there must be questions of law and fact common to the class;  
 (iii) the claims of the applicants representing the class must be typical of the claims of the rest 
 of the class; and  
 (iv) the applicants through their legal representatives, will fairly and adequately protect the 
 interests of the class117 and the class in this matter met all these requirements.118  
Notwithstanding the establishment and recognition of class action in South Africa, the Ngxuza 
case provided slight direction as to the procedure for a class action litigation.119 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Appeal provided some clarity setting out procedural 
requirements of initiating a class action in South Africa. This was the case in the SCA decision 
of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others in which 
the court provided answers to the uncertainty as to when and how a class action may be 
instituted. It transpired from this case that there are two stages of a class action namely, 
certification and valuation of the wrongdoer’s liability.120 This means that before issuing a 
summons, a class action must first be certified121 which authorises the proceedings.122  
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Certification is best described as the most important part of a class action which ensures that 
class proceedings are conducted appropriately.123  In this way, the defendant is given an 
opportunity to show good cause as to why the class proceedings should not proceed. Further, 
it gives the defendant the opportunity to show why the matter should not be settled in instances 
where the claim has no merits.124 This is to ensure that only feasible class action matters are 
brought to court for further adjudication.125 
As far as certification is concerned, the SALRC submits that it is necessary and recommends a 
two-stage approach.126 This approach includes first, that the representative acting on behalf of 
the class must bring an application accompanied by an affidavit requesting the court to grant 
leave to initiate a class action.127 Thereafter, the matter will proceed as a class action until 
finalised, when the court is satisfied that the action is appropriate in the circumstances and has 
certified its proceeding, thereby setting out the procedure to be followed.128 De Vos accepts 
this approach and holds the view that it would be well-suited in South African civil procedure 
compared to a general approach.129 The SALRC suggested the following criteria for 
certification: 
 (a) evidence of the existence of an identifiable class of two or more persons; 
 (b) the existence of a prima facie cause of action; 
 (c) issues of fact or law which are common to the claims or defences of individual 
 members of the class; 
 (d) the availability of a suitable representative or representatives to represent the 
 interests of the class; and 
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 (e) whether, having regard to all relevant circumstances, a class action would be the 
 appropriate method of proceeding with the action.130 
In developing the common law, the decision of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others 
v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others,131 set out non-exhaustive elements for certification as 
follows: 
(i) the existence of a class identifiable by objective criteria; 
(ii) a cause of action raising a triable issue; 
(iii) that the right to relief depends upon the determination of issues offact, or law, or both, 
common to all members of the class; 
(iv) that the relief sought, or damages claimed, flow from the cause of action and are 
ascertainable and capable of determination; 
(v) that where the claim is for damages there is an appropriate procedure for allocating the 
damages    to the members of the class; 
(vi) that the proposed representative is suitable to be permitted to conduct the action and 
represent the class; 
(vii) whether given the composition of the class and the nature of the proposed action a class 
action is the most appropriate means of determining the claims of class members.132 
 
Similar requirements were accepted in the case of Mukaddam.133 Jaftha J found that:  
These requirements must serve as factors to be taken into account in determining where the 
interests of justice lie in a particular case. They must not be treated as conditions precedent or 
jurisdictional facts which must be present before an application for certification may succeed. The 
absence of one or another requirement must not oblige a court to refuse certification where the 
interests of justice demand otherwise.134 
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The court further reasoned that the courts’ power conferred upon them in terms of section 173 
of the Constitution,135 not only protects and regulates court procedures but also the courts’ 
power to develop the common law in instances where it is necessary to do so for the sake of 
interest of justice.136 As a result, the same standard must be applied in class action matters 
where certification is sought.137 In spite of this, the fact that the court has, to some extent, 
developed and clarified some fundamental characteristics of the law concerning class action in 
South Africa, a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities seem to remain unresolved.138 These 
include the procedure that must be followed to give notice to class members regarding class 
action proceedings.139 Class actions can be brought in three ways, namely, opt-in, opt-out or 
bifurcated. In an opt-in action, every member of a class is required to actively consent to take 
part in a class action in order for him/her to benefit from, and be bound by, the outcome of such 
action.140 In this action, potential class members expressly communicate with the legal 
representatives of a class and their interest to join the action as class members.141 The first case 
to use an opt-in action in South Africa was Linkside and Others v Minister of Basic Education 
and Others142  
 
In an opt-out action, the opposite of an opt-in action applies, whereby all members of a class 
benefit from and are bound by the result thereof except when they exclude themselves from 
being class members.143 Opt-out actions are mostly used and are forthright in nature.144 For 
instance, in the Ngxuza case, a class action consisted of tens of thousands of Eastern Cape 
disability grant recipients who chose not to opt-out of the class proceedings.145 In 
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Mukaddam’s146 case, it was found by the Supreme Court of Appeal that only in exceptional 
circumstances would the court allow an opt-in action.147 However, this judgment was upheld 
by the Constitutional Court, which found that:  
A further error committed by the court was the finding that certification in an opt-in class action 
requires the applicant to show exceptional circumstances. The test of exceptional circumstances is 
at variance with the standard laid down by that court in Children's Resource Centre.148   
In a bifurcated class action, two stages are involved.149 First, opt-out is a preliminary 
requirement in which all issues common to the class members are dealt with.150 In the second 
stage, an opt-in process takes place whereby issues relating to the individuals in a class are 
dispensed with.151 This was evident from the decision of Nkala where the mineworkers asked 
to be permitted to implement an opt-out stage in which mineworkers on the mine’s list were 
part of a class action and an opt-in process in which plaintiffs (including dependents) had to 
show that they or deceased mineworkers had contracted tuberculosis or silicosis.152 Mining 
companies opposed this claim, however, the court granted the use of the bifurcated process.153 
4.5 Public interest litigation  
4.5.1 Defining public interest action  
Public interest actions and class actions are important, as they have formed part of the global 
movement towards promoting access to justice. PIL is part of public law.154 In terms of public 
law, the presence of personal or sufficient interest is not a requirement over and beyond public 
interest.155  The concept of ‘public interest’ is based on the belief that in a free society all groups 
must have equal access to the legal system and be adequately represented if their human rights 
are being violated.156 When all other channels of influence have proven futile, litigation is the 
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primary approach to follow for the purpose of protecting the rights of the vulnerable groups.157 
Through litigation, disadvantaged groups are empowered to participate fully and fairly in the 
matters that affect them in society.158  
In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others159 it was 
held that generally in the litigation of a public character, relief sought is forward-looking and 
applies universally so that it may directly affect people.160 Moreover, the harm alleged may 
frequently be relatively diffuse or amorphous.161 PIL also helps challenge the existing laws and 
holds government structures accountable for omissions in fulfilling their constitutional 
obligations and preventing discriminatory practices against particular groups in our 
communities,162 and restoring human dignity where it has been denied.163 
Although the concept of PIL is widely used, there is no universal way of defining it.164 It  has 
been a difficult task to come up with a broadly accepted and comprehensive definition of PIL 
as various jurisdictions have applied a diversity of strategies in an attempt to define the concept 
of PIL.165 However, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is important that a working 
definition is used. According to Badwaza, the narrow and technical definition of PIL is:  
a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in 
which the public or class of the community have a pecuniary interest or some interest by which 
their legal rights or liabilities are affected.166 
In India, the judgment of People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India found as 
follows: 
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PIL which is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice within 
the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different 
kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which essentially of an adversary character 
where there is a dispute between two parties, one making a claim or seeing relief against the other 
and that other opposing such claim or relief. PIL is brought before the court not for the purpose of 
enforcing the right of one individual against another as happens in the ordinary litigation, but it is 
intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands that violations of constitutional 
or legal rights of large numbers of people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically 
disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and un-redressed.167 
The concept of PIL in the USA is that it is the practice by lawyers pursuing PIL to precipitate 
social change through court decisions that reform the rule of law, apply and implement laws 
already in existence and enunciate norms of the public.168 The proposed definition of PIL by 
the South Africa Law Reform Commission (SALRC) is that it is: 
an action instituted by a representative in the interest of the public generally, or in the interest of a 
section of the public, but not necessarily in that representative’s own interest.169  
Ngcukaitobi suggests that PIL is an action adopted in order to achieve comprehensive goals 
and outcomes for the greater good of the public, including law reform protection for 
disadvantaged groups and promotion of their socio-economic rights and in other cases, physical 
benefit for vulnerable groups.170 
PIL is the reinforcement tool against the breach of the rights of the public.171 PIL also helps to 
realise the rights of vulnerable groups172 in our society.173 PIL lawyers play a huge role in 
ensuring that the rights of minority groups are recognised.174 Through PIL, the previously 
underrepresented and unrepresented groups are afforded legal representation.175 According to 
Chief Justice Odoki of Uganda, PIL plays a huge role in protecting and enforcing the 
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fundamental rights and freedoms of people.176 PIL also demonstrates a significant endeavour 
to give a substantial meaning to human rights.177 As a result, PIL plays and continues to play, 
a huge role in transforming our society, internationally, regionally and nationally.178 PIL helps 
persons who have been denied an opportunity to voice their deprivations and infringements by 
government and society.179 It also assists in guaranteeing and restoring human dignity and other 
constitutional rights that have been violated.     
Some scholars believe that PIL dates back to the early African-American civil rights struggle 
in the United States.180 As a result of the movement, the case of Brown v Board of Education181 
produced the decision in which the US Supreme Court found that the segregation of public 
school students in terms of race, was unconstitutional.182 In India, some legal scholars argue 
that PIL must be referred to as social action litigation.183 According to Baxi,184 unlike PIL in 
the United States which focuses its attention on public participation in decision making by the 
government, the PIL movement from the Indian perspective deals with governmental 
oppression and anarchical society, especially against poor individuals living in the rural 
areas.185  
4.5.2 Public interest litigation in South Africa’s pre-constitutional dispensation 
It is a very difficult task to identify the precise period in which PIL began in South Africa.186 
Some believe that PIL dates back to the 1950s and this concept was revived in the 1980s.187 
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However, Ngcukaitobi traces it back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, during the final 
stages of the introduction of colonialism in South Africa.188 He refers to this as the forgotten 
stories of the participations in PIL by African and Coloured lawyers who were litigating against 
the apartheid government, and oppressive policies and laws against black people. During the 
War of Mlanjeni in 1853 between the British and the Xhosa, the Xhosa’s land was taken and 
dominated by the colonialists.189 Between 1857 and 1858, the catastrophe of Nongqawuse 
shattered the Xhosa defiance when they killed thousands of their cattle.190 
 In 1878, in the last frontier war, Cecil John Rhodes passed the Glen Grey Act, which prevented 
the Xhosa from embarking on military resistance to the British.191 In terms of this Act, the 
Xhosa were turned into a nation of labourers as compared to a sovereign nation, their land was 
divided amongst whites and they were restricted to owning cattle and were compelled to pay 
tax.192 In 1879, the Zulu won the victory of Isandlwana when they defeated the British. 
However their victory did not last for long as the King of the Zulus was captured and exiled 
between the periods of 1890-1897.193 During this time, the land of the Zulus was put under 
colonial administration.194 In 1906, the War of Bhambatha took place, as the Zulus refused to 
pay hut tax imposed by the colonialists; the Bhambatha warriors were executed after sham legal 
proceedings.195 The defeat of the Xhosa and the Zulu was the beginning of an oppressive 
chapter in South African history as they could no longer resist the policies, laws and struggles 
imposed upon them by the colonial power. 
The earliest case of PIL that the learned author Ngcukaitobi could trace, took place in 1845 
brought by David Arnot.196 The dissension arose between the Griqua community, the 
Afrikaners and the diamond diggers over the ownership of land, in which lay the diamond 
pastures of Kimberly.197 Represented by Arnot, in the Land Court of the Griqualand West, the 
Griqua community based their claim on prior occupation. In his judgement, Justice Andries 
Stockenstrom rejected the Griqua’s claim on the basis that they were nomadic peoples; their 
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chief’s jurisdiction was over people not of one fixed land or area. In a further matter of PIL, 
Alfred Mangena198 brought legal proceedings in the public interest in the name of the 
Bhambatha warriors who were charged with treason.199 Before their execution, Mangena 
appealed the Privy Council to override the death sentences against the warriors.200 Despite 
getting instructions from the warriors, Mangena pursued the matter in his own name but he 
represented the whole group of prisoners of war on the basis of public interest.201 It was his 
argument during the trial, that was held before the military tribunal, that the tribunal erred, as 
it did not give the warriors sufficient procedural protection. However, the Privy Council ruled 
against Mangena and held that it lacked jurisdiction as the case was not heard in the ordinary 
court, the military tribunal, and the warriors were eventually executed.202  
In 1911, Mangena and Pixley ka Isaka Seme203 formed the first African attorneys’ 
partnership.204 Their practice was based not only in South Africa, it also operated in other 
countries such as Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland) and 
Swaziland. Seme became the attorney of King Sobhuza II of Swaziland. At the end of the 
Anglo Boer War, some of the Swazi’s land was divided up and disposed of to the whites from 
South Africa. The matter went to the Privy Council and Seme represented the Swazi nation 
before the Council.205 The appeal was unsuccessful. Furthermore, in 1913, the Natives Land 
Act was enacted. This Act restricted black people from owning land. As a result, they were not 
allowed in the settlements that were designated for whites. Led by the African National 
Congress (ANC) (the then South African Native National Congress), black organisations 
resolved to send a delegation to England to make representations against the enactment of the 
Act and for the apartheid Government to repeal the Act.  
Other black South African lawyers followed in Seme’s footsteps, including Henry Poswayo, 
George Montsioa and Richard Msimang.206 Msimang opened his own law practice in 
Johannesburg and then later connected with Mangena. Msimang joined the ANC and held a 
leading position and was also involved in drafting the organisation’s constitution. Msimang 
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and Solomon Plaatjies collected stories of people from across South Africa who were affected 
by the Natives Land Act. The stories were used as grounds for the government to withdraw the 
Act. Unfortunately, all these attempts were unsuccessful; the Act remained in operation. 
However, some progress was made as in 1936, a little concession was made for the excision of 
some pieces of land and that was listed in the form of a schedule in the Act.  
During the 1950s, South Africa’s society began its fight against apartheid laws which 
segregated the races and treated them unequally.207 Additionally, it was around this time that 
PIL really grew globally. PIL became one of the most important and useful means to challenge 
unjust laws.208 Interestingly, between the late 1970s and 1994, in South Africa, public interest 
lawyers took up the issues relevant at the time, and with success and the introduction of the 
Constitution, made their work and efforts more effective.209 Among the matters that these 
lawyers took up was the pass laws which prohibited black Africans from living in the cities; 
they were required to have permits unless exempted by statute.210 As a result, in 1986 the pass 
laws were repealed.211 
As mentioned above, public interest actions were essentially unknown in the South African 
legal landscape with very little legal precedent to work from.212 Amongst the ones that were 
brought and heard in court, some failed,213 whilst others were presented successfully.214 
Bagnall v The Colonial Government215 was the first case where the court had to establish 
whether the Roman Dutch principle of actiones populares was part of our law. This action 
allows an individual to bring a matter to court in the name of the public or in the public interest. 
In this instance, a taxpayer and secretary of the Manufacturers Association sought a declaratory 
order providing that the Treasurer-General was not entitled to permit any printed catalogues to 
be imported without payment of the duty as provided for in terms of the law.216  In support of 
this claim, the plaintiff relied on the Roman law practice of actiones populares, which held the 
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idea that any private individual could bring an action to court for the benefit of the people.217  
The court utterly rejected the existence of public interest action in South African law.218 The 
Court rejected this argument and held that this principle had become wholly obsolete under 
Roman Dutch law.219   
Moreover, actiones populares action had never been recognised in any South African court 
and was, therefore, not part of our law.220 In order to be consistent with the practice of our 
courts, De Villiers CJ emphasised that the plaintiff (who did not show that he was personally 
affected or suffered injury or damages as a result of the Treasurer-General’s decision) was not 
entitled to get relief sought in the name of the general public.221 This was because this kind of 
a matter was unheard of in any court in South Africa.222  
In the case of Patz v Greene & Co,223 the court again dealt with the issue of actions in the public 
interest. In reaching a conclusion regarding this matter, the Court referred to the decision of 
Chamberlaine v Chester and Birkenhead Railway Co.224 In the Court’s view, the applicant had 
locus standi but failed to provide clear proof that he had suffered any personal injury due to 
the respondent’s conduct, although he made a prima facie case of actual injury.225 Furthermore, 
the Court found that the decision in Chamberlaine was not ‘only good law, however common 
sense dictated that in the event where the prohibition by legislation is in the public interest, any 
member of the public would be entitled to approach a court for relief if he or she can prove 
they had sustained special damages’.226 In other words, the Court accepted that an action in the 
public interest was possible but that it could only be brought by persons with a direct, personal 
interest in the matter. 
                                                          
217 Bagnall supra. 
218 Loots ‘Locus standi to claim relief in the public interest in matters involving the enforcement of legislation’ 
(1987) 104 South African Law Journal 132. 
219 Bagnall v The Colonial Government (1907) 24 SC 470 at 476. 
220 Bagnall supra. 
221 Bagnall supra 477.  
222 Bagnall supra. 
223 Patz v Greene & Co (1907) TS 427. 
224 Chamberlaine v Chester and Birkenhead Railway Co (1884) 18 L.J. Ex. 494 at 496; Pollock CB found that: 
“Where a statute prohibits the doing of a particular act affecting the public, no person has a right of action 
against another merely because he has done the prohibited act. It is incumbent on the party complaining to 
allege and prove that the doing of the act prohibited has caused him some special damage some peculiar 
injury beyond that which he may be supposed to sustain in common with the rest of the Queen's subjects by 
an infringement of the law. But where the act prohibited is obviously prohibited for the protection of a 
particular party, then, it is not necessary to allege special damage." 
225 Patz v Greene & Co (1907) TS 427 at 438. 
226 Patz v Greene supra at 433. 
117 
 
In Dalrlymple v Colonial Treasurer,227 the Court dealt with the limitation of locus standi when 
it comes to litigation in the public interest. This case clearly highlights the constitutional 
dilemma that arises when the common law rules of standing in matters where issues affecting 
the public were at stake.228 In casu, the court referred to the non-existence and non-cognisance 
of actio popolaris by the South African courts.229 The applicants brought an application for an 
interdict as members of the Legislative Council to prevent the Treasurer –General from making 
payments to members of parliament for a session as if it was an ordinary session, instead of an 
extraordinary one as per their resolution.230 The court found that the applicants as councillors 
did not have locus standi. Innes CJ observed as follows: 
The general rule of our law is that no man can sue in respect of a wrongful act, unless it constitutes 
the breach of a duty owed to him by the wrong-doer, or unless it causes him some damage in law. 
This principle runs through the whole of our jurisprudence. It is not confined merely to the civil 
side: it is of equal force in regard to criminal procedure. Just as no man can claim damages in a 
civil action unless he has himself been injured, so no man may institute a private prosecution unless 
he has been specially affected by the crime. And the rule applies to wrongful acts, which affect the 
public, as well as to torts committed against private individuals. The acts complained of in this 
instance fall within the former category.231 The only right the applicants could claim is the right to 
see that the public funds are not expended in contravention of the statute law of the land; in other 
words, a right arising from a breach of a statute dealing with a public matter. Such a breach would 
not, in accordance with the general principles of our law, entitle the applicants to sue unless they 
could aver and establish some damage to themselves personally, or the breach of some duty due to 
them, or the infringement of some right vested in them.232 
4.5.3 Public interest litigation in South Africa in terms of the current Constitution 
Section 38 of the Constitution (section 7(4) of the interim Constitution) provides a radical 
innovation to standing compared to the common law approach.233 Of crucial importance in this 
                                                          
227 Dalrymple and Others v Colonial Treasurer (1910) TS 372. 
228 C Plasket ‘Representative standing in South African Law’ (2009) 62 The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 262. 
229 Dalrymple and Others v Colonial Treasurer (1910) TS 372 at 387. 
230 Dalrymple supra at 373. 
231 Dalrymple supra at 379. 
232 Dalrymple supra at 381. 
233 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (CCT5/95) [1995] ZACC 13; 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (6 December 1995) para 229, O’Regan held J that: ‘there can be 
little doubt that section 7(4) provides for a generous and expanded approach to standing in the constitutional 
context. The categories of persons who are granted standing to seek relief are far broader than our common 
law has ever permitted’; see also, Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and other 
(CCT 18/03) [2004] ZACC 12; 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC) (9 March 2004) para 14. 
118 
 
section is the provision that allows any person access to the courts for an appropriate relief 
acting in the public interest.234 In order for the applicant to be granted standing in the public 
interest, the court must be satisfied that he or she is ‘genuinely acting in the public interest’.235 
The criteria of determining whether the person bringing the application is acting ‘genuinely in 
the public interest’ was laid out by the Constitutional Court in its key decision of Ferreira v 
Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others on locus standi in a 
constitutional dispensation.236 In casu, O’Regan J observed as follows: 
Factors relevant to determining whether a person is genuinely acting in the public interest will 
include considerations such as: whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which 
the challenge can be brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to which it is of general 
and prospective application; and the range of persons or groups who may be directly or indirectly 
affected by any order made by the court and the opportunity that those persons or groups have had 
to present evidence and argument to the court. These factors will need to be considered in the light 
of the facts and circumstances of each case.237 
Furthermore, O’Regan J held that looking at the special circumstances of the case, the 
applicants had shown that they were eligible to be granted standing to act in the interest of the 
public.238 According to Abebe, the purpose of the criteria laid down in this case was to ‘ensure 
genuineness of the applicants’ motives by stifling cases brought for personal or publicity or 
political reasons under the guise of the public interest.’239 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut NO and Another,240 the Court interpreted section 38(d) 
of the Constitution. Relying on the Ferreira v Levin case, the Court found that two principles 
arise from this section. First, the Court must not rush to decline to exercise its jurisdiction 
concerning the enforcement of the right clause as enshrined in the Constitution, where the 
judgment will be in the public interest and where such may stop similar issues in the future.241  
Second, no valid reason could be given for refusing to grant a litigant standing in order to 
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protect an appropriate decision in regard to an act that affects his/her interests directly.242 
Melunsky J concluded as follows: 
It is therefore not only a person whose rights are infringed or threatened who may apply for 
appropriate relief: it is sufficient if there is an allegation of an infringement of or a threat to a right. 
In the present matter, the respondents have raised an allegation of unfair discrimination in violation 
of s 8(2) of the Constitution and the same issue has a direct bearing on similar cases in which the 
municipality is interested and/or involved. The result is that there seems to be no reason for denying 
the appellant standing, not only because it is acting in its own interest but also because it is acting 
in the public interest. In this regard, it should be noted that it is clearly in the public interest to have 
clarity on whether the municipality's decision to write off more than R62m discriminates unfairly 
against other service-charge debtors or ratepayers. Furthermore, a decision once given in this 
application will not be academic: it will have an effect on all persons in the position of the two 
respondents. Moreover, and in the words of Chaskalson P at 1082F (para [164]) in Ferreira, there 
is 'a pressing public interest that the decision be given as soon as possible'. 
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs,243 Yacoob J embraced the criteria 
set out in Ferreira v Levin, and held that it is not a closed list.244 Furthermore, he added that 
‘the degree of vulnerability of the people affected; the nature of the right said to be infringed; 
as well as the consequences of the infringement of the right are also important considerations 
in the analysis’.245 In Campus Law Clinic (University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban) v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another,246 the Constitutional Court accepted the factors set out 
in Ferreira and Lawyers for Human Rights decisions.247 In this case, the Campus Law Clinic 
brought an application for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
on the basis that it was in the public interest to do so in respect of the exceptional circumstances 
of the case.248 Essentially, proceedings from the beginning were motivated by judicial concern 
to ensure enforcement of warrants for sales in execution of properties where mortgage debtors 
were in default and that constitutional rights concerning access to adequate housing be taken 
into consideration.249 The Court accepted that the applicant had standing in bringing the 
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application for leave to appeal.250 However, the application was dismissed on the basis that it 
was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal as the substantive issue had not been 
properly dealt with.251 
4.6 Civil society driven public interest litigation 
In many jurisdictions on the African continent including South Africa, developments and 
reform of the rule of law have fundamentally promoted access to justice.252 Civil society 
organisations and other institutions specialising in human rights have contributed profoundly 
to the development of the rule of law and realisation of human rights through litigation.253 In 
South Africa, several NGOs such as the Legal Resources Centre (LRC),254 Lawyers for Human 
Rights (LHR),255 Black Sash and Section 27 have been involved in PIL and the provision of 
legal assistance to the most vulnerable communities.256 These organisations either litigate as 
parties or intervene as amicus curiae in the matter.257  
The concept of amicus curiae is firmly established in the legal arena.258 Literally translated, 
this concept means ‘friend of the court’. 259 In the South African context, amicus curiae plays 
an important role mainly in human rights litigation, particularly PIL by the human rights 
activists and civil society organisations.260 Factual material presentation by the amicus curiae 
assists the court in making rational and far-reaching decisions.261 In participating as amici,  
NGO’s can support a party’s arguments in court proceedings and improve jurisprudence in a 
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particular area of law.262  An example of a successful intervention of a civil society as an amicus 
curiae is the case of Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others.263 In this judgment, the Constitutional Court clarified the law relating to the role played 
by amici in South African law and held that: 
The role of an amicus is to draw the attention of the Court to relevant matters of law and fact to 
which attention would not otherwise be drawn. In return for the privilege of participating in the 
proceedings without having to qualify as a party, an amicus has a special duty to the Court. That 
duty is to provide cogent and helpful submissions that assist the Court. The amicus must not repeat 
arguments already made but must raise new contentions; and generally, these new contentions 
must be raised on the data already before the Court. Ordinarily it is inappropriate for an amicus to 
try to introduce new contentions based on fresh evidence.264 
Apart from NGO’s, there are two other institutions that have an important role in the 
development of PIL,265 namely, University Law Clinics266 and Legal Aid South Africa 
(LASA).267 The clinical law movement in South Africa began in the 1970s which emerged 
from the desire of law students and academics to be engaged in bringing about social justice.268 
The primary focus of law clinics is to provide legal education and training within law schools269 
whist providing legal advice and assistance to the poor communities who cannot afford legal 
services.270 Furthermore, LASA was founded on a judicare system in which private attorneys 
provide legal assistance in terms of the Legal Aid Act of 1969.271 The Legal Aid Board was 
created under the Act, which is empowered to provide legal assistance to indigent members of 
society using a means test at the expense of the State.272 As a result of the judicare system not 
producing ideal outcomes, LASA transformed to a salaried system, creating justice centres all 
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over the country including in rural areas, staffed by attorneys and supporting staff paid on a 
salary basis.273 
With a variety of mechanisms available to provide legal aid to marginalised groups, South 
African rules of practice have implemented pro bono services by the legal profession.274 
Literally translated, pro bono publico means ‘for the good of the people’.275 The term is used 
in the legal fraternity, to refer to free legal services or work undertaken at a discounted rate in 
order to assist vulnerable and marginalised communities who are frequently denied access to 
justice.276 Theoretically, the current South African law277 makes it mandatory for candidate 
attorneys and practicing attorneys to do pro bono work.278  
4.7 Strategic litigation  
There are numerous strategies that have been used by civil society in the course of PIL.279 
These strategies have been employed in order to address social injustices against vulnerable 
and marginalised members of our community.280 There are various ways in which strategic 
litigation is defined. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, strategic litigation can be 
defined as ‘a way of bringing a matter to a court of law with an intention to impact beyond that 
particular case to bring about social change in the law, policy or practice in the benefit of the 
public’.281 Strategic litigation is one measure of a broader campaign for social criticism and 
mobilisation, setting of legal precedents and raising awareness, and development for principles 
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of accountability by those in power,282 and norms of legality, regardless of success or loss in 
courts.283 
Many organisations are involved in bringing about social change by helping various groups in 
accessing the courts where their rights have been violated, such as children,284 women and 
PLWHIV.285 It is very important for these organisations to design an appropriate strategy for 
their litigation process in order to achieve social change.286 The purpose of strategic litigation 
is to test the rule of law, acquire a distinctive interpretation287 and appropriate application of 
such law and which in some instances, may have a discriminatory impact on the members of a 
particular group.288  There are certain factors that organisations must take into consideration 
when undertaking strategic litigation. These factors include identifying the nature and extent 
of the problem, proper identification and organisation of clients or victims, deciding on the 
suitable forum for the cause of action, public information, advocacy and legal advice, public 
information, advocacy and legal advice, research and collection of documentation, co-
ordination and organisation of partnerships with community allies, availability of resources, 
timing, identifying the impact of litigation and the remedy.289 
 4.7.1 Identifying the nature and extent of the problem290  
Before commencing with PIL, it is of vital importance that the potential litigator not only 
identifies a general issue of concern but also the precise legal issues that must be determined 
before proceeding to the next stage.291 Often, determination of a specific legal issue is because 
of efficient human rights monitoring.292 This helps organisations in determining priority issues 
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that people face, and to have an understanding of serious and urgent matters of human rights 
violations. Further, these are most likely to be dealt with under PIL.293 The potential litigation 
must establish the extent of the problem; and whether the court can provide a solution upon 
adjudication.294 Moreover, it must be determined whether further advocacy has been done.295 
 4.7.2 Proper identification and organisation of clients or victims296  
When initiating a public interest action, it is vital that the representatives choose the client 
carefully. It must be clear from the outset who the client is, whether it is an individual, a group 
of persons or an organisation with a direct interest in the matter being litigated.297 In PIL, a 
lasting social transformation is most likely to be achieved when an organisation is party to the 
proceedings in which it has a direct interest.298   Nonetheless, in cases where an organisation is 
litigating in a representative role, it is important that the client is actively involved in key 
decision-making.299 
4.7.3 Deciding on the suitable forum for the institution of proceedings 300  
A litigator will have to decide whether legal proceedings will be instituted in a High Court or 
Magistrates’ court or other relevant forum. 
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4.7.4 Public information, advocacy and legal advice301 
A campaign on public information informs and teaches average people of their rights and this 
is considered a vital feature of human rights mobilisation and PIL.302 Once people are educated 
about their human rights, development of strategic litigation in ensuring that these rights are 
realised is critical.303 This can be done by giving legal advice and taking the matter to court on 
their behalf.304 Advocacy is an essential element of social change and achieving ground-
breaking precedents on human rights issues.305 
It is imperative to train presiding officers and legal representatives on how PIL operates 
concerning its general application or on particular human rights violations.306 The reason 
behind this is that often, in many jurisdictions, the judiciary, attorneys and other participants 
lack or have little knowledge about PIL.307 Efficient training of the media as well is also crucial 
for the sake of proper coverage regarding the emergence of public interest cases.308 
4.7.5 Research and collection of documentation309  
Research is the most important aspect of successful PIL.310 There are different kinds of research 
that have been proposed, namely factual and legal research. Factual research includes 
background information on human rights violations, public knowledge, beliefs and attitudes 
regarding the violations,311 and statistical information collected on the experiences and impact 
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of such violations on the victims.312 Legal research is pivotal.313 It examines legal positions 
with regards to the particular problem by looking at existing national and international legal 
frameworks, jurisprudence, government policies, and views of the legal experts in the particular 
field of law, and available remedies that can be ordered by the judiciary.314   
4.7.6 Co-ordination and organisation of partnerships with community allies315  
It is essential that organisations bringing matters to court in the public interest co-ordinate and 
share information.316 The coalition helps litigators to increase their knowledge in the subject 
matter, it increases the resources available317 and prevents duplicate adjudication of similar 
issues.318   
4.7.7 Availability of resources 319  
The anticipated length of the litigation, cost repercussions and implementation of the relief 
sought must be determined in the early stage of the public action.320 
4.7.8 Timing321  
This is an essential feature in any litigation process, especially PIL.322  
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4.7.9 Identifying the impact of litigation323   
Identifying the potential impact of litigation is important as it determines whether the litigator 
must continue with the litigation or not. This helps in identifying the group in the society that 
will benefit from the outcome of the proceedings in question.324 This also helps to identify the 
impact the proceedings will have on clients and their families and the change that it will bring 
in the broader context in the national, regional and international spheres.325 
4.7.10 The remedy  
The relief sought must be identified. It must be determined whether the remedy will address 
the substantial systemic violation of human rights.326 The remedy must also reflect the priorities 
of the victims of such violations.327 It must be determined whether the relief sought has been 
ordered in another court and the possibility of its implementation by the relevant authorities.328  
4.8 Conclusion 
Although PIL is not a new concept in the South African landscape, it has gained momentum 
since the inception of the interim Constitution in 1993. Not only did the interim Constitution 
provide for PIL, it also introduced the concept of class actions. Although section 38 of the 
Constitution provides for a class action and PIL to be brought in cases where a right in the 
BoRs has been violated, the Mukkadam has now bridged the gap by permitting for class actions 
to be brought in matters where a right not provided for in the BoRs has been infringed. The 
availability of these strategic litigation tools is invaluable in the South African context as it 
goes to the heart of access to justice. A key feature of PIL and class actions is the ability of its 
outcome to reach a greater number of women from the affected class. Litigating by way of PIL 
or class actions has very little or no financial implication for the affected class of women, who 
in this dissertation have been found to form the most vulnerable and marginalised groups in 
our community.  
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Chapter Five 
Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa is a transitional evolution from racial 
segregation, inequality and injustices that were faced by the majority of South African 
people.329 The South African Constitution is a transformative tool which addresses inequalities 
and injustices, thereby recognising social change and that the realisation of fundamental human 
rights are necessary if we are to achieve an equal society.330 In one of the landmark post-
apartheid cases by the Constitutional Court, Kriegler J noted that: 
The South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an egalitarian  Constitution. The 
supreme laws of comparable constitutional states may underscore other principles and rights. But 
in light of our own particular history, and our vision for the  future, a Constitution was written 
with equality at its centre. Equality is our Constitution’s focus and organizing principle.331 
The Constitution gives pride of place to the right to equality which guarantees equal treatment 
and protection of every person in terms of the law and the right to be free from 
discrimination.332 However, nearly twenty four years into democracy, the achievement of a 
discrimination free society based on social justice, democratic values and fundamental human 
rights333 remains a remote undertaking, if not a vision impossible. Despite the recognition of 
gender equality by the Constitution and the development of equality jurisprudence by the 
courts, women continue to face discrimination and substantial inequality in our society.334 
This chapter critically examines the decision in the judgment of LM, and whether it closed the 
door on the claim of discrimination by the HIV positive women who allege to have been 
sterilised either coercively or forcibly. Firstly, it does this by assessing the impact of the 
dismissal of the equality claim in the LM case. Secondly, it critically examines the LM 
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judgment by reviewing the extent to which an equality claim in the Equality Courts would or 
would not be successful. Thirdly, it critiques the possibility of such a claim being brought as a 
class action or a form of public interest action.  
5.2 Women, equality and HIV-related discrimination 
Since the inception of the Constitution, very few cases have been adjudicated relating to gender 
equality protecting women, especially black women who are one of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in our society.335 Although the courts have been sympathetic towards 
women in its jurisprudence and have strongly articulated the notion of substantive equality, the 
lived reality of many women, particularly black women, has not changed.  
Women living with HIV have an additional burden placed on them in that they often face not 
only discrimination based on gender and race, but also HIV. Often, women experience severe 
forms of stigma and prejudice resulting from HIV discrimination. The forms of HIV-related 
discrimination include violence, social exclusion, compulsory HIV testing without consent and 
proper counselling, lack of support and denial of healthcare and related services.336  More 
recently, in South Africa and around the globe, HIV positive women have been subjected to a 
discriminatory practice of forced or coerced sterilisation.337 This discriminatory practice 
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constitutes an infringement of sexual and reproductive rights of the women affected.338  In 
addition to dealing with difficulties resulting from their HIV positive status, such as deciding 
on how best to have their children and PMTCT during pregnancy, HIV positive women also 
experience hostile behaviour and judgemental attitudes by healthcare workers.339 HIV-related 
discrimination by healthcare personnel remains a prevalent problem in some jurisdictions.340 
The results of the studies conducted on this human rights issue are evidence that HIV positive 
sexual and reproductive rights of women and their autonomy are being compromised. The 
women illustrate this, in the following narratives: 
“I had to put up with the judgemental attitude of the healthcare staff, including their disbelief 
that a woman with HIV would get pregnant.”341 
One woman recalled the doctor saying, “She should be careful when having sex and that she 
should not even think about getting pregnant.’’342 Thereafter, the doctor was not willing to help 
her with the delivery of her baby and he told her that he “refused to bring children with AIDS 
to the world.’’343 
Many of the women felt that they were being judged simply because they were HIV positive. 
The discrimination and stigma against HIV positive women goes as far as others choosing on 
their behalf, the number and spacing of their children. One woman was advised by the nurses 
not to get pregnant again. Two years later, when she went to hospital for childbirth she recalls 
that: 
“the nurses shouted at me why I did not listen to their advice. I had her because I wanted a child 
in my life, the child is healthy and I don’t think she is infected.”344 
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Discrimination against women living with HIV has a negative effect on the women’s lives.  
Studies show that discrimination and other challenges that these women face affect their 
reproductive rights and motherhood.345 Studies also show that decision-making concerning 
child bearing is influenced by family and cultural commands, pressures from the healthcare 
workers and societal customs as bearing children raises a woman’s status in the community.346 
The inability to bear children impacts negatively on women as it means that they are unable to 
fulfil personal and cultural expectations.347 The following quotes illustrate this point: 
“My husband paid lobola and he must have a child”348 
“if the in-laws paid lobola, they decide how many children, because they brought you to sustain  
the clan. Even if you have many children you should continue falling pregnant until you have a 
boy. If you don’t have children you are less of a woman. You lose everything even your inheritance. 
I have five children and am expected to have another because I do not have a son.”349 
Additionally, HIV positive women experience another form of discrimination in healthcare 
facilities, such as being kept away from HIV-negative patients. One woman from Chile 
remarked that she was separated from other women who had given birth who were placed 
together in one recovery room except for her.  She recalls that she: 
“did not even receive visits from the nurse to bring me pills for the pain, because she walked 
through all the other rooms where there were more people, but it was like she forgot about 
me…the impact was very strong.”350     
 
 
5.3 The impact of the discriminatory forced and coerced sterilisation on the dignity of 
HIV positive women 
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Informed consent is one of the primary principles in the healthcare of modern society.351 Failure 
to take informed consent, before performing sterilisation on HIV positive women, is a violation 
of their reproductive rights. Infringement of the women’s rights and refusal of sexual and 
reproductive rights services impacts immensely on HIV positive women and can be very 
devastating at times.352 As a result, this undermines the women’s dignity and autonomy as they 
are neither treated equally nor with respect. Furthermore, the forced or coerced sterilisation of 
HIV positive women affects their psycho-social and physical relationships with their partners, 
family and society. 353 The narratives below illustrate this point: 
“Sometimes when I remember what I have been through and what cause it all; I burst in tears and 
cry. I feel I should separate from my husband. If it was possible, I would leave him because of the 
pain I am going through. I do not want him to suffer because of my problems; besides, I have lost 
sexual desire.”354 
“Sterilisation comes with other problems including psychological problems, emotional problems 
because the thinking that your tubes are nowhere, it also puts you down. It can cause psycho-social 
breakdown and reduces your productivity.”355 
“I avoid conversations about children because they hurt me…Uhm you avoid going to baby 
showers at all costs.”356 
Moreover, some women suffer financial implications and loss of income because of the 
sterilisations. Below are the women’s experiences: 
“I lost a partner and income for support of my children. He did not provide for those children, he 
did nothing, he just dealt with those who do give birth…since I am not working, I have no one to 
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provide for these children of mine because that man threw me out with the child I had just 
delivered.”357 
“I no longer work the way I used to work. My husband abandoned us with the children. When you 
have a man, he might want you to give birth and so if you have been sterilised he will leave you 
for another woman who can give birth.”358 
“My work has been affected I used to sell bales of cloth for someone but now they are too heavy, 
I quit the job.”359  
5.4 Forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women as a form of discrimination 
and a violation of the right to equality 
5.4.1 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia360  
There has been only one decided case on the issue of forced or coerced sterilisation of women 
living with HIV. This is the judgment of LM and Others v Government of the Republic of 
Namibia. This case is discussed in Chapter one of this thesis. However, for the ease of reading, 
the matter concerned three HIV positive plaintiffs who were sterilised without their informed 
consent in two Namibian state hospitals. 
 5.4.1.1 Analysis of the court judgment on the claim of discrimination 
Even though the LM decision affirms sexual and reproductive rights of HIV positive women, 
there is no doubt that the High Court and Supreme Court failed HIV positive women by 
dismissing the claim of discrimination on the ground of HIV status. This decision did not 
advance or provide any solution to the problem of forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women as it simply avoided the issue. In essence, both the High Court and the Supreme 
Court held that women failed to discharge the onus of proving that there was discrimination 
against them.361 However, no cogent reasons were provided for the dismissal of the claim of 
discrimination. Further, there was no guidance by the court on what would constitute 
admissible and relevant evidence in the circumstances. 
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It is submitted that it is common cause that the evidentiary burden rested on the women to 
prove discrimination on a balance of probabilities. The oral evidence provided by the plaintiffs 
on the issue of discrimination was never set out or evaluated by the courts. This means that at 
the end of the matter, we are still no clearer on how to prove a civil claim for unfair 
discrimination in the High Court. It is unclear if the evidence provided by the three plaintiffs 
was inadmissible, for example, hearsay (i.e. she overheard a nurse saying that all HIV positive 
women must be sterilised).  Likewise, the judgment does not indicate why the women’s own 
versions were irrelevant. 
It is argued that a key failing in this otherwise landmark decision is that the court’s focus on 
informed consent means that the decision revolved around medical negligence by the 
healthcare practitioners, but failed to address why this was only with HIV positive women. 
Thus, it makes the case indistinguishable from other medical negligence cases. The learned 
author Patel, eloquently articulates why precedent is needed on the issue of equality. She states 
that seeing this as an issue of unfair discrimination contextualises the issue and explains the 
underlying causes of this form of medical negligence.   
5.5 The importance of the courts to hold that forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women without their informed consent is a violation of their right to equality and 
a form of unfair discrimination 
Forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women is a human rights problem and it must 
be addressed accordingly. The outcome of the LM case on the claim of discrimination is 
unsatisfactory and this means that reproductive rights of HIV positive women continue to be 
violated and it leaves these women even more vulnerable, and it must re-evaluated. Patel 
suggests reasons why it is critical for the courts to find it as a violation of the right to be free 
from discrimination for women living with HIV:362  
The first reason is that recognising and holding that the sterilisation of the women without 
informed consent was done for the reason that women belonged to a particular group deserving 
of non-discrimination protection, so realising that this problem is broad and a systemic 
discriminatory practice rather than an individualistic matter.363 Finding that forced and coerced 
sterilisation occurs because of discriminatory practices, will also bring change for structural 
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reform.364 The Equality Act does not explicitly recognise systemic discrimination as a distinct, 
self-standing cause of action.365 However, according to the learned author Kok, the Equality 
Act is well equipped to deal with claims alleging systemic discrimination and this can be driven 
by the use of class action and public interest litigation.366 
Second, it is important to find that forced and coerced sterilisation is a violation of a non-
discrimination rights in order to acknowledge and affirm the marginalisation of particular 
groups in our society.367 The acknowledgement of discrimination against HIV positive women 
from the courts will also send a message to the general public that discrimination is 
prohibited.368 
Third, in order to effectively address the primary reasons for the practice of unfair 
discrimination, the court must find that forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with 
HIV is a violation of the right to be free from discrimination.369 This will change the perception 
of the perpetrators of the discriminatory practice.370 
Inherently, forced and coerced sterilisation is a discriminatory practice. It is performed on 
women living with HIV in order to prevent them from procreating as they are perceived as less 
than ideal members of society.371 The courts’ failure to thoroughly investigate this 
discriminatory practice and find in favour of the women, misconstrues the essential nature of 
what this practice is all about and, therefore, does not address the problem at hand.372 Further, 
it undermines the effect that the discriminatory practice has on the group targeted.373 
Patel further makes a recommendation to the potential litigators, especially the NGO’s 
representing the affected women on the issue of forced and coerced sterilisation. The following 
must be done in order to be successful with a claim of discrimination: 
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(i) Include a claim that the right to be free from discrimination was violated in their legal 
papers.374 
(ii) Ensure the discrimination claim alleges discrimination on the basis of sex (if the facts 
support such a claim) and on any other basis such as health status or ethnic or racial 
affiliation.375 
(iii) Provide the court with detailed legal arguments and factual evidence supporting the 
discrimination claim.376 
(iv) Engage in documentation of other cases of forced and coerced sterilisation.377 
(v) Use advocacy strategies, such as raising awareness among the general public and 
engaging the media on the harm of forced and coerced sterilisation.378 
(vi) Consider requesting the court to issue structural remedies to address the systemic 
issues of discrimination in healthcare.379 
(vii) Ensure the remedies requested from the court reflect the desires of the affected 
women. For instance, it may be that the affected women prefer direct access to 
fertility services rather than mere monetary compensation.380 
Moreover, when asked to pronounce on the issue of forced and coerced sterilisation the 
judiciary must be guided by the following: 
(i) Engage in a robust analysis of the discrimination claim.381 
(ii) If the court determines there is insufficient evidence in the case at hand, then provide 
guidance on what type of additional evidence is needed.382 
                                                          
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Patel ‘Forced sterilisation of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 9. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ibid 10. 
382 Ibid. 
137 
 
(iii) Consider structural remedies for addressing systemic discrimination in healthcare, 
including requiring the government to provide appropriate training of healthcare 
workers.383  
(iv) Be open to considering granting alternative remedies to monetary compensation when 
appropriate and available.384 
In order to curb the problem of discrimination, generally, medical practitioners, social and 
community healthcare workers must: 
(i) Ensure that healthcare workers are well trained on informed consent.385 
(ii) Ensure healthcare workers are trained on how to work with marginalized populations 
to ensure they are not subjected to discriminatory treatment.386 
(iii) Develop internal complaint processes so that any violations can be identified and 
appropriately addressed quickly and fairly.387 
5.6 The right to equality in the South African Constitution in addressing forced and 
coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV 
Section 9 of the Constitution contains a substantial right to equality which everyone is entitled 
to,388 including women living with HIV. The stigmatisation, stereotypes and prejudices that 
PLWHIV experience are of recent origin, however, this does not mean that it should be taken 
less seriously than other disadvantages rooted in the past.389 Constitutionally speaking, the 
exclusion of and discriminatory conduct against PLWHIV are unacceptable, likewise the 
discriminatory attributes of the past such as race and ethnicity.390 
 The case of Hoffmann v South African Airways,391 is the only decision in the Constitutional 
Court jurisprudence where the Court has had to pronounce on discrimination based on HIV 
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status. In determining whether the appellant (Hoffman) was unfairly discriminated against, the 
Court focused on the impact of the discriminatory conduct on him and whether his human 
dignity was impaired. In doing so, Ngcobo J emphasised the vulnerability of PLWHIV and 
how, as a minority group in our society, they have been subjected to stigmatisation and 
discrimination. Referring to the plight of PLWHIV, the learned Judge observed that society 
has responded with harsh prejudice and stigmatisation.392 Further, the court held that pervasive 
perceptions about PLWHIV must be combated and society’s prejudices could not be allowed 
to justify unfair discrimination against PLWHIV.393 
When an equality complaint is lodged, different tests are applicable to different cases. Firstly, 
in instances where the complainant seeks a declaratory order on the validity of a statutory 
provision, the court must rely either on sections 9(1), 9(2) or 9(3) of the Constitution.394 
Accordingly, the application of each section will be determined by the facts and circumstances 
of each case. For the reason of constitutional supremacy, relying directly on section 9 is 
required in matters where the invalidation of a statutory provision is sought.395 Secondly, in 
cases where the conduct of a public agent or a private institution is questioned on the basis of 
equality but does not concern legislative provision invalidation, the complainant must rely on 
the provisions of the Equality Act.396 This is as a result of the principle of subsidiarity which 
requires that the complainant who alleges infringement of his/her constitutional rights rely on 
the legislative provisions protecting that right.397 Nonetheless, when the complainant is 
challenging the constitutionality of a discriminatory act, they cannot rely directly on section 9 
of the Constitution but may use PEPUDA which gives effect to this section.  
Section 9(1) must be applied in instances where a statutory provision differentiates between 
persons or a group of persons, but the differentiation is not directly or indirectly based on one 
listed or analogous ground of discrimination as per section 9(3) of the Constitution.398 This will 
not be applicable in our scenario where HIV positive women have been subjected to forced or 
coerced sterilisation. This is because no legislative provision is being challenged. 
                                                          
392 Ibid para 28. 
393 Ibid paras 35-38. 
394 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 429. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
139 
 
Section 9(2) is applicable in cases where the provision in question aims at implementing a 
restitutionary measure. In such matters, the court first looks at the constitutionality of the 
restitutionary measure in terms of section 9(2). If the restitutionary measure in the legislative 
provision affirms a section 9(2) enquiry, then that will be the end of the constitutionality test. 
However, if the answer is in the negative, then the court moves on to section 9(3).  
Section 9(3) is applied in cases where the distinction between persons or a group of persons is 
drawn directly or indirectly affecting one or more of the listed prohibited grounds or analogous 
grounds under this section.399 This is to say that as a complainant’s claim must be based on 
discrimination, refer directly to section 9(3). In section 9(3) matters, the onus of proving that 
the discrimination alleged is unfair, rests on the defendant.400 HIV/AIDS status is not listed as 
a prohibited ground under section 9(3) of the Constitution. However, it is suggested that the 
word ‘including’ in section 9(3) shows that the list of grounds of discrimination is not a closed 
list and that discrimination on the other grounds not listed in the section may constitute 
discrimination. In order to determine whether there is discrimination based on an analogous 
ground, a test developed in the case of Harksen is applicable. Applying the test to our scenario 
of the claim of discrimination against HIV positive women, the court will have to ask the 
following questions: 
(i) First, whether the differentiation relates to the unequal treatment of HIV positive women 
based on other ‘attributes and characteristics attaching to them’ which are not related to the 
specified ground, but are however comparable to them.401 In Harksen’s case, the court warned 
against application of narrow definition of ‘attributes and characteristics’.402  
(ii) Second, whether this differentiation has the effect of treating HIV positive women differently 
in a way which ‘impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal 
in dignity’ or affects HIV positive women adversely in ‘a comparably serious manner.’403 
The recognition of the right to human dignity is foundational to the respect and realisation of 
other human rights entrenched in the Constitution. The right to human dignity is interrelated 
with the right to be treated equally and without discrimination.  As it was held in Hoffmann’s 
case, HIV positive women belong to a vulnerable and marginalised group in our society. The 
mere fact that HIV positive women are sterilised without their informed consent should be a 
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sufficient characteristic to prove discrimination to the Court because there has not been any 
scenarios of HIV negative women or HIV positive men who have been sterilised either 
coercively or forcibly. It is argued that this differentiation impairs the women’s dignity as 
individuals who deserve to be treated equally before the law, with human dignity and respect 
for their human rights.  
Once it has been established that HIV positive women are being treated differently, the onus 
lies on the defendant to show that the differentiation is justifiable in terms of the law. Proving 
whether discrimination is fair or not, is seemingly dependent on whether it impairs on the 
complainant’s dignity.404  A non-exhaustive list of factors was set out in Harksen to determine 
whether discrimination impacted unfairly on the complaint.405  HIV positive women do not 
have to show the court that the medical personnel’s conduct against them was intentional.406  
Recognition of the right to equality in section 9 of the Constitution is a foundation of our legal 
system and should help redress the inequalities and stigma against HIV positive women. As 
good as this sounds, it does not seem to completely address the challenges that these women 
face. First, bringing a complaint of discrimination relying on the equality clause, specifically 
section 9(3), places a huge burden on the HIV positive women to prove discrimination. This is 
because HIV status is not listed in the specified prohibited grounds of discrimination. Second, 
worldwide, there have been no successful equality cases where HIV positive women have been 
sterilised without their informed consent. Still, the issue remains that women are left in the dark 
on what evidentiary requirement must be met in order to be successful in a claim of 
discrimination in the circumstances. Third, a claim of discrimination based on the equality right 
must be heard in the High Court. The disadvantage of this is that most of the complainants are 
poor and illiterate, which will make it difficult for them to approach the court because of the 
costs and the technicalities of the court process.   
Nevertheless, this does not mean the end of options for HIV positive women and that they will 
be left with no redress. Section 9 of the Constitution mandates the enactment of the Equality 
Act which makes provision for the Equality Courts which is a much easier way of resolving 
equality disputes.  
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5.7 The role of the Equality Courts in addressing forced and coerced sterilisation and 
elimination of discrimination of women living with HIV in South Africa 
The aim of the Equality Act is to eradicate discrimination created by the inequalities of the past 
in South Africa. In achieving this aim, the Act creates Equality Courts as a primary tool to 
advance the right to equality. In order to increase access to justice for the groups that are mostly 
affected by discrimination, innovative and creative procedural and evidential rules are 
applicable in the Equality Courts.407 It is submitted that in South Africa, the LM case has not 
closed the door on the claim of discrimination by women living with HIV who have been 
sterilised without their informed consent. This is because we have legislation, which 
specifically deals with claims of this nature.  
5.7.1 Strengths 
The proceedings in the Equality Courts are facilitated based on an inquisitorial approach. This 
provides ease of access for the victims of discrimination. For effective access to justice, the 
proceedings in the Equality Courts are speedy and informal which allows unrepresented 
litigants to seek relief with the help of the clerk of court.408 As a result, the proceedings in the 
Equality Court is less likely to be delayed because of procedural technicalities as the process 
takes up to 37 days.  No legal representation is required when bringing a complaint in the 
Equality Court and there are no legal costs to be borne by the complainants, unless the parties 
elect to have representatives. This will be in favour of HIV positive women because of their 
generally low economic-status. 
The Act prohibits unfair discrimination against any person or a group of persons based on 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. HIV/AIDS status has recently been added to the list of 
prohibited grounds in terms of the Act. This is a milestone progression in our law and an 
opportunity of immeasurable value for PLWHIV/AIDS in South Africa for access to the 
equality courts for discrimination redress based on their HIV status.  
Section 13 of the Equality Act requires the complainant to prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination.409 Thereafter, the onus rests with the alleged perpetrator of the discriminatory 
conduct to prove that no discrimination took place,410 or the discrimination was not based on a 
                                                          
407 N Bohler-Muller ‘The promise of Equality Courts’ (2006) 22 (3) South African Journal on Human Rights 385. 
408 Section 4 of PEPUDA. 
409 Section 13(1) of PEPUDA. 
410 Section 13(1)(a) of PEPUDA. 
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prohibited ground,411 or that the alleged discrimination was not unfair.412 The recent 
amendment to the Equality Act and the inclusion of the HIV/AIDS status as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination makes it easier for an HIV positive woman when lodging a complaint of 
discrimination because it is automatically presumed to be unfair unless the alleged respondent 
proves otherwise.413 A woman living with HIV who has been sterilised without her informed 
consent only needs to show a prima facie case of discrimination on the part of the respondent. 
The Equality Court is empowered to order a wide range of remedies for the complainant, 
including an unconditional apology by the respondent.414 It is believed that ordering an apology 
as a remedy is educational to the perpetrators of discrimination in a sense that they can learn 
that unfair discriminatory practices in a democratic South Africa will not be tolerated. The 
ordering of this remedy is also indicative of the potential that the Equality Court has in 
empowering persons and communities by enhancing their psychological and physical well-
being as victims of unfair practices in our society and dealing with the root source of the 
problem.415  
Furthermore, in terms of the Equality Act, the Equality Court has the power to award damages 
to the complainant for the loss suffered resulting from a discriminatory conduct on the part of 
the respondent. In most of the cases that have been to the Equality Courts, damages awarded 
were related to hate speech. In some cases, the damages were awarded to the organisations 
chosen by the complainant,416 and in some cases to the individual complainants.417 The issue 
of HIV discrimination is distinguishable to these other cases. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
Equality Court may grant compensation to an HIV positive complainant where the court is 
satisfied that she had suffered damages as a result of the forced or coerced sterilisation. 
                                                          
411 Section 13(1)(b) of PEPUDA. 
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5.7.2 Weaknesses 
The existence of Equality Courts does not come without problems. First, the Equality Courts 
are relatively unknown to the people of South Africa, especially the poor and illiterate. This 
indicates that insufficient awareness programmes have been conducted and as such, limits 
access to and use of the Equality Courts. Second, there is no precedent by the Equality Court 
for HIV-related discrimination. Hopefully, now that HIV is a listed ground we will see more 
of these cases coming to court.  Third, generally, Equality Court proceedings are conducted in 
an ‘open court’ unless the contrary is so directed. As a result, HIV positive women may be 
reluctant to approach the court because of further stigmatisation and discrimination they might 
be subjected to.  
Fourth, although the Equality Court presiding officers and clerks have been provided with 
appropriate training, a once off training is insufficient. On-going training is needed in order to 
keep up with the current issues that South Africans face. In application to our scenario of HIV 
positive women, training of the presiding officer will help them to be sensitive to these women. 
There has not been decided cases on this issue, which makes it difficult for us to pin point 
whether the same prejudices will be shown to HIV positive women by the courts. It is for this 
reason that on-going training is suggested. Furthermore, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development has not provided sufficient support, forums and spaces for 
learning for the presiding officers and clerks and sharing of insights, challenges and practice 
strategies in the Equality Courts’ settings.418 There have been constant complaints about 
shortages of staff and in some instances, lack of resources to enable the proper working 
environment in the Equality Courts.419 
Lastly, although the Equality Court, as a special court, may develop its own rules, it is still 
subject to the rules applicable to the civil courts. Prescription will be a difficulty for the women 
to approach the courts with. For instance, the studies on sterilisation of HIV positive women 
conducted in South Africa are more than three years old and there has been no new research 
on whether this discriminatory practice is still on-going in our hospitals. The implication of 
this is that a relief that an HIV positive woman may seek in the Equality Court is limited to a 
claim of discrimination. This means that if the three years have passed after the cause of action 
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has arisen then the complainant cannot bring the matter to court. This is not in favour of the 
complainants in our scenario because some of the women would want the courts to grant them 
compensation. 
 
5.8 Bringing a class action or public interest action in the Equality Court 
Generally, the Constitution establishes a right of access to justice for the enforcement of the 
rights provided for in the BoRs.420 Despite this constitutional provision, accessing the justice 
system in South Africa is still a hurdle for poor people. Other factors that bar indigent people 
from accessing the courts are lack of knowledge of their human rights resulting from illiteracy, 
geographic location of the courts, procedural challenges and lengthy and delayed dispute 
resolution processes.421     
It is submitted that in an attempt to give effect to the enforcement of the rights clause, any 
person or an organisation may approach the Equality Court on behalf of a group or a class 
action or in the public interest. The value of using the Equality Courts by an organisation on 
behalf of the people affected by a discriminatory conduct, or challenging an equality issue in 
the public interest involves two things.422 These include Equality Courts as a mechanism to 
achieve impact litigation and a tool to initiate advocacy and raising awareness.423  In this regard, 
the NGO’s play a pivotal role in developing law on equality, and that is why we need more 
litigation in the Equality Courts as part of the vision to eradicate discrimination and inequality 
in our society. 
5.8.1 Strengths 
There are a number of reasons that support approaching the Equality Court as a class or in a 
claim of discrimination based on an HIV status. First, a class action and a public interest action 
will reach out to a number of women who have been subjected to forced or coerced sterilisation. 
Second, women belonging to a class will bear no legal costs because they will be assisted by 
an organisation specialising in these kinds of matters. Third, HIV status is a listed ground of 
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discrimination in terms of the Equality Act, which makes burden of proof not too onerous for 
the complainants, as the respondent will have to prove that the discrimination is fair. 
Fourth, working through an organisation will be beneficial for HIV positive women because 
the organisation will have skilled legal minds to drive the litigation process. It is submitted that 
an organisation is best placed to represent the litigants in a claim of discrimination before the 
Equality Court.  Fifth, greater media coverage will be obtained when an organisation litigates 
on behalf of several HIV positive women as opposed to one women approaching the court. As 
a result, this will have the effect of raising awareness amongst a greater group of persons and 
may prevent this practice from continuing.  
Moreover, when an organisation approaches the Equality Court in the name of HIV positive 
women, it will set a precedent that will assist with future cases of HIV discrimination, in the 
Equality Courts. Seventeen years  after the enactment of the Equality Act in South Africa, HIV 
status has been included as a prohibited ground. This is an indication that discrimination based 
on HIV status is still taking place and the legislature has deemed it prudent to add this ground, 
which makes it easier for the victims of discrimination to bring a claim to court. More 
importantly, legal professionals in the organisations are more familiar with court procedures 
and hence, have a good chance of obtaining a positive outcome.  
5.8.2 Weaknesses 
 Litigation for social change also has its own challenges. The first is that of prescription. The 
prescription period is three years and organisations will be prevented from bringing a claim of 
discrimination after this period has expired. Funding is the most important factor when it comes 
to litigation for a greater good. Strategic litigation and planning for litigation is costly and this 
may become a major challenge for organisations involved in public interest litigation.424 
However, some cases attract publicity and organisations will not be left completely helpless in 
the circumstances.425 This is because the media looks for interesting cases that will make 
headlines. In that way, donors also come on board considering publicity as a positive sign of 
that organisation’s progress and approval of a sound strategy, thus encouraging continued 
funding.426 In some cases of strategic litigation, funding determines the ability to collect 
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information and evidence as it is often difficult and costly to attain.427 Moreover, finding the 
right clients may be difficult at times for the NGO’s. Sometimes, clients may pull out of the 
litigation before it is finalised. Litigation in the public interest will go on regardless of the 
clients’ unwillingness to proceed, as the NGO will be representing the public in general.428    
5.8.3 Certification of a class action  
It is my submission that HIV positive women who have been sterilised without their informed 
consent may make use of a class action as a litigation strategy in order to obtain legal relief and 
this may benefit them immensely. In doing so, an action claiming discriminatory practice 
against HIV positive women in general may be brought and the requirements laid down in the 
judgment of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd429 must be 
complied with.   
For the purposes of this dissertation, the legal representative acting on behalf of the class must 
indicate that the class is identifiable by objective criteria.430  In our scenario, there will be no 
difficulty showing this as HIV positive women who have been forcibly or coercively sterilised 
between specific periods will form the class.   Additionally, the cause of action must raise a 
triable issue.431  In our case, the issue arising from the cause is the discriminatory practice of 
forced and coerced sterilisations by healthcare practitioners based on the women’s HIV 
positive status and a violation of their right to equality.  
A further requirement is that the desired relief depends on the adjudication of issues of law or 
fact or both, common to all members of the class.432  The infringement of the right to equality 
and discriminatory practice of forced and coerced sterilisation will be common to all women 
forming the class. The common facts will be that the women were pregnant and HIV positive 
when they were subjected to discriminatory treatment in healthcare facilities.   
Likewise, in the event where the relief sought is the payment of damages, the complainant must 
show to the court that there is an appropriate procedure for awarding damages to the members 
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of the class.433  In the current matter, the legal representatives will have to show the court that 
the personal circumstances of each HIV positive woman will determine the payment of 
compensation for pain and suffering because of the discriminatory treatment.  Additionally, 
future medical expenses and claims for loss of income must be easily quantified.  The court 
must be satisfied of the suitability of the nominated representative.434 It is this thesis’s 
submission that the court may deem it necessary and appropriate that an NGO specialising in 
human rights litigation, represent and assist the affected women with their litigation process. 
Lastly, the court makes an enquiry into whether a class action is the most appropriate route to 
deal with the claims of the members of the class.435 It is submitted that the court may allow for 
a class action in the current matter, as more women will be accommodated in one action.  
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Chapter Six 
 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The focal point of this thesis was to examine whether the judgment in LM and Others v 
Government of the Republic of Namibia closed the door on potential claims of discrimination 
by South African women living with HIV, alleging to have been coerced or forced into being 
sterilised because of their HIV status. This chapter concludes this thesis by assessing the 
possibility of either an individual or an NGO bringing a class action or a public interest action 
to the Equality Court on behalf of South African HIV positive women who have been sterilised 
without their informed consent. In summary, this chapter makes a number of findings, and 
conclusions that may be relevant when bringing an action to the Equality Court on behalf of 
HIV positive women in South Africa who have been sterilised without their informed consent. 
This thesis was undertaken because the judgment by the Namibian Supreme Court in the case 
of LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia failed to address this issue as an 
equality matter. In this case, there were two claims that the court was asked to pronounce on. 
The first was that of informed consent and the plaintiffs were successful in this regard. The 
second claim was for unfair discrimination based on their HIV status and this was dismissed 
by both the trial and appeal courts. In South Africa, Strode, Mthembu and Essack conducted a 
qualitative study documenting experiences of HIV positive women who had been sterilised 
without their informed consent. This study demonstrated that a number of HIV positive women 
perceived their sterilisations to be a violation of their sexual and reproductive rights and their 
right to equality. Although other studies have been conducted in the sub-Saharan region and 
around the world, the focus of this dissertation was to establish the effect the LM decision may 
have on potential discrimination complaints in South Africa considering our legal framework. 
The research questions investigated in this study were: 
(i) Is forced and/or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women a form of unfair 
discrimination in terms of both international and South African law?  
(ii) What are the evidential requirements for proving unfair discrimination through 
forced and coerced sterilisation of women based on their HIV status by means of a 
class action and public interest litigation in the South African Equality Court? 
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(iii) What lessons that can be learnt from the LM case, international jurisprudence and 
South African judgments on equality matters? 
In answering these questions, this thesis critically examined the relevant South Africa legal 
framework, focusing on the use of class actions and public interest litigation to bring claims of 
forced and coerced sterilisations of HIV positive women before the Equality Court. This thesis 
also referred in detail to the Namibian and Slovakian cases on sterilisation. Primary and 
secondary information sources were used in the undertaking of this study. 
The first chapter provided the background to the topic, including an overview of the issue of 
forced and coerced sterilisation, described the primary statutes, relevant legal instruments and 
set out the research questions and methodology of the study. The second chapter provided the 
South African constitutional perspective of the right to equality and the context in which this 
right has been interpreted by the courts. Further, the chapter set out the international and 
regional legal framework for addressing unfair discrimination. Chapter three discussed the 
Equality Act, the operational procedure of the Equality Courts and the powers conferred on the 
presiding officers of this court under the Act. It also discussed the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Act by the courts. Chapter four dealt with class actions and public interest 
litigation as a means to achieve access to justice by HIV positive women in South Africa. The 
previous chapter, Chapter five, provided a critical analysis of the decision in the LM case, the 
equality clause, the use of class actions and public interest litigation by NGO’s in the Equality 
Courts in the name of HIV positive women who have been subjected to forced and coerced 
sterilisations. 
6.2 The findings of this study 
It is submitted that the following findings can be made from this study: 
6.2.1 Forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women is a form of discrimination 
and, therefore, is a violation of their right to equality and it impacts on their dignity 
There are various forms of discrimination that PLWHIV face today. Stigma is associated with 
prejudice and a number of factors including poverty, gender based violence and indigenous 
norms and attitudes.1 
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In the South African context, women, especially black women, have often been subjected to 
discrimination because of their low social status in our community. A further layer of 
discrimination is faced by HIV positive women. Across the globe, HIV positive women have 
been sterilised for discriminatory reasons.2  
Two local studies conducted in South Africa show that HIV women have been the victims of 
forced and coerced sterilisations. Although there have been no further studies showing that the 
problem is still continuing, it is clear from the documented experiences of women that they 
have been subjected to discriminatory treatment in healthcare facilities in the past. Besides the 
studies there has been one matter settled out of court involving an HIV positive woman who 
was sterilised during a caesarean section.3 There have not been any other cases brought before 
our courts concerning this issue. It is submitted that the forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women constitutes unfair discrimination and it is of vital importance that courts find 
as such. A finding will clearly move this issue from being simply one of the system failing to 
obtain proper consent to one which focuses on the root cause of such actions which is 
discrimination against women with HIV. 
The literature shows that it is stigma and discrimination against PLWHIV that has a significant 
impact on them. It hinders the proper provision of healthcare services and hinders the 
management of the epidemic effectively. 
6.2.2 HIV positive women have the right to equality under South African law 
The South African Constitution contains a comprehensive BoRs that can be utilised to 
challenge and overturn discriminatory laws, policies and practices.4 The equality protection in 
the Bill of Rights is found in section 9, which comprehensively outlaws unfair discrimination. 
It does not list HIV as a ground of unfair discrimination but the Constitutional Court has 
recognised that discrimination against PLWHIV violates their dignity and is unlawful.  Women 
also have legal protection against unfair discrimination based on their HIV/AIDS status in 
terms of PEPUDA. 
                                                          
2 A Strode, S Mthembu & Z Essack. ‘“She made up a choice for me”22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of 
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6.2.3 Women living with HIV have the right to access to justice but in practice, the courts 
and the legal system are often out of the reach of the poor 
Generally, the Constitution establishes a right of access to justice for the enforcement of the 
rights provided for in the BoRs.5 Despite this constitutional provision, it is still a hurdle for 
poor people to access the South African justice system. Other factors that bar indigent people 
from accessing the courts include a lack of knowledge of their human rights resulting from 
illiteracy, the geographic location of the courts, procedural challenges and in some instances 
lengthy and delayed dispute resolution processes.6     
6.2.4 Legal redress for HIV positive women in the Equality Court 
It is submitted that any forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV in South 
Africa ought to be laid as a complaint in the Equality Court. From the studies conducted, it is 
apparent that HIV positive women require legal redress such as compensation for the 
sterilisation done for discriminatory reasons. The Equality Court is well-equipped to offer such 
redress to the affected women as they are specialised courts with the power to inquire into and 
resolve allegations of unfair discrimination on a range of grounds, including a person’s HIV or 
AIDS status. 
6.2.5 There are three different forms of complaints that could be made before the 
Equality Court 
Legal redress in the Equality Court for women living with HIV who have been sterilised 
without their informed consent and simply because of their status may be effected in three 
ways. First, any affected woman may bring an individual claim. Second, an action in the name 
of a class of HIV positive women may be brought before the Equality Court. Lastly, an NGO 
may bring a complaint in the public interest.  There is no substantial difference between these 
claims in the sense that depending on the circumstances, they all could be successful. 
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6.2.6 Although HIV positive women have rights and there is accessible legal redress 
available, there are still legal complexities in bringing a class action and public interest 
action in terms of PEPUDA 
It is submitted that forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV is a violation of 
human rights and must be treated as such by the courts. In many instances, where human rights 
have been violated, litigators turn to the courts in order to address the issue and obtain justice 
for the concerned victims. Litigation comes with its own set of complexities that may hinder 
access to justice for the affected individuals or groups.  
As stated previously in this particular chapter, illiteracy is one of the key challenges that prevent 
the instituting of legal action by the affected persons. Generally, in terms of the studies referred 
to in this thesis, women are often not well informed of their human rights and that sterilisations 
performed on them interfered with these rights. As a result of their ignorance, no legal action 
could be taken by them in the circumstances.  
Access to justice for HIV positive women comes with other difficulties resulting from societal 
stereotypes and discrimination against PLWHIV. The proceedings in the Equality Court are 
conducted in an ‘open court’. As a result, women may be fearful of coming forward to seek 
legal redress because of the judgmental treatment they get from medical facilities and from 
people around them. In the circumstance, the women’s privacy will be compromised as well.  
When bringing a complaint of discrimination, women bear the onus of proving a prima facie 
case of discrimination based on their HIV positive or AIDS status. As easy as this may sound, 
the gathering of evidence in order to prove discrimination may become problematic for these 
women because of the difficulties in accessing medical records. It is unlikely that there will be 
any physical evidence to corroborate claims of discrimination. The only fact that may be 
established is that the medical practitioners were aware of her HIV status. It is unlikely that 
notes of the discriminatory reason for the sterilisation would be recorded. This may prevent the 
institution of legal action against the wrongdoers. 
Internationally, regionally and nationally, no precedent has been set regarding a claim of 
discrimination. Even though cases in the Namibian and Slovakian jurisdictions have been 
brought to court, this does not put women living with HIV women who have been subjected to 
sterilisation without their informed consent and for a discriminatory reason, in any better 
position. The reluctance by the courts in finding that this practice violates women’s rights to 
equality and to be free from discrimination, further reduces the low status of women in our 
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society. The sterilisation of women is often seen in a patronising way to be in their best interests 
because they already have children, or should not leave orphans. This defeats the purpose of 
access to justice for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups and a further violation of 
human rights that our legal system deems to protect.  
Although the Equality Court is a specialised court, it is subject to the rules that apply in our 
civil courts. Prescription is a key challenge when one seeks to institute legal action. In our 
scenario, the claim of discrimination, which resulted in the forced or coerced sterilisation of a 
woman, must be brought within three years of the sterilisation. As discussed in this thesis, 
experiences of women in the studies conducted in South Africa show that some sterilisations 
were performed in a period more than three years before the women became aware of their 
rights. This leaves women with no relief even in the matters where there were prospects of 
success. 
6.2.7 There are advantages of instituting a class action and public interest litigation in the 
Equality Court 
The use of the Equality Court will increase access to justice as there are no costs associated 
with lodging a claim with the Equality Court. A class action or PIL can be used and the 
advantage of this approach is that the litigation will be linked to a broader advocacy strategy. 
Once women have received education on their rights, they may seek legal advice and the 
expertise of NGO personnel that will ensure success in the matter. This will help the affected 
women because NGO’s have the resources to fund litigation processes. 
The Equality Act has recently been amended to include HIV/AIDS status as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination. This is very helpful on the part of the complainant as the burden of 
proof shifts to the respondent to show that the discrimination is not unfair. This means that the 
conduct of the respondent is deemed to be discriminatory, unless proven otherwise.  
6.3 Conclusions  
Based on the above findings, this dissertation draws the following conclusions: 
6.3.1 Women living with HIV would have good prospects of success in the Equality Court. 
The only disadvantage of using the Equality Court is that the women are unlikely to receive 
sufficient damages to pay for the reversal of the sterilisation procedure. 
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 6.3.2 An Equality Court judgment in favour of a complainant(s) would significantly boost 
national and international advocacy on the issue of forced and coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women, as the focus will shift from the issue of informed consent to equality. 
 6.3.3 The LM case has made it difficult to bring a civil claim dealing with informed consent 
and equality as the equality part of this matter failed.   
6.3.4 However, the LM case has not closed the door on the claim of discrimination in 
jurisdictions such as South Africa, which has specific equality legislation. 
 6.3.5 Even though in the South African context we could have a successful case, the remaining 
key problem would be prescription as many of the cases of sterilisation in the two studies 
conducted took place before the full roll out of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) in 2006. 
6.4 Summary 
In conclusion, given that South Africa has specific equality legislation in place, which 
recognises that discrimination based on a person’s HIV or AIDS status is unlawful, there are 
good prospects of success if a HIV positive woman were to complain that she had been 
sterilised for a discriminatory reason. This would be a global first and it could help and support 
both advocacy and litigation to protect the rights of HIV positive women in other jurisdictions. 
It would be particularly important, as it would demonstrate that it is not simply a failing of the 
health system to obtain consent but a deliberate act to stop HIV positive women from having 
children because of their status. Naming this shameful act of sterilisation as a form of 
discrimination could also help litigation in other jurisdictions where women are sterilised for 
other discriminatory reasons such as their ethnic status, race or position in society. Although 
this litigation would take the global fight against HIV-related discrimination further, given the 
Equality Court’s limited set of civil remedies, it may appear to the affected women that they 
have not been given full redress, as it is unlikely that they would be awarded damages. In the 
Essack and Strode study, HIV positive women stated that they would want damages as many 
wanted the procedure reversed or they wanted assistance with conceiving in the future. 
Attempting to find a balance between the desires of the victims of this practice and the fight 
against discrimination will remain a complex one. 
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8. The Public Civil Action Act of 1985. 
9. Uniform Class Proceedings Act of 1996. 
10. US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1966. 
 rule 23. 
7.2.5 Conventions/Covenants 
1. ACHPR 
 Article 2 
 Article 3 
 Article 14(1) 
 Article 14(1)(a) 
 Article 14(1)(b) 
 Article 14(1)(c) 
 Article 14(1)(f)  
 Article 14(2)(a) 
 Article 14(2)(c) 
 Article 18(3) 
 Article 30 
2. American Convention on Human Rights. 
 Article 5  
3. CEDAW 
  Article 1 
  Article 2 
  Article 3 
  Article 12(1) 
  Article 16 
 Article 24 
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
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 Article 14 
5. ICCPR 
  Article 2(1) 
  Article 3 
  Article 26. 
6. ICERD 
7. ICESCR  
  Article 2(2)  
  Article 3 
8.  The Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) 
  Article  14 
  Article 14(1)(d) 
9. UDHR 
  Article 1 
  Article 2 
  Article 6 
  Article 7 
  Article 8 
